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Foreword: Neuroscience Versus Cultural System: Direction of Research for Cultural Psychology

The Taiwanese Psychological Association invited Prof. Shinobu Kitayama from the University of Michigan, USA, to give a keynote speech in its annual meeting held at Cheng-Kung University, Tainan, from September 15–16, 2016. Professor Kitayama is an old acquaintance of mine; we first met 20 years ago at Kyoto University in Japan when the Asian Association of Social Psychology held its bi-annual conference. Before that, he published a widely cited article on the *independent self* and *interdependent self* (Markus & Kitayama, 1991), and became one of the most famous Asian psychologists in the international community of psychology.

A Confrontation Between Two Approaches in Cultural Psychology

Professor Kitayama was invited by the Department of Psychology, National Taiwan University, to give a lecture on '*Research of Culture Neuroscience on Emotion: Achievement and Future Direction*' on September 18th, 2016. Subsequently, I made a 30-minute comment on his presentation entitled, '*Neuroscience or Cultural System: Direction of Research for Cultural Psychology*,' in which I mentioned his commentary on previous research related to individualism–collectivism published in a special issue of *Psychological Bulletin* (Kitayama, 2002). He had indicated that cross-cultural research on psychological process by any instrument of measurement should be interpreted from a system view of

culture. Unfortunately, Kitayama himself has since moved away from this approach. He and his colleagues have compiled a great deal of empirical data in the field of cross-cultural research on neuro-imaging with fMRI.

This is totally the wrong direction if we are to understand the subjectivity of East Asian cultures. This reductionist approach tries to capture the cultural differences by reducing them to some pan-cultural dimensions measured by either a paper-and-pencil instrument or fMRI. But the accumulation of fragmentary data cannot provide a whole picture of the cultural system (Hwang, 2015). I will begin my arguments with a brief review on the weakness of previous research on individualism–collectivism.

Positivist Research on Individualism and Collectivism

The most popular culture theory, which has been widely used for cross-cultural comparison is the research paradigm of individualism and collectivism. Hofstede (1980), a well-known Dutch organizational psychologist, was the first to conduct research on individualism–collectivism. When he was a director in the department of human resource management at IBM, Hofstede constructed a scale of 32 items to measure work goals or values. He administered this scale to equivalent and stratified samples of IBM staff in 40 countries, calculated means of their endorsement on 32 work values for samples from each country and created a correlation matrix amongst the 32 average nation-values. Four factors were thus obtained as a result of factor analysis: individualism, power distance, masculinity and uncertainty avoidance. Factor scores of the 40 countries were marked to show their positions on the map constituted by any two of these four dimensions, respectively.

His empirical mapping of the world's 40 major countries on these four cultural dimensions attracted great attention from the psychology community. Inspired by this work, in the following decades many psychologists began to conduct research on related topics. Indeed, a tremendous amount of research has been done on the dimension of individualism–collectivism. For example, an intensive review by Oyserman, Kemmelmeier, and Coon (2002) showed that psychologists had constructed at least 27 distinct scales for measuring individualism–collectivism (IND–COL) tendencies, and completed numerous empirical studies on related topics in the last two decades.

Most researchers engaging in this topic generally consider collectivism to be the opposite of individualism. They assumed that the social structure of Western societies shaped by Protestantism and the process of civic emancipation contributed to such psychological traits of individualism as individual freedom, right of choice, self-realization and so on (Triandis, 1995). In this way, countries or ethnic groups that inherited a Protestant tradition should demonstrate more individualistic characteristics than the traditional cultures of non-Western countries. Therefore, individualism is more prevalent in Western industrialized countries than in other countries, especially in contrast to the more traditional societies of developing countries. As such, the individualistic tendencies of European–Americans in the USA should be higher than other minority groups, and their tendencies for collectivism should be lower than that of other minority groups (Oyserman et al., 2002).

Philosophy of Anti-reductionism

Researchers in this field have mostly followed a research orientation of positivism. They adopted the method of trait approach to personality psychology, conceptualized individualism or collectivism as a kind of psychological syndrome, and constructed various scales to measure traits and to test their hypotheses. This approach represents typical research in Western psychology, which has been deliberately constructed on the presumption of individuality, reductionism, experiment-based empiricism, scientism, quantification/measurement, materialism, and objectivity so as to obtain homothetic laws (Marsella, 2009).

Some researchers have even attempted to formulate theories in support of this stance once they had accumulated a certain amount of empirical data. However, from the perspective of post-positivism, a theory is constructed by scientists through their creative imagination for explaining observed facts (Hempel, 1966), rather than induced from data accumulated via empirical research. In order to illustrate his philosophy of evolutionary epistemology, Popper (1972) proposed the metaphor of a bucket and a searchlight to explain the difference between these two approaches: the accumulation of empirical data might be viewed as pouring water into a bucket. It is impossible for any theory to emerge from it even the bucket is filling up with the water of empirical facts. He argued that a theory is something like a searchlight that has

been constructed by a scientist with his creative imagination. Once constructed, the searchlight might cast light on the future.

Pan-Cultural Dimensions

When researchers attempt to induce theory from findings of empirical studies on individualism–collectivism, they may encounter many difficulties—as do other positivists. For example, Triandis (1994), the first psychologist who attempted to produce such a theory, conceptualized individualism and collectivism as two independent dimensions that can exist simultaneously to varying degrees within an individual in different cultural contexts. By contrast, Hofstede (1980), who adopted an ecological factor analysis method for his study at a cultural level, conceptualized individualism (IND) and collectivism (COL) as two opposite poles of one dimension.

In order to emphasize the difference between the individual and cultural level, Triandis (1994) proposed a set of contrasts between idiocentrics and allocentrics as a way to indicate the concept of individualism–collectivism at the individual level. Triandis attempted to define these two sets of personality dispositions with various attributes. However, in his attempt to define these two sets of concepts at the theoretical level, several obvious weaknesses of the positivist approach were revealed.

First, when Triandis (1994) attempted to define allocentrics with a group of attributes, he often used the antithetical attributes of the idiocentrics to define the personality disposition. This method of theoretical construction, however, inevitably invites the question: is this a correct way to describe behavior in so-called collectivist cultures? Put another way, is it appropriate that psychologists studying individualism–collectivism have taken European–American psychological characteristics as a frame of reference for constructing their images of other cultural groups? European–Americans are situated at one end of the dimension with their cultural and psychological characteristics used as coordinates of reference for understanding other ethnic groups around the world. These other ethnic groups are situated at different locations along the dimension, suggesting that their cultural identities are so vague that their own psychological characteristics can be understood only if they are described in contrast to Americans.

Attributes of the Antithetical Other

For this reason, Fiske (2002) has criticized previous research on individualism–collectivism and indicated that individualism is the sum of cultural characteristics by which Americans define themselves, while collectivism is formalized to show characteristics of the antithetical other in accordance with the American ideological understanding that "[w]e are not that kind of person" (p. 84).

In other words, this trait approach represents a kind of Orientalism in psychology (Said, 1994); it attempts to understand non-Western cultures from the perspective of Western centrism. The traits approach for developing the individualism–collectivism scale—as adopted by Triandis (1994) to describe idiocentrics and allocentrics—used the methods of behavioral sampling to select representative items from constructing a scale. This approach attempts to use a 'catchall' way to represent various contents of cultural differences (Bond, 2002; Hofstede, 1994; Hui & Yee, 1994; Kagitcibasi, 1997; Rohner, 1984; Triandis, 1994). A careful examination of scales in terms of their components will show that their contents vary substantially. If this is the case, what are the adequate attributes for representing the personality dispositions of individualism–collectivism?

Earley and Gibson (1998, p. 291) pointed out that there are no parallels in the content measured by individualism and collectivism. Speaking rather bluntly, regarding to the highly varied operational definitions of individualism and collectivism, they deemed these scales to measure irrelevant underlying constructs. Oyserman et al. (2002, p. 28), analyzed the content of the 27 individualism–collectivism scales most widely used in cross-cultural studies and showed individualism to comprise seven components including independence, individual goal striving, competition, uniqueness, self-privacy, self-knowledge, and direct communication; while collectivism embodies eight components including relatedness, group-belonging, duty, harmony, seeking advice from others, contextualization, hierarchy, and preference for group work. The lack of parallels between components of individualism and collectivism suggests that it is inadequate to compare them directly.

A Yet-to-be-Developed Approach of Collectivism

An analysis by Oyserman et al. (2002) indicated that early understandings of individualism and collectivism represents two types of different behavioral categories. They indicated that there is considerable heterogeneity among conceptual definitions of collectivism and the contents of scales for measuring it. The cultural difference in this respect reflects its multifaceted nature in the way of connections between an individual and others. Following an intensive review of previous literature, they pointed out that:

> American and Western psychology are infused with an understanding of human nature on the basis of individualism, raising the question of our ability to separate our current way of understanding human nature based on individualism from a yet to be developed approach of collectivism (Oysermen et al., 2002, pp. 44–45).

After a similar review and re-analysis of the data in previous literature, Schimmack, Oishi, and Diener (2005) indicated that the conceptual definition of individualism is clear, that instruments for measuring it are significant, and that it is a valid and important dimension for measuring cultural differences. However, the definitions of collectivism are ambiguous and varied, and the validity of instruments for measuring it is undetermined. Therefore, they suggested that it is necessary for cross-cultural psychologists to re-evaluate the meaning of collectivism.

Philosophy of Science

Instead of locating cultures of the world along such pan-cultural dimensions as individualism and collectivism, the cultural system approach requests social scientists to capture the complexity of a given culture through the use of adequate paradigms of Western philosophy of science.

A comprehensive understanding on the dialectical relationships among various paradigms of Western philosophy of science is a necessary but not sufficient condition for constructing culture-inclusive theories of psychology. In order to help Chinese young scholars, understand the progress of Western philosophy of science, I spent more than ten years writing the book *Logics of Social Science* (Hwang, 2001/2013), which addresses different perspectives on crucial issues of ontology,

epistemology and methodology proposed by 18 noted Western philosophers in the twentieth century.

The first half of this book addressed to the switch in the philosophy of natural science from positivism to post-positivism. The second half expounds the philosophy of social science, including structuralism, hermeneutic and critical science. It is one of my eternal beliefs that in order to overcome the difficulties encountered in the work of theoretical construction, non-Western psychologists have to understand not only their own cultural tradition, but also the Western philosophy of science. Based on such a belief, since appointed as the principal investigator of the *Project in Search of Excellence for Research on Chinese Indigenous Psychology* at the beginning of 2000, I have constantly attempted to resolve the difficulties of constructing culture-inclusive theories in psychology by using various paradigms in Western philosophy of science.

Paradigms of the Mainstream Approach

Michael Bond is a pioneer psychologist who has opened up the field of Chinese psychology. He published the first English-language book on Chinese psychology (Bond, 1986), followed by two volumes of the *Handbook of Chinese Psychology* (Bond, 1996, 2010), which successfully brought the term 'Chinese psychology' to the attention of the international psychological community. The latest version of *Oxford Handbook of Chinese Psychology* (Bond, 2010), contains 41 chapters by 87 authors who intensively reviewed previous works on a variety of topics related to Chinese psychology.

Nonetheless, with a careful review of that book, Lee (2011) indicated that he: "was somewhat puzzled and bothered by the fact that the book does not have a clear structure." It is thus difficult for readers to quickly learn what is included in the book and to identify the chapter on a specific topic unless they go through the whole table of contents carefully. He remarked: "There is a general lack of theory in the whole handbook." The topic-oriented chapters have done a great job in reviewing and reporting extensively empirical findings in the field regarding the Chinese people. However, very few chapters offer indigenous theories of Chinese psychology. Most of them stay at the level of confirming/disconfirming Western findings, referring to well-know cultural dimensions such as collectivism and power distance to explain the variation found, despite the openly stated effort to push for indigenous research.

Moreover, most of the studies cited in the book simply "dichotomized their findings as Chinese vs. Western, failing to capture the much more refined complexity of the world." (pp. 271–272).

Soon after the publication of *Foundations of Chinese Psychology* (Hwang, 2012), the Committee for Promoting Indigenous Psychology invited ten well-established cultural and indigenous psychologists to attend the international conference, *The Construction of Culture-Inclusive Theories in Psychology*, sponsored by the Institute for Advanced Studies in Humanities and Social Sciences, National Taiwan University, Taiwan, from June 1–2, 2013.

Bond was invited to give an opening address at the conference, in which he reviewed his academic life. In his keynote speech, he also explicitly illustrated his approach to studying the psychology of Chinese people.

A Confrontation Between Two Approaches

This seminar witnessed a confrontation between the two approaches for studying indigenous psychology: the pan-cultural dimension approach vs. cultural system approach. Bond (2015) defended the pan-cultural dimension approach and argued that "we must develop measures of psychological constructs that are metrically equivalent across a host of cultural groups" in building models of interpersonal behavior. He also gave a list of well-known psychological constructs, including dimensions or domains of values (e.g., Bond, 1988; Schwartz, 1992, respectively), types of self-construal (e.g., Gudykunst et al., 1996), social axioms or beliefs about the world (Leung & Bond, 2004), motives such as distinctiveness (Becker et al., 2012), and dimensions of stereotyping used by individual perceivers (Cuddy et al., 2009).

That is a typical derived etic approach of reductionism that has been used frequently by mainstream psychologists. Bond (2015) indicated that some of these adduced constructs have a provenance outside of the mainstream and are indigenous in origin, but applicable pan-culturally. Such a macroscopic approach of cross-cultural psychology tries to allocate various cultural groups in the world along one or several *universal* dimensions that constitute the scientific microworlds or psychological space constructed by psychologists.

All those pan-cultural dimensions could be said to be kinds of 'culture-inclusive theories' in psychology. However, that approach

does not treat any concrete culture as a cultural system. In *Indigenous Psychology: Grounding Science in Culture, Why and How?*, Sundararajan (2015) strongly opposed such a dimensional approach for studying culture. She argued that such dichotomous dimensions as individualism vs. collectivism, or independent vs. interdependent self-construal, may perpetuate the long shadows of Orientalism in psychology. "The difference detected by the one dimensional measure may be a difference that makes no difference psychologically to the local culture" (p. 236). Therefore, she cited Fiske (2002, p. 87): "We [Western psychology] must transcend our ethnocentric framework and not just study how other cultures differ from the United States but explore what they are intrinsically," and advocated using the complex models of cultural or system approach to replace the dimensional approach.

A More Culturally Sensitive Future

Bond (2015) also acknowledged the importance of initiatives outside of the mainstream WEIRD nations in extending the disciplinary compass of Western psychology. In the concluding chapter of his 2010 handbook, 'Moving the Scientific Study of Chinese Psychology into Our Twenty-First Century: Some Ways Forward,' he quoted a paragraph from Arnett (2008):

> The role of indigenous theorizing, then, is to enlarge our repertoire of constructs and theories in describing and explaining the human condition using scientific best practice. Their ultimate function is to demonstrate how, "Within the four seas, all men are brothers". Non-mainstream cultural groups like the Chinese can enlarge our conceptual ambit, and ground psychology in the whole of human reality, not just their Western, usually American, versions (p. 713).

The concluding chapter of *Handbook of Chinese Organizational Behavior*, which he co-edited with Huang (Huang & Bond, 2012), was even entitled 'There is Nothing More American than Research on Chinese Organizational Behavior' for the sake of urging his Chinese colleagues "to be more culturally sensitive." In fact, the Chinese version of a famous Confucian saying, "learning without thinking leads to confusion; thinking without learning ends in peril," was engraved on the book's cover.

Neroscience or Cultural System

It seems to me that a more culturally sensitive future can be achieved by the cultural system approach, but not by a pan-cultural dimensional approach. Unfortunately, Kitayama and his colleagues have proceeded in direct opposition to the approach indicated in his earlier work. They have continued to compile a lot of data to show the cultural differences between European-Americans and Asian (particularly Japanese)-Americans by using not only various instruments for measuring attitudes, but also fMRI of neuroscience. When Kitayama was invited to give a one-hour keynote speech at the annual meeting of the Taiwan Psychological Association, he presented data from a series of cross-cultural studies on neuroscience and interpreted his findings in terms of the coevolution of genetic, cultural and ecological differences between cultural groups over 10,000 years. At the end of his presentation, I asked him: “Can we explain cultural change by your approach?” He shook his head and said, “No.”

The programme had allocated only five minutes for questions and answers, so the section ended with many questions that had not been discussed in detail. In accordance with regulations of the Ministry of Science and Technology, the invited scholar who visits Taiwan with financial support from MST has to make two speeches in public. Therefore, two days later. The Department of Psychology, NTU, invited Prof. Kitayama to give a lecture on the topic of ‘Research of Cultural Neuroscience on Emotion: Achievement and Future Direction.’ I deliberately asked the organizer to give me an opportunity for public dialogue with him, presenting with a title of my choice: “Neuroscience or Cultural System: The Direction of Research for Cultural Psychology.”

Gene–Culture Co-evolutionary Theory

In his presentation, Kitayama presented a series of cross-cultural research in order to show various aspects of cultural differences in neuro-imaging. He explained these differences with a hypothesis of the co-evolution of genes and culture over thousands of years in different ecological environments (Kitayama & Huff, 2015).

The gene–culture co-evolutionary theory conceptualizes the human mind and brain as a byproduct of two kinds of evolutionary forces: genetics and culture. Akin to biological traits, cultural traits are supposed to be adaptive to, evolve with, and have influence on the social and

physical environments under which genetic selection operates. Adaptive neural machinery may arise not only via pressures of natural selection but also cultural selection. Neural mechanisms that facilitate the successful storage and transmission of cultural values, practices and beliefs are also likely to endure over successive generations due to their adaptive function (Boyd & Richardson, 1985). After his presentation, I asked Kitayama: "many psychologists have accumulated a lot of data to show the cultural differences between different cultural groups by using instruments for measuring attitudes, but they don't know where the cultural difference comes from. Now you follow the mainstream of Western psychology to compile data to show cross-cultural differences of neuro-images and asked the same question: where the cultural differences come from? Do you have any way to verify or falsify your hypothesis about the co-evolution between gene and culture?"

"No," he said, somewhat embarrassed.

System View of Culture

I showed some major paragraphs from the conclusion of Kitayama's (2002) article published in the special issue of *Psychological Bulletin* entitled: *Culture and Basic Psychological Process: Toward a System View of Culture*, on the screen by PPT, read them and said, "Those arguments are very important. I used your paper as part of an assignment for my graduate students to support our approach of analyzing the Confucian cultural system."

Kitayama said with a smile, "It is a paper published long time ago, I forget it."

I said seriously, "You should not forget it." I showed a figure of three cultural zones on the screen, abridged from three waves of the World Values Survey on 65 countries carried out by Inglehart and Baker (2000). Their data indicated that a history of Protestant or Islamic or Confucian traditions gives rise to three cultural zones with distinctive value systems that persist after controlling for the effects of economic development. Societies differ according to the dimensions of traditional vs. secular-rational, and survival vs. self-expression values, while most societies (including Western) are moving towards secular-rational and self-expressive values (indicative of modernity and post-modernity) at rates that maintain differences between those three cultural zones. Therefore, they draw the conclusion: "We doubt that the forces of

modernization will produce a *homogenized world culture* in the foreseeable future" (p. 49).

I continued: "Now most theories of social science were constructed in the presumption of individualism. Confucian cultural tradition does not support the value of individualism, it advocates for relationalism. But, we have only scarce culture-inclusive theories of Confucianism in psychology … You are the most famous Asian psychologist in the world, it is really pity what you have not had led the East Asian academic community to follow the correct way as you indicated before."

Conclusion

I do not know Kitayama's feelings about this confrontation. However, I do expect that Taiwanese Psychological Association, Ministry of Science and Technology, and Ministry of Education will reflect on the implications of this confrontation. Contemporary philosophy of science is a product of Western civilization, familiarity with scientific philosophy may enhance one's ability of solving a scientific problem. From the perspective of post-positivism, a sincere scholar must identify the important problems to be resolved in his field and attempt to solve them with all his efforts (Hwang, 2013).

Unfortunately, most non-Western social scientists have only a fragmented understanding of Western philosophy of science. In order to publish SCI or SSCI papers in international journals, they tend to train graduate students from top universities to find 'hot' issues in international journals, to translate Western instruments of measurement into their own language, to follow Western paradigms of research, and to seek for possible outlets for their papers. Once their papers can be published in either domestic or international journals, all their deeds are legitimated. Students as authors can use their papers to apply for jobs, while professors as co-authors may utilize it for job promotions, fund applications, or award competitions. In contract to the research of problem-solving orientation, a professor who indulges in research of this type may publish a lot of 'junk papers' without paying any attention to the work of theoretical construction.

The arrival of fMRI in Taiwan has intensified publication-oriented research to an incredible degree. Many professors find that it is a very easy way to organize research 'gangs' to manufacture papers in the name of neuropsychology, neuro-economy, neuro-marketing, and so on. They

publish short articles with a small piece of data and a large group of authors, but they are able to utilize this kind of publication to acquire research funds from the Ministry of Science and Technology by squeezing financial resources from other fields.

Professional associations should assume the responsibility for indicating the direction of future development for its members. Unfortunately, the Taiwanese Psychological Association tends to invite keynote speakers from US universities to talk about their own research findings, which are supposed to be the 'normative practices' of mainstream psychology for the graduate students or young scholars to follow. Ultimately, the scientific community is indulged in the atmosphere of self-colonialism without much reflection given to seeking outlets to escape from the long-term negligence of their own culture.

I understand that this confrontational dialogue is unlikely to change either Kitayama's own approach of doing research, or the indulgence of The Taiwanese psychological community in abusing fMRI. However, I hope that this article may leave a record to enable the next generation to recognize the reason for academic decay over the two decades since the 1994 Educational Reform.

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CHAPTER 1

Introduction

Kuang-Hui Yeh and Louise Sundararajan

Asian indigenous psychology is a particular form of Asian psychology, marked by its commitment to indigenous psychology (IP). An introduction to Asian indigenous psychology, therefore, needs to start with an overview of IP. The late Jahoda (2016) claimed that IP is in demise due to its intrinsic weaknesses, most notable among which are diversity, lack of consensus, lack of identity and lack of scientific rigor. For a formal rebuttal of Jahoda (2016), the reader may consult Hwang (2016). For our purposes, we use Jahoda's (2016) critique as a key part of reaching a clearer vision of IP.

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What Is Indigenous Psychology (IP)?

Put it succinctly, IP is an *intellectual movement* across the globe to resist the *hegemony* of Western psychology in representations of the human mind, and in investigations of local mentality. This definition has the following implications:

Movement

One way to understand an intellectual movement is to think of it as a mighty river with many tributaries such as critical psychology (Teo, 2015), postcolonial psychology (Hook, 2012), and psychology of First Nations (Wilson, 2008), none of which, however, are recognized by Jahoda (2016) as disciplines relevant to IP. Another way is to conceive of IP as a verb, not a noun. As a verb, IP refers to a dynamic ongoing process that is bound to change over time, including "radical" shifts "in [the] meaning of 'IP'" (Jahoda, 2016, p. 178). As a process, all existing IPs are approximations to the visions of IP, rather than finished products. Of course, this is the way we judge any pursuit of ideals, including democracy. By contrast, Jahoda (2016) approaches IP as a noun—a static, finished product. This is characteristic of majority groups' approach to minority groups, which are considered as something lesser in being hence relatively less dynamic and open ended. To complicate matters, Jahoda (2016) follows one particularly problematic definition of IP (Kim & Berry, 1993), which he himself points out; when that version of IP leads Jahoda down a dead-end street, he declares IP to be infeasible.

Intellectual

The intellectual attributes of IP have the following implications:

- To the extent that cultures are memes (Lindenfors, 2017), which are—like epidemics—not bound by national or geographical boundaries, IP and nationality are not synonymous terms. Mistakenly looking for IP along geographical and national divides, Jahoda (2016) found only one full-fledged IP of a particular country—Filipino psychology (Enriquez, 1993). This reinforced his suspicion as to whether IP really exists.

- As an intellectual enterprise, IPs can be unified through science. Put another way, science is the language through which IPs communicate with one another and with other disciplines. By science, we mean scientific inquiry, which is the guiding principle across modern disciplines ranging from psychology, anthropology and sociology, to the humanities. This notion of science deviates from Jahoda's (2016) narrow definition of science in terms of experimental and quantitative approaches. For IP, a broader definition of science that embraces many disciplines beyond psychology is necessary, since culture is a complex phenomenon, the understanding of which requires insights from multiple disciplines.
- As to the question of intellectual identity, Jahoda (2016) complains of the lack of identity in IP, as evidenced by its overlap with cross cultural psychology in topics and methods. We believe that intellectual independence is necessary and possible, regardless of the overlap with other sub-fields of psychology. We also believe that it is the research goal, not the research topic or method, that sets IP apart from mainstream psychology. As a research programme (Allwood, 2011), the goal of IP is to investigate and understand local cultural phenomena without reducing them to variables of behavior or of the brain. IP can certainly use scientific findings on behavior or the brain to shed light on a particular cultural phenomenon, but it does not reduce the latter to the former. In this sense IP is complementary to but different from many sub-fields in mainstream psychology, including cross-cultural psychology.

The Intellectual Makeup of IP

The training of IP consists of two major components: importing theory and method from the West; and drawing on traditional resources from the local culture (literature, history, philosophy, etc.) in hypothesis testing and theory construction.

This intellectual hybridity of IP is problematic to Jahoda (2016). He sees a dilemma on multiple grounds. First of all, according to Kim and Berry (1993), IP has to do with the study of behavior that is **not** transported from other regions. This definition of IP casts a jaundiced glance at anything imported from the West. Secondly, it sounds like treason for the IP researchers to be trained in Western science, but to then refuse to accept its hegemony. Jahoda (2016) calls this a dilemma: "The

dilemma was that of wanting IPs to share the prestige of science, while at the same time displaying a reluctance to be shackled by the demands of rigor; it tended to result in more flexible re-definition of 'science'" (p. 177). However, both redefinition of science and rejection of its received wisdom are fine examples of critical thinking, which is an intrinsic component of science. Unfortunately, Jahoda (2016) considers exercises of critical thinking as exemplified by critical psychology to be outside the scope of IP.

Measuring the Success of IP

As Intellectual Tools

Contrary to his portrayal of IP as being on the decline, Jahoda (2016) concludes: "So it appears that both 'IP' and indigenization have come to serve as intellectual tools in a much broader context than that originally envisaged" (p. 178). To the extent that, as Vygotsky points out, language is one of the most important tools for thinking, we may pause to ponder the fact that, "What the IP movement has successfully done is put the phrase 'IP' on the linguistic map, and it is now quite widely used" (Jahoda, 2016, p. 178). A new vocabulary opens up a new horizon of meaning making. That is why "The search for IPs inspired a considerable number of interesting and valuable empirical studies" (Jahoda, 2016, pp. 177–178).

Global Psychology

IPs have been interested in global psychology ever since the beginning. Various blueprints have been drawn and rightly judged to be inadequate by Jahoda (2016). The fact of the matter is that global psychology is an emerging phenomenon that no one, neither mainstream psychology nor IP, can fully predict. But one thing seems clear, namely that resistance against the hegemony of Western psychology is necessary in order to keep the possibilities open for a more equitable global psychology (De Vos, 2012; Sundararajan, 2014). It is this insight and insistence of IP that secures it a place at the forefront of debates on the new internationalization of the human sciences and psychology. By going beyond Western psychology in researching the ontological,

epistemological, ethical, and spiritual dimensions of the mental life around the globe, IP plays an increasingly important role in shaping the psychology of tomorrow. That is why in the recent issues of psychology's flagship journal, *American Psychologist*, IP features in a series of articles that are concerned with the future of psychology (e.g., Blanco, Blanco, & Díaz, 2016; Christopher, Wendt, Marecek, & Goodman, 2014; Teo, 2015).

Literature

One of the reasons behind Jahoda's (2016) pessimism about IP is attributable to ignorance. He does not seem to be aware of the far-reaching impact of the IP literature. For instance, works of the El Salvador psychologist Martín-Baró (1989) recently inspired Blanco et al. (2016) to challenge the DSM model of psychological trauma. Promotion of scholarly work in IP can definitely benefit the rest of psychology. It is for this reason that this volume is being published by the world's first book series on IP: *Palgrave Studies in Indigenous Psychology* (http://www.palgrave.com/us/series/15445). This volume on Asian indigenous psychology seeks to promote research on Asian indigenous concepts, theories and related empirical findings to shed light on the distinct ways that Asians view culture, mind and psychological phenomena against the backdrop of a global context.

IP in the Global Context

Globalization—defined as "a transplanetary process involving increasing liquidity and growing multi-directional flows of people, places, products, and information"—is a powerful force that has shaken established structures and social relations and at the same time provides new opportunities and challenges. If globalization is a potential force that levels everything down to a homogenous mélange, one consequence of this universalizing trend is the counter-movement of diversity, joined by a growing number of psychologists who recognize that all psychologies, including Western psychology, are 'indigenous' to the cultures in which they arise and are sustained (Marsella, 2013). Globalization is indeed an exciting time of competing claims about culture and the mind. How will Asian indigenous psychologists respond to the challenges and opportunities of globalization?

As Asia's economy, especially that of China and India, is becoming the focus of worldwide attention, psychological research on Asians is gaining importance at the international stage. Showcasing Asian indigenous psychologies and their major theoretical and practice issues, this edited volume has the potential to make significant contributions to the field. Potential contributions consist of asking important questions about the discipline, profession and practice of psychology; exploring knowledge production outside the framework of Western psychology; constructing theories to shed light on mind and behaviour from an Asian perspective; going beyond Western psychology in researching the ontological, epistemological, ethical and spiritual dimensions of the mental life; shedding light on the dialectics of the universal and the particular in psychology; and exploring possibilities for a more equitable global psychology.

Purpose and Scope of This Volume

To the extent that diversity is endemic to IP, this volume does not intend to *represent* 'the field' so much as to *present*—to showcase—the potentials and emerging possibilities of Asian IP. Celebrating diversity, rather than lamenting its lack of consensus like Jahoda (2016), we need to get the metaphor right about the 'field': The field of IP is not a fixed space that can be mapped (represented) with precision so much as a dynamic, ongoing movement. Incompleteness in coverage is therefore to be expected. Indeed, many scholars in Asia publish in their native languages, thereby rendering their work inaccessible to the international community. Consequently, only Asian psychologists who publish in English were considered for this volume. As we know that contributions in Asian IP are not evenly distributed. What seems to be over-represented—the Chinese and Indian contributions—in fact under-represent the extant scholarship, in light of the many well-qualified Chinese and Indian researchers that we have overlooked. There are two regrettable omissions: experts on Filipino psychology (Rogelia Pe-Pua) and Korean psychology (Uichol Kim) were invited, but due to their busy schedules could not accommodate our submission deadlines.

This volume consists of three sections.

Part I: New Visions of Asian Indigenous Psychology in the Global Context

No longer confined to applied psychology tailored for the local use of non-Western populations, Asian IP has expanded its intellectual horizon to address issues in the field from a broader perspective. Recently, some IP researchers have further claimed that IP is not just for the discovery of scientific truth regarding multiple ways of life, but also about making a paradigm shift in social science and psychology (e.g., Sundararajan & Raina, 2015). These ideas find eloquent expressions in the subsequent three chapters of Part I.

In Chapter 2, Bhatia and Priya take issue with the definitions of culture within indigenous and cross-cultural psychology, pointing out that culture and nation are not synonymous, and that migration and globalization are creating indigenous hybridities where several ongoing cultural voices become part of an individual identity formation. Thus, culture has to move from being an object of scientific study to a space in which indigenous struggles about land, people, myths, and collective and individual identity come to the surface. The postcolonial, modern, ancient, urban, colonial and traditional form complex layers of contemporary hybrid indigenous identities. By providing an internal and external critique of mainstream indigenous psychology, and by showing how a politically constituted IP is narrative- and voice-based, Bhatia and Priya also suggest that the communication or sharing that psychological research entails has the primary goal of providing space to people's different voices that could address social justice and social problems rather than figuring out the "objective truth." In summary, they advocate that the basic tenets of IP may focus on fostering different voices instead of representing distinctive cultures.

In Chapter 3, Gergen et al. also challenge two common assumptions of the meaning of 'culture,' *bounded entities* and *temporal endurance,* and argued that all cultures are both hybrids and in continuous transformation. This chapter first proposed that the view of cultures as identifiable entities must be replaced with a view of culture as a continuously unfolding process. With this new perspective, Chapter 3 offers four case studies of this process in China, Taiwan, Japan and India, respectively. These case studies demonstrate how social scientists themselves have entered into the process of cultural change. In attempts to carry out their scientific projects, these social scientists participated in their culture

as transformative agents. They concluded with suggestions on how the study of culture, indigenous and otherwise, might be redirected. In their formulation of culture, IP researchers are invited to foster the process of hybridization in the continuous transformation of culture, and to celebrate the resulting enrichment in human life, rather than simply representing traditions as given.

In Chapter 4, Paranjpe contrasts mainstream Western science and Indian Yoga to demonstrate that the ontological, epistemological and ethical foundations in the Western and Indian IP's are totally opposite; for example, the outward gaze of science vs. the inward look of Yoga; the primacy of the physical domain vs. the primacy of consciousness; the focus on control of environmental factors vs. the focus on self-control; the reliance on third person statements vs. first person statements, and so on. Nevertheless, neither of the two psychological perspectives needs to be seen as exclusive to their cultures of origin. Indeed, neither is irrelevant in the other's land of origin. These systems are not 'emic' systems designed to suit the specific conditions pertaining to the cultures of their origin. Rather, they are systems of potential universal relevance: universal in the sense of being appropriate for persons with specific needs no matter what part of the world they may belong to. Paranjpe further points out the benefits offered by both are complementary, providing opportunities to develop a broader and richer psychology in the global context. Varied indigenous systems of psychology have developed in long traditions in a way that effectively meets the differing needs of different types of people.

Part II: Current Scholarships in Asian Indigenous Psychologies, with Special Focus on Contributions to Theory Construction and Methodological Innovations

Most of the contributors of this section use culture-inclusive concepts or methodologies to formulate their own theories. As authors of well-established indigenous theories or methodologies, the contributors in this section demonstrate how they have expanded or improved the counterpart concepts, theories or methodologies in mainstream Western psychology, and also suggest possible applications and future directions for their indigenous theories and methods.

In Chapter 5, Chiu, Shi and Kwan propose a theory of "normology" to replace "personology" as an explanatory framework for individual judgement and behavior, and ongoing interaction with others. Their theory expands Western psychology in two important ways. First, they introduced polycultural psychology as a framework to overcome intellectual centrism in IPs (including both Asian and Western psychologies). Second, they introduced Asian psychology-inspired normology as a more holistic understanding of human behaviours in context to complement the personality-centered, de-contextualized Western psychology. They also presented two stories to highlight the global relevance of Asian indigenous psychology. One story highlights the cultural blind spots of psychological knowledge, providing the motivation for developing culture-inclusive theories. Another story illustrates the conditions that must be met for Asian psychologies to make intellectual contributions toward the advancement of psychological science. Lastly, they have identified three conditions for future research directions in order for Asian IPs to play an important role in global psychology. First of all, the emphasis should be shifted from culture as independent, historically stable entities to cultures in the making; second, cultural influence on behaviours should be recognized as partial, plural, dynamic, intermittent, and situated; third, foreign cultural ideas and practices should be embraced as intellectual resources for expanding the boundaries of cultural precepts.

In Chapter 6, Lin, Cheng and Chou use "paternalistic leadership" (PL), a Chinese indigenous concept, to develop their triangular model of PL theory, which comprises three dimensions of leadership: authoritarianism, benevolence, and moral character. In the non-Western majority world, PL is perceived as a common mode of leadership and has benefits to business organizations (Jackson, 2016). However, due to negative interpretations (paternalism remains linguistically and conceptually gendered and freedom-expropriating) by Western leadership researchers, PL has long been ignored. Most MBA students across many countries learn a great deal about Western mainstream leadership (such as transformational leadership), even though they are not sure whether this knowledge will be useful to their countries' business organizations. On the other hand, they have scarce knowledge of the PL that does have benefits to their business organizations. Thus, recently, Jackson (2016) concluded that "clearly there is still much scope, and a need, to further study and refine our knowledge of paternalistic leadership within the mainstream of leadership studies, and to incorporate into cross-cultural management

studies a consideration of organization life in the context of the majority world" (p. 7).

It is therefore timely that Lin et al. document how their PL theory has been fruitfully applied to Chinese business organizational behaviours, and cross-cultural comparisons on leadership styles. They also reviewed how PL is perceived through different cultural lenses. Employees in high power distance and collectivistic cultures tend to endorse PL, whereas employees in egalitarian and individualistic cultures tend to criticize it. Lin et al. report findings that employees who consider transformational behavior as ideal would also consider paternalistic behaviours as ideal, regardless of the cultural context. Leadership schemas underlying these prototypes seemed to be endorsed "universally," consistent with previous research (cf. House, Hanges, Javidan, Dorfman, & Gupta, 2004). Lastly, to deepen PL theory and increase its robustness, rigor and applicability, Lin et al. suggest three important future research directions: deepening an insider's perspective on PL; clarifying the stigma and misunderstanding concerning authoritarian leadership; and advocating a full-cycle approach (Chatman & Flynn, 2005) in conducting PL research.

Research in creativity has long neglected the contributions of non-Western cultures (Sundararajan & Raina, 2015), especially the connection between spirituality and creativity. One of the contributing factors for this not-so-benign neglect is the tendency for science to shy away from anything that smacks of mysticism. This vacuum in the psychology of creativity is filled in Chapter Seven, in which Bhawuk presents his spirituality-based theory of creativity, and argues persuasively that spirituality is the foundation of all creativity. By expounding the Indian concept of *Atman*, a self that transcends both the social and psychological constructs of the self, Bhawuk takes us on a journey deep into the intellectual, spiritual, experiential and mystical heartland that Western psychology dares not tread. Along the way, he shows us how his spirituality-based theory of creativity is able to synthesize both material and spiritual domains, and has much to contribute in our understanding of creativity and well-being. He backs up these claims with erudite scholarship and incisive critique of the extant theories of creativity in mainstream psychology.

In Chapter 8, Ohashi and Yamaguchi use their theory of "superordinary bias" to explain the Japanese tendency to overestimate the likelihood of experiencing common events and underestimate the likelihood of experiencing rare events. However, they do not think that it means

positive self-esteem is not important for Japanese and Asians. Rather, they argue that the Japanese seek positive self-esteem in a different way. They suggest that people are concerned with maximizing their positive outcome and minimizing their negative outcome in social interactions. In Japan, it is safer to show modesty and to hide one's high self-esteem when a harmonious relationship is important. Being ordinary would be satisfactory in such a situation. On the other hand, when Japanese people feel safe to self-enhance—as in a family setting—they would do so, because they can feel better with asserting their superiority, like North Americans. The authors further asked "Is super-ordinary bias unique to the Japanese?" They found that the US sample also showed a super-ordinary bias in self-predictions but to a significantly lesser extent than the Japanese sample. They conclude that research and discovery of the universality of the super-ordinary bias would not have been possible without a jump start from the Japanese indigenous perspective.

In Chapter 9, Tsao and Yeh introduce the dual filial piety model (DFPM) (Yeh & Bedford, 2003), an indigenous theory of parent–child relationship based on Chinese family culture, to re-conceptualize filial piety (Xiao) as a culturally sensitive basic psychological schema rather than a cultural-specific norm. According to the DFPM, filial piety can be seen as a double-contextualized personality construct that develops both within the parent–child relationship context (the most enduring and important interpersonal context in one's life, which is basic to the evolution of the human species) and within the Chinese cultural context (well-known for its special emphasis on parent–child dyads as the basic social unit). Based on this theoretical position, the DPFM proposes two fundamental aspects of filial piety, reciprocal and authoritarian, corresponding to the inherently dual structure—horizontal and vertical—of the parent–child relationship that guides individuals' interaction with their parents. Compared with other concepts regarding parent–child interaction in Western psychology, including attachment (focusing on young children and affective bonding), perceived parental authority (focusing on adolescent and the vertical relationship structure), intergenerational ambivalence (focusing on relationship quality), intergenerational solidarity/filial obligation (focusing on adult children's support to parents), the dual filial aspects not only represent the core schemas of interaction with parents across situations and life course but also provide more comprehensive explanations to diverse intergenerational issues. The new application and future research direction of the DFPM is addressed

in Chapter 9, with particular focus on its potential for investigating the issues of elder care, cross-cultural/national comparison of filial beliefs or behaviors, and multicultural counseling.

Part III: A Showcase of the Next Generation of Scholars Developing Novel Applications for Culture-Inclusive Concepts, Topics and Empirical Research in Asian Societies

The contributors in this part of the book showcase the interflow among current culture-inclusive concepts and empirical research in Asian societies. The studies reported here have the potential to expand or improve the concepts or research methods of mainstream psychology, with implications for applications and future directions of Asian IPs.

In Chapter 10, Bedford uses 'guanxi,' a Chinese indigenous concept, to broaden the construct of interpersonal trust in the workplace. Although many studies of guanxi have mentioned trust, few have explicitly explored the role of trust in relation to guanxi in the Chinese workplace. Often guanxi and trust are examined in the context of other variables while assuming an underlying relationship between the two, but there is no consensus as to what that relationship is. Bedford first compared the components of guanxi with the components of workplace trust in the prevailing Western model to identify four cultural differences in the meaning of affective bonds: expectations for the boundaries, content, length and moral norms of the relationship. She then constructed an integrated dynamic model of guanxi and trust to reflect indigenous Chinese values such as mianzi (face), xinyong (credibility), and renqing (favour). Using this dynamic model, she proposes future directions in cross-cultural research. For example, guanxi determines the course of relational exchange in Chinese societies, influencing the ways in which people make decisions about resource allocation. By contrast, in Western cultures, the basis of relational exchange is trust. The difference in emphasis results in distinctive styles of trust-building and variation in expectations for trust-building activities that have implications for communication and for the development of work-related relationships in a cross-cultural context.

In Chapter 11, Ting, Zhang and Huang use an interdisciplinary approach to study the cultural and religious differences in suffering and resilience between two ethnic minorities (Bimo Yi and Christians Yi) in southwestern China. Their explanatory framework is based on the ecological rationality theory (Sundararajan, 2015; Todd, Gigerenzer, & The ABC Research Group, 2012), which posits that cognitive styles shape and are shaped by different types of adaptations in response to the varying demands of the ecological niche. In particular, they report on an empirical study that applied Sundararajan's (2015) theory of strong vs. weak ties as ecological niches to explain the difference in suffering experiences, emotional expressions and resilience between the two Yi religious communities. The authors argue that their study contributes to indigenous psychology by challenging stereotypes that prevail in mainstream thinking. For instance, they point out that imperialism is not the monopoly of the West—the majority of Han Chinese have also been hegemonic toward the ethnic minorities in their midst. Through their efforts in challenging the biases and stereotypes in mainstream thinking, the authors are demonstrating that their culture-sensitive approach stems from an ethical imperative—justice for all—which they believe is the foundation for a truly global psychology of tomorrow.

In Chapter 12, Ko, Cheng, Bleech, Fox and Hooker conducted two empirical studies to examine how intergenerational contextual resources may promote optimal self-views of aging and well-being in Taiwan. The first study showed that aging parents are willing to lower their expectations to accommodate changes in filial piety beliefs in the society; they also emphasized taking physical care of themselves to reduce burden for their children. The second study, based on Taiwan Social Change Survey 2011 data from 654 older adults, found that the different functions of authoritarian and reciprocal filial piety consistently related to worse or better self-reported health and life satisfaction, respectively, and that older adults adjusted expectations for intergenerational connections to better maintain psychological well-being. In contrast to Western psychology that generally considers self-views from an individualistic point of view, older adults in Taiwan, and probably in other Asian cultures as well, factor in their families as an integral part of their self-views of aging, suggesting a multidimensional perspective on self-views of aging. The authors suggest incorporating Asian psychological concepts of self and filial piety to complement Western theories of views of aging.

In the concluding chapter, Louise Sundararajan highlights the distinctive contributions of Asian IP, as evidenced by this volume, to a viable global psychology, with special focus on two questions: why do we need Asian IP when we already have Asian psychology; and what difference does that make to global psychology? Using GPS as acronym for both 'global positioning system' and 'good psychological science,' Sundararajan coins the term GPS-based global psychology, and claims that a good psychological science has to track the social/historical and epistemological underpinnings of all psychologies, including Western and non-western psychology. For GPS to function, it is essential that all psychologies see themselves as one specific local mentality within the global community of psychology. However, the GPS for psychology is not based in outer space so much as in self-reflexive consciousness. As she points out, IP is not simply application of psychology for local use, but more primarily an intellectual movement around the globe—a movement sustained by critical thinking and self-reflections of what psychology is about for the local as well as for the global community. It paves the way for a more equitable global psychology of tomorrow. In the concluding section, Sundararajan presents the results of the Delphi Poll recently conducted by the Indigenous Psychology Task Force to answer the question about how Asian IP relates to the larger context of IP. The Delphi Poll results revealed both continuity and new developments in the field. This is a robust rebuttal to Jahoda's claim that IP is dead.

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PART I

New Visions of Asian Indigenous Psychology in the Global Context

CHAPTER 2

From Representing Culture to Fostering ‘Voice’: Toward a Critical Indigenous Psychology

Sunil Bhatia and Kumar Ravi Priya

Introduction

Terms such indigenous psychology (IP), indigenous identity, indigenous community, or indigenous worlds have different meanings and values. For some, indigenous worlds implies being subjected to centuries of colonization and oppression of group of people; for others it implies a cultural psychology that means recovering specific myths, rituals and stories and a way of life that was erased due to conquest and colonization; and for some others it is developing a worldview that is compatible with scientific principles. In ‘third world’ or developing nations, indigenization has often referred to taking Western psychological tests (e.g., personality or motivational tests), and customizing them for the local populations.

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In this chapter, we bring a critical perspective in: (1) examining how culture is defined within indigenous and cross-cultural psychology; (2) articulating an internal and external critique of indigenous psychology; and (3) analyzing how the cultural discourses and narratives of people could be central in creating an IP that is based on reciprocity and addressing social justice and social problems.

Indigenous Psychology and the Scientific Universalism of Cross-Cultural Psychology

Cross-cultural psychology (CCP) and scientific psychology have provided the foundation for the growth of IP in North America and in other parts of the world. A brief history of CCP shows how it made 'culture' a central focus of its investigation and attempted to provide insights into how people and natives from other cultures and countries made sense of their practices, history and customs (see Bhatia, 2002). Cross-cultural psychologists have embraced psychology as a science and from that vantage point defined culture primarily as a variable. For example, cross-cultural psychologists, Segall, Lonner, and Berry (1998, p. 1102) define culture as "comprising a set of independent or contextual variables affecting various aspects of individual behavior." Furthermore, the universalist assumptions about culture are based on the idea that there are "basic characteristics common to all members of the species (i.e., constituting a set of psychological given) and that culture influences the development and display of them (i.e., culture plays different variations on these underlying themes called 'variform universals')" (Segall et al., 1998, p. 1104).

CCP's characterization that culture can be treated interchangeably as an independent or a dependent variable is based on the assumption that culture and "psychological operations" are completely separated from each other. Such a distinction is based on the notion that the self has some 'natural' properties that are already assumed to be there even prior to culture (Holland, Lachicotte, Skinner, & Cain, 1998).

The self in CCP is seen as similar to the heart or the liver in the body—its properties are as natural and invariant as the organs of the human body. For example, Berry and his colleagues do suggest that factors such as the political and economic conditions of immigrants or a group's "society of origin" play an important role in the acculturation of groups and individuals. However, these social and historical factors are,

at best, referred to as a "broad class of variables" that are different from psychological-individual level variables (Berry & Sam, 1997).

An important strand of IP, as articulated by Uichol Kim, Kuo-Shu Yang, and Kwang-Kuo Hwang (2006), has also adopted a scientific framework to develop the principles of an IP. These authors propose a grand theory of IP that operates within a scientific framework that is also seen as simultaneously compatible with the humanities, philosophy, social sciences, and qualitative and quantitative psychology. The edifice of this project rests on one of the most salient beliefs that IP uses the principles of science to question "the universality of existing psychological theories and attempts to discover psychological universals in social, cultural and ecological context" (Kim et al., 2006, p. 3).

Sundararajan (2015) describes IP as a "psychological inquiry that subsists in the gap between the canonical terms of mainstream psychology and a phenomenal world that has its point of reference a Mecca that falls outside the pale of the epistemological universe of Western psychology" (p. vii). In summary, one of IP's main targets of criticism is American psychology or Euro–American psychology owing to its purported affinities with natural science, objectivity, linear causality and ethnocentric thinking. Yet, in their edited book, Kim et al. (2006) write that the aim of IP is to adopt the universalism of science. For example, Kim and Park (2006) position IP as a field that "represents the transactional model of science in which agency, meaning, intentions, beliefs, and goals are incorporated into research design … The goal is to create a more vigorous, systematic and universal science that can be theoretically and empirically verified" (p. 43). The emphasis on looking for psychological universals within varied socio-cultural contexts as a defining feature of IP gives rise to some inherent theoretical contradictions, such as reducing culture to a cross-cultural variable.

We believe that the epistemological theories and presuppositions about science, psychological universals, and culture often get blurred in this vision of IP and it forces us to ask the following questions: How do you create an indigenous psychology that interrogates the universality of existing mainstream psychological theory, but yet believes that it has to map out psychological universals present in different cultural contexts? How do you create an empirically verifiable, universal science without reducing culture to the status of an independent variable? How does IP, which is supposed to act as counterforce to the dominant and colonizing perspective of Euro–American psychological science, offer a psychology

that is based the voices of the marginalized or invisible populations. We characterize and define some of the key ways in which culture as a crucial phenomenon for understanding identity, religious systems, and practices is incorporated in cross-cultural psychology and IP.

Culture as Equal to Nation

One assumption that key cross-cultural and indigenous theories make about culture lies in equating culture with the geographic space of the nation (for a discussion of this point, see Bhatia & Ram, 2001; Herman & Kempen, 1998). Thus the nation-states such as India, England or Germany are described as static, monolithic, homogenous, "cultural" entities that seem to be bound by their geographic space. Hermans and Kempen (1998), for example, state that culture and acculturation in American psychology is typically characterized as a process in which individual migrants make a journey from culture "A" to culture "B" by following a linear trajectory. Similarly, Gudykunst and Kim (1997), both of whom have played a pivotal role in the developing very influential models of acculturation research, state that usually boundaries between cultures coincide with boundaries between countries. Thus, an *apolitical* conception of culture as equal to nation overlooks the various ways in which flows of commodities, capital, people and ideas move from one location to another and alters the context of both local and global cultures.

Culture as Providing Homogeneity and Temporal Stability

Jaan Valsiner (2007) argues that culture in much of psychology is described as a static entity that has implicit properties. This definition of culture simultaneously indicates the "commonality of such belonging (the descriptive or classificatory role of the use of the term), and some, usually unspecified, causal system that guarantees the relative similarity of all the persons who 'belong to' the given culture …" (Valsiner, 2007, p. 20). The assumption is that every person who "belongs to" a given culture shares similar qualities and traits with all other member of that culture. Psychologists do account for inter-individual differences between members of a given society, wherein some members share stronger cultural characteristics (e.g., patriotism) than others, but the

general assumption is that all members who belong to a given culture share a similar cultural background.

Furthermore, in this model, it is also assumed that the cultural attributes or implied properties remain stable and constant over time and the historical, social and generational shifts that have the potential to disrupt stable cultural norms are usually overlooked or not explained. Thus, events such as 9/11, the French Revolution or the genocides of Pol Pot's Cambodia are "not assumed to dramatically modify the cultures involved" (Valsiner, 2007, p. 22).

Culture as an Overgeneralizing Label

Psychology makes claims about comparative differences in cultural groups by relying on the strategy of transforming qualitative homogenous descriptions of groups and societies into causal essences (Valsiner, 2007). For example, Indians are said to derive their 'Indianness' from India in a similar way that 'maleness' is understood as causing the difference in males compared with females. Similarly, the difference in females compared with males is explained as being caused by their 'femaleness.' By labeling members of a group as having identical essences, "it is possible for cross-cultural psychology to think in terms of random sampling from the pool of culture members in an effort to let the sample data represent the abstraction called population" (Valsiner, 2007, p. 24). The category of 'population sample' acts as an overarching representation of all the members that are present in a given culture and the underlying assumption is that if the sample data is an accurate representation of the population then it also can be a complete representation of the culture of the population that is being studied. This epistemological assumption then allows the psychologist who use the concept of 'culture' in their studies to create specific empirical designs and permits them to make generalized claims about cultural differences between populations. This form of tautological thinking is deeply embedded in the psychological investigations of group-based differences. Valsiner explains (2007):

> Empirically discovered differences in cross-cultural psychology cannot be explained within the theoretical system of cross-cultural psychology, except in tautological terms. For example, the '*Italian-ness*' of Italian subjects can be recruited to explain their behavior, in contrast to the '*American-ness*' of the American subjects. The constructions of such explanations is

> circular—Italians are found to be 'Italian' because they are from Italy; and Americans to be 'American' because they are from America (or from the United States). (emphasis in original, p. 25)

The idea that "population equals culture" is quite pervasive in cross-cultural psychology and IP and furthermore it acts an over generalizable label and obscures the complex interactional context in which process of socialization occurs. Scholars have argued (Bhatia, 2007; Bhatia & Ram, 2009; Hermans & Kempen, 1998) that in a period of increasing globalization, the rapid creation of multinationals, massive flows of transmigration, and border crossings, the concept of culture and cultural difference become increasingly complicated.

Threats to Bounded and Reified Notions of Culture

Diaspora Theory and Identity

We live in an age where transnational immigration, border crossings and global media are proliferating at an increasing rate. Discussions about the self—which are further intensified by issues of gender, class, sexuality, ethnicity and nationality—challenge the grand narratives of the bounded Cartesian self (Bhatia, 2007). How does globalization, modernization and the concomitant flows of capital, goods, people, finance, images and ideas unsettle and reshape homogenous, reified and bounded notions of culture, community and self?

According to van der Veer (1992, p. 1) in the early 1990s about 8 million South Asian, 22 million Chinese, 11 million Jews, 300 million people of African descent and 350 million Europeans were living as migrant populations. Contemporary global movements and globalization impulses (variously motivated) force us to abandon such seamless conceptions of similarities and differences between national cultures in favor of hybridized, diaspora-ized, and heterogeneous notions of culture (Hall, 1993, p. 356). In other words, 'culture,' however we wish to understand it, cannot be understood as contained and circumscribed by national boundaries.

In contrast to these psychological models of acculturation discussed above, the notion of 'diasporas' has become increasingly utilized to understand immigrant experiences and in the last decade there has emerged a distinct area referred to as 'diaspora studies' (for a review, see

Tölöyan 1996). The term 'diaspora' emphasizes the ongoing negotiations that many immigrants undertake at multiple levels with their host culture and their native homeland (Hall, 1991). Race has always played a key role in US state-sponsored immigration, naturalization and citizenship laws (Lopez, 1996; Mohanty, 1991). Moreover, given the existence of racial prejudice in American and European society, non-European/non-white immigrants have been more likely to face exclusion and discrimination compared with their European counterparts. Subsequently, through personal and collective remembering, tales of discrimination, hardships and sheer exploitation are kept alive in most non-European, non-white immigrant communities. Such narratives have played a large part in constructing and maintaining what are known as diasporas.

Diasporas distinctly attempt to maintain (real and/or imagined) connections and commitments to their homeland *and* recognize themselves and act as a collective community. In other words, people who simply live outside their ancestral homeland cannot automatically be considered diasporas (Tölöyan, 1996). Tölöyan attributes the expanding usage of this term in part to the acceleration of immigration to the industrialized worlds; to the lack of assimilation of many immigrant groups; to institutional links with the homeland; to sustained work by many immigrant groups to create and maintain their own religious institutions, language schools, community centres, newspapers, radio stations; and to the American university itself where many diasporan elites have converged to forge theoretical sites to address immigrant identity and transnational locations.

Diasporas are usually formed when the immigrant community in question does not find its culture represented in the mainstream host culture and when immigrants experience the absence, erasure (e.g., through intentional efforts to promote assimilation into the host's mainstream culture) and silencing of their culture by members of and practices within the host culture. A contested notion of culture raises the following questions: When indigenous psychological studies about India, China, Korea, and Poland are mentioned, which India China, Korea, and Poland are we talking about? For example, there is a huge Indian diaspora population that lives in North America and they have strong ties to India that are both real and imaginary. Would this population be considered indigenous to India or America or both? Diaspora and hybridity theory of self provides a crucial counter example to the bounded,

depoliticized, and apolitical notions of culture and self in cross-cultural psychology and IP.

Social, Colonial and Historical Frames

Psychologists who are sensitive about problems and issues their societies are facing often tend to consider ways in which the prevailing cultural and socio-political context could shape human experiences and worldviews in vital ways. As seen earlier, cultural psychology (CP), CCP and IP are some of the apparently relevant sub-disciplines that one may turn to in order to study human experiences in relation to the context or conditions in which human beings live their lives. As seen earlier, IP emerged primarily as a response to the colonizing nature of mainstream psychology; some of the early research that is recorded in literature initiated in the Philippines in 1960s and 1970s (Enriquez, 1977, 1993; Paredes-Canilao & Babaran-Diaz, 2013). During this period, two parallel developments—one social and political the other academic—gained momentum.

As Sampson (1993) highlighted, the 1960s was marked by social movements, including those voiced by African–Americans, feminists, people from third world countries, and gays and lesbians, who pushed for space for their identities in mainstream American society. Although apparently these were *social* movements, their genesis was intricately linked with the attempts psychologists were making to render the discipline purely 'scientific.' According to Sampson, one of the salient forces instrumental in maintaining the status quo (and therefore denying space for experiences and identity to the members of these groups) was the ethnocentrism implicit and inherent in the mainstream psychological theorizing of this period, which claimed to follow a value-neutral and universalistic approach to science.

Another development of the 1960s was the impact of the classic, *The Structure of Scientific Revolution* (Kuhn, 1962, 1969) in addition to the works by critical social scientists on the meanings of science and scientific progress. Within social science, these works transformed the singular meaning of science (which was hitherto taken as value-neutral, methodocentric and universal law-based) into new meanings that openly accepted the use of theoretical perspectives in scientific inquiries, multiple methodologies giving space to the research participant's experiences or worldview in research interactions, and the analysis of data that did justice to

the issues and priorities of people (participating in the research) rather than focusing exclusively on the universalistic cause-and-effect relationship to create scientific laws. Such an impact is also described as a paradigm shift in social science from positivism towards social constructionism, the critical theory paradigm and the participatory inquiry paradigm (Guba & Lincoln, 2005).

From the above two developments coinciding with the era of the emergence of IP, it seems amply clear that it was ethnocentrism (inherent in inquiry within and progress of psychological 'science') in the guise of the claims of value-neutrality and the use of universalistic constructs that led to the social movements of 1960s along with the turn toward resurrecting IPs. It is, however, paradoxical that the fundamental goal of IP is "to create a more rigorous, systematic, and universal science that can be theoretically and empirically verified" with the intermediary step being developing indigenous *psychologies* by "examining knowledge, skills, and beliefs people have about themselves and how they function in their familial, social, cultural, and ecological context" (Kim et al., 2006, p. 4). Rather than developing psychological knowledge utilizing new paradigms, IP fell prey to the exclusive focus on developing value-free and universal laws with a mere lip-service to sensitivity towards the *contexts* of human experience. Perhaps the boundaries of psychology as a discipline were bound by the positivist paradigm of science at this time. The training of psychologists in the domain of IP by cross-cultural psychologists also did not help to realize the paradigm shift in psychological science since any cultural concept that could not be digitized using psychometrics was taught to be despised, in fact, to be taken as dangerous for the growth of the discipline (Kim et al., 2006; Wallner & Jandl, 2006).

Colonialism was a problem due to the derogatory identities it enforced on the natives (besides facing the atrocities of the alien rule). Let us spare some thought for the glaring issues of today: racism, classism, sexism, internal displacement, problems of being a refugee, or everyday violence and wars due to prejudice and indifference. Have the problems arising out of the process of exclusion or enforcing oppressive identities on the 'other' stopped after the development of the 'contextual' or 'culture-sensitive' universal science of IP? Or, has it solved the problems just in the mind of indigenous psychologists because they have been working towards a *omnipotent universalistic* science of IP? Has IP rather contributed to the scientific category-driven exclusion of the populace? What would have happened if IP had been founded in today's

world of psychology that is open to multidisciplinary approaches, social justice perspectives and multiple paradigms?

IP for whom and for what? This question begs an answer as the criticism from the adherents of IP and CCP in addition to the critical psychologists who adhere to the new paradigms of psychological science has been mounting. A social justice-based IP was envisaged in Brazil as a departure from the mainstream psychology, through attempts to provide space to the marginalized voices (see Freire, 1970). Before we discuss in a subsequent section how new paradigms of psychological science could aid IP in its attempts to address issues of exclusion or denial of voice, let us explore in detail the criticisms posed to IP from external paradigms.

What Went Wrong with Indigenous Psychology: Criticisms from the Outside

The paradigm shift in social science in the 1960s made social scientists realize how an uncritical use of the positivist paradigm could be perilous since it contributed to the process of gender and racial exclusion, in some cases seeing the invisible populations as a 'deficient' or 'malicious' *other*. Besides such criticisms of being a divisive force, IP as a positivist science has also been criticized for forcing its ill-suited ontology and epistemology on the study of human experiences and social processes when other more suitable paradigms are available for these ends. Both these major criticisms of IP emanating from the scholars of social constructionist and critical theory paradigms bring to the fore serious limitations of IP that are presented below as (1) positivism and the status quo, (2) absence of reflexivity, (3) cultural processes as 'outliers,' and (4) restrictive ontology and epistemology.

Positivist Indigenous Psychology and the Status Quo

Kim and Berry (1993a) and Kim et al. (2006) posited that in the pursuit of a universal IP, the indigenous concepts of various cultures need to be examined and put through the cross-indigenous process (whether the constructs about a psychological phenomenon—say, 'well-being'—converge into a finalized construct that may be generalizable across all cultures). These authors also maintain that for the pursuit of value-neutral and universal IP, constructs from no single culture should be

taken as superior to another. However, as Bhatia (2002, 2018) and Gergen (1994) have illustrated, if the basic goal of psychological science is to achieve reified universal categories, these categories are prone to uncritical use in academic as well as social worlds since the categories represent 'reified realities.' These may often be misused knowingly or unknowingly by the power-seeking person (or group/section of the society) in order to initiate or maintain social hierarchies or aid the process of exclusion. Gergen (1994) provides an example of such exclusion prevalent in the use of universal diagnostic categories, "Although they attempt to occupy a position of scientific neutrality, it has been recognized that the helping professions are premised on certain assumptions about cultural good.... In this context, then, we find that terms of mental deficit operate as evaluative devices, demarking the position of individuals along culturally implicit axes of good and bad" (p. 149).

Being aware of and a readiness to address such a serious limitation of the uncritical development and use of reified categories might help IP achieve its erstwhile goal of creating space for the unheard voices. However, creating or having such awareness does not seem to fit in the current academic pursuits of most of the indigenous psychologists. This issue is discussed in the following section.

Absence of Reflexivity

By reflexivity, Guba and Lincoln (2005) mean "that we interrogate each of our selves regarding the ways in which research efforts are shaped and staged around the binaries, contradictions, and paradoxes that form our own lives" (p. 210). Reflexivity may potentially help researchers to become more open, creative and flexible in incorporating meaningful use of diverse paradigms. However, as practiced in positivist science, IP eschews any kind of reflexivity in the pursuit of 'objectivity' or value-neutrality for developing a universal science. Gergen (1997) aptly summarizes the dangers of being non-reflexive about knowledge creation in positivist psychology, and such a non-reflexive stance in IP may create similar problems:

> Whether a primitive society or a scientific subculture, we develop working languages for carrying out our collective lives. For the constructionist, however, there are significant dangers inherent in the solidification ('objectification') of any given way of constructing the world. Univocal

> agreements occlude possibilities for self-reflexive appraisals. To reflect critically on one's pursuits, using the very rationalities that legitimate these pursuits, one can scarcely do other than rationalize the status quo. More importantly, those who do not share the premises are rendered 'other,' often dismissed, disparaged, or denigrated. (p. 122)

Cultural Processes as 'Outliers'

As described in the cross-indigenous approach of IP, only those indigenous processes or concepts are accorded scientific status that pass the litmus test of "representing realities across cultures." As Kim and Berry (1993a) asserted"

> One of the goals of the indigenous psychologies approach is the discovery of universal facts, principles, and laws. It does not, however, assume a priori the existence of psychological universals. *If they exist*, they need to be theoretically and empirically *verified*. (p. 4, emphasis added)

The non-generalizable and messy political and cultural phenomena lose scientific significance and are rendered 'outliers' in the game of universal science. Let us consider the ramifications of producing such outliers or 'excluded other' in the words of Jesse Jackson (2000):

> A shepherd called in his sheep in the evening; 99 came but 1 did not. He was worried about it, wanted to go look for it. But some argued that "You can't save everyone," and the 99 sheep said, "What about us? We came when called." As they argued about whether he should go find the lost sheep, the sun went down. … Maybe the one who stayed behind had an auditory problem; maybe it stepped on glass and was bleeding; maybe it was kicked by a bigger sheep, or was lost, or in distress, or had been abused. … You, as good psychologists, as teachers, bring your light to dark places. Help us find all lost sheep, and leave no one behind. (p. 330)

The call by Jackson to make psychology more inclusive of the *voices*, *perspectives* and *identities* that are often neglected due to psychologists' being uncritical of their own science has been contributing to the sense of inequality and inequity in the human world (see Bhatia, 2018; Sampson, 1993). However, such an uncritical approach, despite defying scientific temper, remains being used largely unabated in IP.

Restrictive Ontology and Epistemology

In addressing the research questions about the challenging circumstances (e.g., structurally induced discrimination and oppression) people may face at times, realist ontology not only turns out to be highly restrictive in studying the dynamic socio-political processes shaping their realities, but such an apolitical stance on research may often silence the voice of people. Deliberating on the need for psychology to embrace issues of social justice fully, Mays (2000) re-apprised psychologists at the beginning of the twenty-first century about the divisive and oppressive forces that continue to shape the people's adversities. She emphasized:

> [I]f psychology is to show society the path to greater equality among its members, psychologists must demonstrate that psychology's methods and procedures can embrace diversity. … [S]ocial scientists [should] understand that the behaviors they seek to study, modify, and eliminate are related to gaps resulting from poverty, inequality and inequity… These behaviors are inextricably linked to wealth, economics, education, governmental policies, and even the professional policies of psychology. (p. 326)

If IP, in the pursuit of universal science, keeps forcing such subtle and dynamic political processes such as poverty, inequality and inequity into reified categories and quantified variables, it actually amounts to 'scientifically' *invalidating the very forces that are instrumental in maintaining the status quo*, besides silencing people's suffering. In the often-cited books on IP edited by Kim and Berry (1993b), Kim et al. (2006), one does find studies that claim to incorporate "political context," but again in the ultimate search for universal categories and cultural predictability, insights about social inequalities, displacement, migration and people's experiences of leaving home, experiencing injustice and oppression remain just on the periphery of concerns.

What Went Wrong with Indigenous Psychology: Criticisms from Within

CCP is closely connected with IP since both are concerned with incorporating the impact of culture on human experience and behavior using different ways of indigenization of constructs. As Jahoda (2016) noted in the literature on IP, some consider IP as complementary to CCP, or

a sub-branch of CCP. Many indigenous psychologists were trained by cross-cultural psychologists. The key critique of IP as articulated by CCP, therefore, may be considered criticism from within.

While the criticisms from without or the outside forces is focussed on IP's *obsession* with positivist science, the ones with from within are related to its *inability to become* such a science. These may be defined as being (1) in the shadow of CCP, (2) unfounded allegations on colonialism, or (3) use of religio-cultural concepts being unscientific.

In the Shadow of Cross-Cultural Psychology

As mentioned earlier, IP and CCP share an overlapping nature of concepts (particularly the ones that would be relevant across cultures) and goals (indigenization or at least considering culture to be relevant in studying human experience or behaviour). However, it is IP that is often taken to be wanting in terms of its scientific progress. One such criticism is whether or not IP has become a unified and universal science like CCP. Jahoda (2016) described this state of flux regarding IP's scientific status as a serious limitation:

> [I]f innovative indigenous concepts and methods are regarded as sufficient to characterise an IP, then Sikolohiayng Pilipino [Filipino psychology] is one; if on the other hand one requires the presence of a theoretical system, then it fails. (p. 176)

Similarly, Jahoda also points out that unlike CCP where the universal concepts are not difficult to locate, indigenous constructs based on universality are "unworkable" (p. 177). For example, he points to the following anomaly in such a process:

> Berry and Kim (1993, p. 279) suggest a kind of ANOVA approach, with psychological sub-fields on the Y-axis and IPs on the X-axis and a two-way integration resulting in a global psychology located at the bottom right. Yet, what the entries in the cells should be remains obscure. (p. 179)

Clearly, in the efforts to make IP a universal science, the conceptual and statistical approaches mentioned above achieve no more than further obscuring the process of getting close to the realities and the myriad lives of the local/global population.

Unfounded Understanding of Colonialism and Decolonization

IP developed as a resistance to the detrimental impact of colonialization, but it also emerged as a discipline to understand how colonization shaped one's thinking and behavior (Enriquez, 1993; Ho, 1998). Jahoda (2016), however, argues that IP's reaction and resistance to the use of Western psychology in the non-Western world is emotional rather than rational:

> [S]uch an attitude is understandable, it is emotionally rather than rationally based. If western psychology was suitable for Asia, there would be no reason for jettisoning it just for the sake of having one's own IP. (p. 170)

Such a criticism of IP, however, seems out of place particularly when literature in critical psychology presents numerous examples of the silent (in the guise of objective and scientific research) colonialization of the mind (Sampson, 1993). Bhatia (2018), for example, shows how the de-colonization process is not just about reclaiming indigenous identity, but it is about reclaiming history, land, language, knowledge and sovereignty. The larger project of decolonization involves claiming history, giving indigenous testimonies, making space for storytelling and oral histories as valid knowledge, celebrating survival, engaging in collective remembrances for healing and transformation, indigenizing the world views and images of settler communities, intervening through action research, revitalizing indigenous languages and arts, offering critical rereading of Western history, "researching back," writing and theory making, renaming the lost world of the indigenous people, negotiating self-determination and sovereignty, and so on (Smith, 2012). Decolonizing involves understanding the present situation of colonialism and its devastating consequences in settler communities and requires what Richards (2014) calls "epistemological decolonization" (p. 14). This means showing how marginalizing particular ways of knowing, thinking and researching is rooted in both epistemic and material inequalities. She further elaborates on this concept:

> Colonialism rests on the notion that colonizing settlers are the 'knowers' and the indigenous that which is to be known. And it is colonial knowledge on which the dominant system comes to be built—so European/Northern knowledge about everything from how to set up a state and legal system to property ownership, the relationship between humans

> and the environment, religion, language, cultural practices, education, and healthcare are privileged as correct and legitimate ways of knowing, while indigenous knowledge in these same is marginalized, annihilated, or viewed as suspect and subjective. This epistemic aspect of the ongoing colonial relationship justifies dispossession to this day. (Richards, 2014, p. 145)

Jahoda reinforces orientalistic tropes when he dismisses the impact of colonization in Asian societies and dismisses the resistance to Western psychology as emotional and irrational.

Use of Religio-Cultural Concepts as Unscientific

Jahoda (2016) again hits out at IP for the fact that there is no clear definition or procedure for attaining knowledge in this domain. His problem is that such redefinition treats human science in an "elastic" manner, once again diluting the scientific status of IP (p. 173). Both IP and its critics would be better off by situating the debate in relation to the available critical paradigms of social science in order to realize their potential in pursuing meaningful context-relevant research and address the concerns and priorities of people.

Jahoda argues that the use of traditional or religious concepts that appear to have their parallel in psychological concepts or knowledge are not found to be suitable for exploring human experience since these are either not measurable across cultures or no tool has been developed to test their generalizability across cultures. Therefore, knowledge systems such as Buddhist psychology, Hindu psychology or Sufi psychology are not found to be suitable for exploring human experience in contemporary world as these fail to live up to 'scientific' standards (Jahoda, 2016; Kim et al., 2006).

Alternative Paradigms: Creating Space for the Voice and Priorities of People

Positivist paradigm takes us some distance (albeit with its serious limitations). Through the use of new paradigms of social science inquiry, new horizons can open up to address the goals of providing space for the voices and experiences of the marginalized. Some elaboration on the new

paradigms is provided below before we present illustrative examples of research that could be construed as critical IP.

New Paradigm: What Is It?

A paradigm of social science is structured by the answers it provides to the ontological (assumptions about the nature of reality being studied), epistemological (the nature of relationship between the knower or the researcher and the knowable or the participant), methodological (the ways of attaining knowledge) and axiological (the purpose the research and its findings may serve to the participants) questions (Guba & Lincoln, 2005; Lincoln, Lynham, & Guba, 2011). In the last two decades literature reveals considerable overlap among constructivist, critical theory and participatory inquiry paradigms.

Dalal and Priya (2015), situating their understanding on the work of Gergen (2009), Guba and Lincoln (2005), Sampson (1993), have noted that the ontological position taken up by the constructivist paradigm is that "the nature of reality is taken to be socially constructed … with a scope of multiple interpretations … shedding light into its multiple facets." The ontological position of the critical theory paradigm is understood as reality shaped within a socio-historical context where cultural, political and gender-related dynamics pivotally shape the worldview or experiences of people. Similarly, the ontological position of participatory inquiry paradigm is to assume reality as "cultural and contextual" (p. 8). Dalal and Priya also observed greater similarities among these paradigms as far as their epistemological, methodological and axiological standpoint go. On the epistemological grounds, there is a common concern for a dialogical or empathic relationship between the researcher and the participant (see Bhatia, 2007).

Methodology in these paradigms has a focus on enabling joint constructions of meanings between the researcher and the researched by creating space for the participants to voice their concerns and lived experiences. The axiological concerns in these paradigms are to facilitate empowerment or emancipation from forces that deny participants their voice. For Lincoln (1995), such new paradigms may be characterized by:

> three new commitments: first, to new and emergent relations with respondents; second, to a set of stances—professional, personal, and political—toward the uses of inquiry and toward its ability to foster action;

> and finally, to a vision of research that enables and promotes social justice, community, diversity, civic discourse, and caring. (pp. 277–278)

New paradigms, thus, are very much in line with the very goals of giving voice and explaining the agency of the marginalized population, which is also consonant with IP's original goals in 1970s. It is, however, important to note that these new paradigms do not subscribe to the conception of 'culture' as merely a set of shared beliefs or meanings. Rather, these paradigms posit culture as a process where the shared meanings are shaped and re-shaped within the hierarchies or the socio-political and historical forces represented in the works of Hermans and Kempen (1998), Bhatia and Ram (2002), Bhatia (2007, 2015, 2018) and Priya (2012).

We believe that the new vistas of IP need to be shaped by such new theoretical or conceptual matrices provided by new critical paradigms that are in synchrony with a more problematized conception of culture. As an illustration of such research in recent times, we present below three studies conducted among: (1) a community affected by political violence in India, (2) mothers distressed by the 'neoliberal discourse' from urban slums in South Africa, and (3) Indian diaspora grappling with their transnational identity. We begin with retracing the experiences of communities who have been afflicted with the socio-political hierarchies in South Africa and India that have implicitly but pivotally shaped their experiences.

Reconstructing Voices Silenced by Socio-Political Forces

Kruger and Lourens (2016), in their study of the relationship between poverty and suffering, noted how gender roles and the neoliberal discourses created in mothers of low income families of South Africa a feeling of being 'deficient.' The images of being an efficient or an ideal mother are related to the socio-cultural as well as the academic discourses mothers are socialized into but such discourses place the individual responsibility of care of child primarily on the mother. As the authors observed, the internalized notions of being a mother was to be an "all-providing, ever-giving, self-sacrificing mother, an ideal that the women could not live up to" (p. 137). The participants narrated the

experience of guilt as well as the feeling of being a deficient person as they took the entire burden of caring and providing food for the children on themselves. One such participant shared:

> [Slowly moves her head in thought] Yes. Like… I, I… The whole *situation*, the whole problem I take on *me*. (.hhhh) Because I think if things were perhaps *different,* if I perhaps could work and all the things then… Then we wouldn't have stayed in *such* a place, then it would not have been so hard for my children and they would not be hungry…
>
> So I blame myself… Most of the time I blame *myself* for my circumstances, my *situation* and that makes it difficult for me…
>
> (.hhh) It makes me feel *very*-very inferior. It makes me […] feel as if I am a zero. I… A zero, I don't exist… A zero… I am a nothing, yes. This makes me feel very-very inferior. And if I sometimes sit still and think, I don't perhaps have what my two sisters have, or so. And […] I have the tendency to say: I *am* a nothing, because I don't *have* anything in life [tears starting to show and voice trembling]. That is how it feels to me right now [wipes her eyes with a tissue]. (p. 132)

If the study conducted in South Africa brings to the fore the silent distress of poverty-stricken mothers induced by the socio-political and relational dynamics of neoliberal discourse, the study by Priya (2015) in the villages of Nandigram, India, highlights how in the name of 'development,' the longstanding interpersonal and community bonds are severed by the state government.

The study undertaken in Sonachura village of Nandigram block in West Bengal State highlights how the state government wanted to construct a chemical hub under the lauded scheme of creating Special Economic Zone (SEZ), despite the resistance from the local villagers. Priya (2015) observes how the villagers were driven out of their homes, with not only brutal killings and torture for not falling in line with the wishes of the government, but also damage caused to the bond villagers shared among themselves since pre-independent India. He conducted a semi-structured interview with Shekhar, a 45-year-old farmer. Shekhar was carrying a serious injury after he faced the bullets from the cadre of the ruling political party and the police during a protest villagers were holding against land acquisition by the state government on 10 November 2007. He had numbness in his right leg after he was operated

on for the bullet injury incurred neared his waist. He had tears in his eyes as he narrated the experience of nearly dying due to the gun shot. He, however, was not concerned about his personal injury and losses. He mentioned his deep shock over the fact that the assailant was from his own village and who shared an environment of trust and togetherness. Besides this shock, there was a sense of insecurity and danger for life since their 'own' people had betrayed them for petty political gains. He shared:

> The man who shot at me, has fled to Gujarat with his entire family… The villagers, in general, have peace of mind but, they still fear that the villagers affiliated to CPM party may attack them once again.

Besides a sense of betrayal by the fellow villagers, he also expressed a sense of distress associated with being betrayed by the very government that apparently stood for villagers concerns over and above the industrialization of the state:

> Our way of life is entirely different from urban people in that we are entirely dependent on agriculture. While planning the 'chemical hub,' the government cared little about our agriculture-based life. (Priya, 2015, pp. 437–438)

These two studies amply display the socio-political processes shaping the interpersonal, social and cultural worlds of people in a drastic way unless their voices are heard not only by the government and social activists but also the social scientists and researchers of IP who claim to focus on the context of everyday experience. It is important to keep their experience of struggle alive in the academic and public discourses (for that could be the beginning of some healing for them; Priya, 2010, 2012) rather than allowing them disappear in the objective category-driven positivist IP or mainstream psychology.

Voices from the Indian Diaspora: An Illustration of Transnational Hybridity

If Priya's study focused on the displacement of local villagers as enabled by the government and the corporation's business interests, Bhatia's ethnographic study (2007, 2015, 2018) examines another type of

displacement that is created by migration. He draws on narrative and critical psychology (critical theory paradigm) in addressing racial exclusion and contested notions of citizenship based on the study of diaspora immigrants living in the USA.

There are approximately 1.7 million Indians who live in various diasporic communities across the USA. According to the 2000 US census, the Indian–American community is one of the fastest growing immigrant communities in the USA. From 1990 to 2000, there was a 106% increase in the growth rate of Indian–Americans, compared with the average 7% growth rate in the general population. This shift marks the largest growth in the Asian–American community (Bhatia, 2007). By all accounts, the immigration reform of 1965 is considered to be the most significant and profoundly influential reform in the history of Indian immigration. The 1965 Immigrant Act fundamentally changed the perception of the background of the Indian migrants in the USA. Within a very short span of time, Indian migrants in the USA made the transition from being "pariahs to elite" (Rangaswamy, 2000, p. 40).

Unlike the first wave of the Punjabi Sikh diaspora, the second wave of Indian migrants are highly skilled professionals. They are trained as medical doctors, engineers, scientists, university professors and doctoral and postdoctoral students in mostly science-related disciplines, such as chemistry, biochemistry, math, physics, biology and medicine. Prashad (2000, p. 75) writes that between 1966 and 1977, 83% of Indians who migrated to the USA were highly skilled professionals comprised of about "20,000 scientists with Ph.Ds, 40,000 engineers, and 25,000 doctors." These professional Indians have made their 'home' in suburban diasporas in towns and cities all across America.

Despite achieving tremendous economic success in the USA, the professionals from the Indian diaspora experience varying levels of racism and discrimination in their workplace and their suburban communities. The skin colour, *bindi*, sari, food, gods and goddesses and "thick accents" of the professional Indians become the main vehicles through which much of the racism is directed towards various members of the Indian diaspora by their suburban neighbours and co-workers. For example, Deepali, a biochemist, struggles to find play dates for her daughter, Karishma, because her daughter is seen as different by her suburban neighbours. Venkat, a top-level executive at the local computer company, talks about many painful occasions when both his children asked him why they were brown and different from white children. Neelam,

a university professor, talks about how her daughter's *bindi* was ripped off by a six-year-old boy on the first day of school. How do these professional, elite, transnational migrants understand their racial designation as non-white people or people of colour?

The majority of Indian participants documented in his book, *American Karma: Race, Culture and Identity in the Indian Diaspora* (Bhatia, 2007), faced varying levels of racism and discrimination, but were largely unwilling to frame themselves in terms of having a racial identity. On the surface, it would appear that these professional Indians have 'made it' in America and ultimately are integrated within the larger society. Their stories of racism and prejudice, however, force them to reposition their identities as the cultural 'other,' as they carve out an isolated space for themselves in the suburban diaspora. These different voices represent the multiple, shifting and often conflicting cultural positions in the diaspora. Venkat, a 42-year old Indian immigrant, began his interview by telling me that he had accomplished a lot of his goals during his life. He had a doctoral degree in management and is a director of the eastern region for sales and marketing in the PC division at the local multinational computer company. Venkat felt it was important to underscore the point that his "Indianness" did not play any role in his accomplishments. He emphasized that it was his talent, hard work, and persistence that put him on a successful trajectory in corporate America. Venkat remarked, "I did my Ph.D., and everything I did, I was successful. Every career or otherwise, endeavours I have taken I've done them well, and it has nothing to do with whether I am Indian or not." Venkat said that his nationality did not put him at a disadvantage over his white co-workers because everyone experiences some form of discrimination and prejudice. He said:

> If I was a white American male, you know, maybe there would be prejudice because I'm too short. So, it doesn't really matter. It doesn't really matter. Everybody has their own, you know, pet peeve I guess. So being an Indian, I don't think, it put me at a different spot. Or at least, that's how I feel.

In an earlier part of the interview, Venkat had mentioned that he was seen as "Indian" and therefore "different" by many of his co-workers, that his being a foreigner and having an accent would never allow him to

achieve his full potential in corporate America. During our conversations, I recalled his earlier statements from the interview and asked Venkat whether or not he thought being Indian had ever specifically prevented him from getting promoted to the upper-level management. Venkat said that his Indian values, cultural habits and educational foundations prepared him well to meet the challenges of his workplace, but that his being "different" never affected his work life.

Venkat and many other upper-class Indians describe themselves as privileged "model minorities," but they are also positioned as outsiders, foreigners with "thick accents," brown skin, and having different customs and traditions. In order to counteract these positions, many Indians actively place themselves as "same" or "similar" to the majority of Americans by invoking the I-positions of universal human nature ("racism is universal, everyone is prejudiced"), American benevolence ("America has given me successes," "America is a great country so why talk about racism") and shoring up their professional identity ("I am a scientist so race or racism does not matter in performing one's role as a doctor, software engineer or a biochemist").

Many of the Indians I interviewed made strategic attempts to convert their difference into positions of sameness. That is, some of the participants wanted to establish their identity as being very similar to the dominant majority. This kind of assertion is based on a dialogical relationship in which there is also a strategic identification with the voice that represents the dominant majority. Venkat's interview also illustrates the theoretical significance of the concept of positioning. Hermans and Hermans-Konopka explain: "As a verb it shows the dynamic aspect of the process of receiving, finding and taking one's place in the field of social relationships. There is an active *placing* of oneself in particular relationships. A significant theoretical advantage of the concept is that it can also be used in the passive form: being *positioned* by others, *being placed* by others and with oneself" (2010, p. 150). When Venkat is placed and positioned by others as a minority, he counter positions his difference by invoking the "voice of sameness." In other words, by equating his experience of racial difference with other forms of prejudices that some white people experience, Venkat finds a way to form a strategic positioning with the dominant majority. Such identification also involves seeing one's voice and subject positioning as being equal to each other.

Conclusion: Toward a Qualitative, Participatory and Hybrid Indigenous Psychology

The ethnographic studies by Priya (2015) and Bhatia (2007, 2015) show how culture is connected to a set of practices and is shaped by power and conflict. The participant's voices play a vital role in revealing the larger relationship between culture and identity. Priya's study in Nandigram in West Bengal sheds light on how the government, in collusion with larger multinational corporations, were oppressing the villagers through suppressing dissent, carrying out torture, and creating divisions between the villagers.

Similarly, Bhatia's (2007) study shows how culture and nation are not synonymous, and how migration and globalization are creating indigenous hybridities where several ongoing cultural voices become part of an individual identity formation. Thus, culture moves from being an object of scientific study to a space in which indigenous struggles about land, people, myths, and collective and individual identity comes to the surface. The postcolonial, modern, ancient, urban, colonial and traditional form complex layers of contemporary hybrid indigenous identities.

Broadly, the journey of IP as a sub-discipline thus far has been dominated by the concern to ferret out cross-cultural universals from the indigenous psychologies. Such a concern has invited criticism from within and outside of the discipline in the forms of "being an impossible universalistic science" and "denying the voice of people," respectively. Drawing on the fact that the academic and cultural impetus to rediscover a culture's or a community's voice from colonized or Westernized psychology was the major goal for which IP was established in the Philippines in the 1970s, we have proposed how new paradigms of social science inquiry could help to address this major goal in a more meaningful way.

As the illustrative studies have highlighted, the new paradigms may help to open up new possibilities of transcending the process of 'othering' or 'denial of voice' inherent in the category- or variable-based universalistic IP. The qualitative studies on reconstructing the distress of urban poor mothers in South Africa, and political violence-stricken farmers of rural West Bengal, India, illustrate how the concerns of the distressed groups were an outcome of the subjective longings (for an erstwhile harmonious community that is also cared for by the government) or expectations from oneself (nurturing one's child and

supporting the family) that were shaped within their unique socio-historical context. These concerns or voices of people are dynamic and context-dependent, and may lose their meaning upon getting forced into a category or a variable.

Another important feature of these studies lies in the way that the shared (cultural) meanings of 'motherhood' or 'being a rightful member of one's village or state' are shaped by the prevailing socio-political forces of 'neoliberal discourse,' and the 'mindless industrialization drive by the government,' respectively. Culture, as these studies illustrate, is more than just a static set of shared meanings or beliefs that help people lead their everyday life. Its conception is rather problematized to incorporate processes within the socio-historical context that continually shape the shared meanings or beliefs of a community. Furthermore, the studies by Bhatia (2007, 2018) revealed another important way in which culture needs to be conceptualized (being shaped by the affinity to as well as the demands of more than one culture) in IP when he raises the question of how the diaspora and the youth in India negotiate their cultural identities in the neocolonial or globalized world.

Our studies illustrate that the care for voice and concerns for people's priorities is anchored in an openness to multi-paradigmatic and multidisciplinary approaches. As Sampson (1993) put it, "In the long run, the legitimacy of any scientific exercise rests in the hands of people it serves" (p. 1228).

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CHAPTER 3

Cultures in Motion: Challenges to Future Inquiry

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> …Words from all the twisted sphere
> Meet in my magic mouth
> And for each time I pronounce them
> They are increasingly sounding Danish.
> —Benny Andersen, “World citizen in Denmark”

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The concept of 'culture' has always been elusive. Even in 1952 the anthropologists Kroeber and Kluckhohn offered 156 definitions. The debates on the meaning of culture continue into the present (Jahoda, 2012). Yet, regardless of the disagreements among social scientists on the meaning of the term, there are several assumptions that are common to almost all. Two of these are pivotal to contemporary inquiry in cross-cultural and cultural psychology. They are also at the heart of more recent inquiry into indigenous culture. There is first the assumption of *bounded entities*. For this, we presume the existence of individual or separated cultural traditions. We thus seek to identify various cultural groups, and to inquire into their particular forms of life. We variously write about European culture, Chinese culture, Arab culture, or the Ifaluk, the Trobrianders, the Ilongot, and so on. While there is general recognition that the cultural boundaries are permeable, we presume that there remains a "cultural heart," the characteristics of which guide the interests of the researcher. The second significant assumption is *temporal endurance*. Here we presume that cultures remain more or less constant or identifiable over time.[1] This presumption provides the very rationale for research: to illuminate a given way of life from which others may learn. In effect, we hope to accumulate knowledge of other ways of life.

Yet, even with the nineteenth century emergence of anthropology as a discipline, scholars confronted an inherent paradox. The study of cultures descended from an earlier field of natural history. From this historical perspective, scholars traced both cultural diffusion and change across time. In these studies, both the assumptions of cultural boundaries and endurance were challenged. How can we study "an enduring entity" when the entity is continuously undergoing change, which is to say, ceasing to be an entity at all? While intellectually interesting, this paradox has made little difference in practice. If differing ways of life move slowly enough, the historical argument is benign. If the world's peoples remain more or less stable geographically, and there are no major alterations in the conditions of life, one may reasonably speak of identifiable cultures about which knowledge can be accumulated. By analogy, we may usefully conduct studies of world geography, even though the configuration of land and water have undergone radical change over the last 4 billion years.

[1] Both of these assumptions are represented in the concept of indigenous culture as "people with historical ties to a particular territory," with "distinctiveness from other populations." www.indigenouspeoples.net.

As we now recognize with increasing clarity, the twentieth century has unleashed forces of massive change. In significant degrees, such change can be attributed to the mushrooming developments in communication technologies, from the telephone and radio early last century, through television in the mid-century, and now the Internet and cell phone. All of these technologies essentially contribute to creating, sustaining or subverting forms of understanding or belief. In today's world, the circulation of meaning—in volume, speed and number of participants—approaches staggering proportions. In the time required to read this sentence aloud, 80 million email messages will have been launched into the world. The volume of text messages sent via cell phones in a year is over 8 billion. Meaning is everywhere in motion, shaped and reshaped on virtually every issue of importance to our lives: government, education, religion, family, work, leisure, the economy, love, appearance, and so on. Added to this invisible flow of information, ideas, values and relationships are forces of globalization and migration. As economies have gone global, so have the interdependencies and exchanges multiplied (Eitzen & Zinn, 2011). There are also significant changes in society resulting from massive globalization. As wars and famines have ravaged many countries, immigration has become commonplace. At the present time, over 300 million people live outside their place of birth.

Numerous scholars now characterize our emerging cultural condition as one of rapid, incessant and accelerating change. Early contributions included Berman's (1983), *All That Is Solid Melts Into Air*: *The Experience of Modernity*, Hardison's (1990) *Disappearing Through the Skylight: Culture and Technology in the Twentieth Century*, and Gergen's (1992) *The Saturated Self: Dilemmas of Identity in Everyday Life*. As Zygmunt Bauman (2010) more recently commented:

> Everything or almost everything in this world of ours keeps changing: fashions we follow and the objects of our attention (… today drawn away from things and events that attracted us yesterday, and to be drawn away tomorrow from things that attracted us today), things we dream of and things we fear, things we desire and things we loath, reasons to be hopeful and reasons to be apprehensive. (p. 1)

As the pace of cultural change continues to accelerate, the paradox inherent in the early emergence of anthropology returns in force. As early as 1992, Gupta and Ferguson remarked on the ways in which cultures were

no longer linked to particular spaces, and challenged anthropologists "to reevaluate such central analytic concepts in social sciences as that of 'culture,' and by extension, the idea of 'cultural difference'" (p. 6). As Bhatia (in press) more recently commented, "The formation of diasporas across international borders forces us to reconfigure the concept of culture and society and how time and space are manifested in these concepts of culture."

In the remainder of the present offering, we wish to build on these discussions, particularly since they have a bearing on future inquiry in psychology. We first propose that the atomized view of cultures as identifiable entities must be replaced with a view of culture as a continuously unfolding process. With this view in place we offer four case studies of this process in Asia. These cases are significant, as they demonstrate how social scientists themselves enter into the process of cultural change. In their very attempts to carry out the scientific project, social scientists participate in their culture as transformative agents. In this light, finally, we offer deliberations on how the study of culture—indigenous and otherwise—might be redirected.

Cultures in the Making

There is a third assumption that is common to almost all attempts to define culture, and this assumption we do not place in question. It is the assumption of culture as a byproduct of human interchange within a context. While both biological make-up and physical surroundings may establish the grounds and limits of cultural life, within this space there is room for enormous variation. Indeed, the variations provide the rationale for most cross-cultural, cultural psychology, and indigenous studies. It is this space of "social interchange" to which we are particularly drawn, for herein lies the chief source of variation. We find most useful in this case the writings of Bakhtin (1981) and Wittgenstein (1953), and particularly their account of linguistic meaning in terms of the coordinated actions among persons—of "dialogue" in the former case and "language games" in the latter. In brief, language attains its meaning from its use within relationships. On this account, meaning does not reside in the heads of individuals, but emerges from the process of coordination itself. We know what the word 'rabbit' means in terms of the occasions or conditions in which we use the word.

Mutual understanding is achieved when satisfactory forms of coordinated action are established.[2] The same argument can be extended to bodily movements (e.g., signals, dance, gestures), clothing and objects. They gain their significance for people in terms of the way they figure in patterns of coordinated action.

On this account, culture is not buried deeply within the minds of its participants, but is carried within the taken-for-granted forms of relating, and these exist within the array of material objects, structures, and the like that derive from and support this process of coordination. As Hammack (2011), puts it, culture "is not something we *have*; it is something we *do*." (p. 22). The cultural game of soccer, for example, is sustained not only by a language (e.g., goal, defender, yellow card), but an array of coordinated actions (among players, referees, coaches) and a range of objects or structures (e.g., ball, goals, field). At the same time, it is clear that anything that disturbs the patterns of coordination essentially unsettles the patterns we call 'culture.' It is here that one becomes aware of how radically and rapidly cultural life may be transformed by new waves of technological innovation, new products, the creation or disappearance of new jobs, or the immigration of new peoples. As a host of scholars have traced, the cell phone alone has changed the landscape of relationships in society. Cultures are always in the making; indigenous culture itself is a hybrid; it would be correct to replace the term 'culture,' with 'culturing.'

Social Scientists as Agents of Change

Like all social scientists, psychologists are participants in cultural meaning-making. Yet, unlike most cultural participants, they do not simply acquiesce to traditions as given; they are specifically engaged in activities that may potentially unsettle traditions. This is the case in two major ways. First, in attempting to describe and explain human action, social scientists step outside of the commonplace discourse. To rely on this discourse would be to do nothing more than to repeat "what everybody knows." Thus, to provide illumination means to create new ways of using the language, new ways of understanding, and new patterns of

[2] A more extended account of this relational orientation to meaning can be found in Gergen (2009).

action. The impact of the discourse on mental illness on Western cultural life is only one of the most obvious instances. Secondly, many of those trained in the social sciences function as professionals within the society, offering therapy, counseling, or consulting, for example, or functioning as professionals in healthcare, welfare, or community-building services. Here, their expertise becomes a direct input into cultural life, generating actions with reverberating consequences in society. In what follows, we offer four illustrations of these catalysts to 'culture in the making.'

Translation as Cultural Appropriation: Li Ping Yang

Since the 1980s, with the development of China's reform and opening up, Western values and a variety of academic ideas have been imported into China. This promoted an ideological transformation from traditional collectivism to individualism. It also brought with it a range of social problems. Individual competition became more and more intense. People seemed to exist only as competitors against each other. Individual success became a primary life pursuit. Selfishness and greed now seem rampant. Certainly, amazing developments were made in science, technology and national economy. At the same time, various conflicts within society intensified and continue to do so. Reflecting on the development of Chinese society, many researchers began to rediscover the value of traditional culture. This new trend is conducive to a more balanced exchange between Eastern and Western cultures.

I have been engaged in some translation work, mainly to introduce social constructionism to Chinese readers in order to promote constructionist practice in China. While translating the books, I find social constructionism has many views that are similar to those in ancient Chinese classics. For example, social constructionism proposes that the idea of a world made up of independent objects or events is a cultural construction. This idea is also reflected in Chinese culture. We can find a related expression in *Tao Te Ching*:

> When the people of the Earth all know beauty as beauty,
> There arises (the recognition of) ugliness.
> When the people of the Earth all know the good as good,
> There arises (the recognition of) evil.

Therefore:

> Being and non-being interdepend in growth;
> Difficult and easy interdepend in completion;
> Long and short interdepend in contrast;
> High and low interdepend in position;
> Tones and voice interdepend in harmony;
> Front and behind interdepend in company.

Resonating with this thesis of relationalism, Buddhists also propose that everything is within everything else, and thus inseparable. They call this "inter-being." It is in this light that I see how Eastern and Western culture come together in contemporary social constructionism.

Translation not only involves an understanding of the original text, but also involves offering a suitable expression in another language. Translators will never find an appropriate expression without an understanding of the two cultures. As for myself, I have realized that as a translator I confront many contexts in which I cannot rigidly translate the original words, but rather must help Chinese readers to understand them. The result is that I have to cross the boundaries of the two cultures and provide my own understanding.

When I translated Gergen's book *Relational Being*, I encountered some limitations in literal translation. For example, the literal translation of the book title should be 《关系的存在》. But given my reading of the text, I know that translation does not capture the meaning Gergen is trying to express. 'Relation' corresponds to the word '关系' in Chinese, which has no verb form. It can only mean the relationship between two or more separated entities, such as people or things. Whenever Chinese people read the word '关系,' they consider it to be the relationship between two (or more) independent entities, instead of relating as a dynamic process. In order to avoid misunderstanding, I choose a free translation of the title, that is to say, to change 'relational' into a Chinese adverb, so that the exact meaning of the title *Relational Being* can be better expressed in the context of Chinese culture.

As people have more and more opportunities to communicate across cultures, translations in different fields (whether formal or informal) become increasingly important bridges of communication. Different languages represent different ways of looking at things. We can never separate a single word, a sentence, or a research conclusion from its mother

language or its cultural context. Whenever we try to understand an idea or a theory from another language or from an alien culture, we are actually making an integration of our own tradition and new ideas. In this sense, translation is not a mechanical duplication, but a creative understanding, which includes a mixture of different contexts and cultures.

Another experience related to translation comes from research my team did on self-esteem. Undertaking a project sponsored by the Chinese Ministry of Education, we designed a study to make a comparison of self-esteem between vocational college students and undergraduates at the university. The Chinese university entrance examination is held in June once a year. Students who graduated from high school can only gain admission to the higher educational system through high examination scores. Students who receive a good grade in the university entrance examination can enter comprehensive universities, while students with lower scores can only enter various vocational colleges. Entrance also signifies their academic failure. Owing to this, we assumed that vocational college students would have lower self-esteem compared with university undergraduates.

We translated Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (SES) as the main measuring instrument. In total, 711 vocational college students and 435 undergraduates were selected as representative samples. The results were completely unexpected: the vocational college students scored significantly higher than college students. We were confused at the result. In the subsequent literature search, we found a reference that discussed the validity of the eighth item in SES ("I wish I could have more respect for myself") in the context of Chinese culture. The authors proposed that since people raised in Chinese culture consider humility to be a great virtue, most Chinese people—even those with high self-esteem—agree with the content of the eighth item. So, rather than negatively scoring the eighth item as researchers would do in the West, we should score the eighth item in a positive way, or simply omit it. After modifying the scores of the eighth item, indeed the pattern of findings in the original study dropped away. The difference between the two groups was no longer significant. Further interviews shows that the training model of vocational colleges helped to make up for students' early academic failures and thus improved their self-esteem.

Over the years, we have imported many concepts and theories from Western psychology, as well as conducted a lot of research using Western mental measures scales. In doing so, we are increasingly aware that, just

like the concept of self-esteem, many concepts in Western psychology are not suitable for describing and interpreting in Chinese. We have to transform and localize these concepts. At the same time, we find that Chinese people are also changing, especially the young generation. They are becoming more and more westernized. Perhaps in the future, 'localization' will no longer be a topic worthy of discussion.

Evolving Together: Shi-Jiuan Wu

As a person who grew up in Taiwan, received graduate training and worked in the USA for 20 years, and then moved back to my home country, I often wonder how I can re-honor the people and organizations at home. As a consultant, re-honoring means not only appreciating the people and organizations I work with in their own context, but also co-evolving with them in the directions they hope to develop (Wu & Katz, 1998). There is no single criterion of performance. People in organizations live under the constantly changing forces in the society, and for me this means paying close attention to the detailed relational processes at play.

For the past five years I have worked as a consultant to an orphanage named TzXin (translated as 'merciful heart'). My engagement there provides a useful illustration of the evolution of a sub-culture within the larger cultural context, and our own process of co-evolution. People tend to view the orphanage in Taiwan as a place that provides food, shelter and other support for basic needs, and as a temporary shelter only in which the professional caregivers deliver the standard school-like residential care with minimum nurturance. By contrast, TzXin draws from two different Chinese traditions. A few decades ago, the founder of this orphanage was a practicing monk. Therefore, Buddhist philosophy is a core pillar upon which this orphanage is organized. Overall, Buddhism emphasizes assisting ordinary people in lifting their suffering. At the same time, the teachings of Confucius are a very important part of life in China. Filial piety is one of the key principles of Confucianism.

In this context, most parents are willing to sacrifice themselves to take care of their young as well as their elders. Family is paramount to people, and interdependence across generations is commonplace. Many people are nurtured by their families throughout their lives, and of course, also give back all their lives as well. While most orphanages have difficulty

realizing such traditional family values, TzXin has insisted on them as their core mission. All activities and curricula have been designed with the family life cycle and child development in mind.

In designing the orphanage as a big family, creative processes have been set in motion, and the subsequent evolution of the organization prepared. Children/adolescents could participate in such a way that they were 'part of a big family,' not just part of an orphanage. For example, the children and staff were each divided into 'families' of six; children could arrange to 'go home' with the caring staff for the biggest family event of Chinese New Year (3–5 days); they were invited to attend a staff member's wedding; encouraged to express their support/care in thoughtful ways when staff or children were ill; brought to visit their biological parents who might be in jail; and encouraged to participate in agency evaluations and present to the community how the orphanage is working. Children who have grown up and left the orphanage come back annually to join the current staff and children to celebrate Chinese New Year as a big family. Children even know where the future cemetery of the staff is since visiting one's family cemetery is a significant event for many Chinese people.

When children are seen as family members, it becomes impossible not to see staff (teachers, social workers, psychologists, administrative staff, chefs, drivers, etc.) as part of the family. At the same time, providing quality care in the orphanage takes a lot of preparation and work. It becomes a challenging task to support staff as family members. One not only asks what staff members can do for and with the children, but also what the orphanage can do for the staff members. It was within this context that I was invited to TzXin, not only to support their staff, but to explore how the institute could also support them.

As a consultant, I drew from dialogical techniques and theories of narrative practice, collaborative practice, relational responding, co-reflecting, co-constructing as a team, and other contributions from my training.[3] At the same time, it was very important for me as an outsider to listen very carefully to what the supervisors were telling me, how their staff were doing, as well as their struggles and their hopes. Their local culture and working culture were also undergoing constant change. I brought my

[3] Particularly significant for me have been the writings of Andersen (1991, 1997), White (2007), and White and Epston (1990).

understanding and knowledge from the past, but it was also essential that I walked with them, grew with them, and co-created with them.

Guided by a postmodern, or more inclusive orientation, it was important for me to join different levels of staff in various meetings. After we all agreed on how the day might flow, I often pondered how to open the dialogical space for staff to have the opportunity for their voices to be heard, for them to listen to each other, for them to respond to each other as a relational team, and for them to have some relational fun (since they had long working hours together). Many things can happen in the process of working with children, and this process could sometimes be draining for the staff. Therefore, creating a dialogical space for the staff to reflect in a respectful and non-judgmental way on how they were doing was very important.

I also learned that the core team felt that many staff members rarely experienced high quality dialogue in their lives. Thus, the opportunity for individual conversations with me in the team context was created. Initially, very few people signed up for the conversation. But as the staff witnessed how the conversation went, they began to sign up for consultations more enthusiastically. The idea was when the staff found their personal and professional stories heard in a respectful, dialogical context, they would apply their personal experiences to their work with children. Staff members revealed to me that they felt valued and supported in these conversations, and that this kind of conversation helped them to break through older patterns of relating.

As relationships developed, I also began to introduce ideas on postmodern dialogue and its application. By listening carefully to their concerns, we could then use these concepts to talk about the challenges of "being busy," "going slowly" and "constant change." I invited staff members to reflect on what these topics meant to them and their relationships with each other. We also talked about how they support each other in the context of being busy, going slowly, and going through constant change. These deep reflections then set the stage for further evolution. As they gained in confidence in terms of sharing, they were ready to talk about their 'conflict' with children and with each other. Culturally, conflict has been viewed as a negative trait in relationships, so people do not usually feel comfortable in conflict or in talking about it. I invited staff to look at how each of them related to the idea of conflict, how their family viewed conflict, and about their preferred way of seeing conflict. As a consultant, I was deeply moved by the process of the whole

team talking about their local relationships with conflict. They could talk with dignity and without feeling shamed. They discussed how they were influenced in their understanding of conflict, and the new directions now open to them. I learned a great deal, and was pleased that I could be with them in this dialogical process.

In summary, I entered into this continuously evolving organization with a variety of theoretical and practical resources. Buddhist and Confucian traditions were in place, and my more postmodern orientation supported a more flexible and integrative practice. However, the people I was trying to serve also taught me how and when to use these resources. Their conversations opened new understandings, both for them and for me. Together we evolved in ways neither of us could have predicted.

Mutual Support for Well-Being: Terumi Sameshima

If you focus on culture as a whole, cross-time change may seem very slow. However, when you look at specific segments of society, you begin to see how quickly things change. My own work is within the medical system. Japanese medical treatment largely shifted from traditional medicine to modern (Western) medicine after the restoration of imperial power in 1868. With the subsequent development of medical technology, Japan has become one of the most macrobiotically advanced countries in the world. And with the expansion of medical insurance, the medical examination rate has risen and it has become possible to receive medical treatment of a consistent quality at any time all over Japan. However, cultural change creates further change. In this case, for example, distrust of medical treatment is becoming an issue. Advances in chronic disease control also contribute to the rapid expansion of the elderly population. The government has responded with active programs in health protection. The modern meaning of 'protecting one's own health' differs from the social meaning 70 years ago. Formerly, medical care itself was insufficient and people lived in poverty, so they could not survive without helping each other. Moreover, they had to provide the necessary medical care themselves.

However, in the modern period it has become possible for people to live without helping each other, and instead rely on professional medical care. As a result, human relationships have become diluted, and social problems of isolation have emerged. Here, social isolation and solitary

death have become social problems. The Japanese government has analyzed the cause as a weakening of regional strength and family networks. Thus, it stresses the need to rebuild mutual assistance between local people, friends and generations. In order to prevent isolation, strengthening of cooperation among residents of the community is being promoted.

It is within this context that a residents' movement has developed, and I came to work with 'Living Together in Kyoto,' a welfare organization run by residents. The movement was initiated by one doctor and residents who wanted to contribute to mutual support activities in the area. Their idea is that "in supporting each other, we are supporting ourselves." Their hope is to facilitate "medical care for the residents based on their own lives." They believe that patients (i.e. residents) can help each other in terms of health needs. They are trying to restructure the network of mutual support, "to rebuild the network of regional symbiotic cooperation." Those who agree with the aims can be members. Members pay an annual fee of 2000 yen per year. As of June 2016, the number of members was 181. Annual membership meetings are held to determine the management policy. The facilitators conduct the business of the group. A member will be the facilitator of the month and will participate in the facilitator's meeting once a month. Activities are publicized through a monthly newsletter.

More formally, the movement has the three basic aims: (1) to create a common forum and strengthen partnerships in the community, (2) to generate relationships to support each other, and (3) to develop new forms of resident-centered medical and welfare support. From my own background, I brought to the situation more postmodern ideas on relationship. My hope was that we could shift away from viewing relationships as between two "bounded beings," and move toward a focus on the relational process itself. This focus could be on the single individual as part of the process, along with the process as it functioned within families, and how it functioned within communities as a whole. While my approach was congenial with the communal tradition, it also became clear that our work could not stand in isolation from the forces of modernization.

Of special importance, the government has reasoned that families cannot be burdened by the care of the elderly, and that it is necessary to have public healthcare support for the aging. Thus, the national government and local governments dispatch caregivers into the communities. One might characterize this as a vertical support system, functioning

centrally from the top down. This system treats individuals as "bounded beings,"—that is, cut away from relational processes. The relationship between the caregiver and patient is impersonal. Caregivers are essentially inter-changeable. By contrast, our network in the 'Living Together in Kyoto' program functions horizontally. It is centrally concerned with relationship. We try to facilitate mutual support, and the communication between caregivers and people who need help occurs face-to-face.

There is a tension at play here. If the centralized network develops too much, it may break the collaborative network. Yet, the horizontal network cannot provide sufficient healthcare support on its own. Thus, the design and balance of the two care support systems are important. This also means that every day presents us with new creative challenges. Medical care and nursing in Japan can be seen as a social system but also as culture in motion. The challenge is to catch the change in the phenomenon and work with it toward an ideal. It is this motion that is so central in the post-modern age, particularly in the healthcare arena.

We must respond to great diversity, balancing systems of caregiving, old traditions and new ideas on relational processes.

An Unfolding Drama: Charru Sharma

I had previously served as an acting teacher at the Theatre in Education Company, at the National School of Drama, New Delhi, India. I was especially drawn to the concept of 'creative drama,' which was imported from England. At the same time, based on work in child development, various travels, and my life in India, I had my own ideas about how to use creative drama in the classroom. As part of my doctoral research, I thus developed creative drama intervention workshops for a primary school classroom of Grade 3 students in a state-run school in New Delhi. I was essentially bringing with me into the school culture values and ways of thinking with an international influence. As I tried to put these values and ideas into action, I was not totally prepared for the result.

I saw first that there was a rather firm division between genders. There were two tattered mats spread on the floor; the girls sat on the right mat and the boys on the left. I asked myself, why are such young children taught to live as separate entities based on their physiology? Why are they not sitting together as students, irrespective of their gender? It may be that this was not their choice, but a rule imposed by the teachers and the Principal of the school. It could also be a norm in the state-run schools

of Delhi. My first challenge, then, was to devise a drama activity in this socially divided classroom.

I introduced an ice breaking activity and invited the children to form a circle on the count of five. They instinctively formed two circles, the boys and then the girls. I then invited the group to make a circle so each girl had a boy next to her and vice versa. They did so, but the boys and girls did not hold hands. I then invited them to form a circle with a mix of boys and girls instructing them to hold hands. I still remember vividly the giggles amongst the girls as they were holding hands with the boys. I felt I too had to be a part of the circle and held the hands of the boys on either side, which removed some discomfort among the children. Subsequently, I had to devise other activities for mixing up the boys and girls.

Another dominant classroom feature was the children often laughing at the mistakes and inadequacies of other children. This habit of the children was kept constantly in check by me in order to develop a constructive atmosphere in the group. However, more intervention was required. Quite relevant was the shocking fact that children did not know the names of all their classmates. I thus developed a 'name game' and other activities, in which children had to interact with others, and to remember the names of other children.

In order to further develop their cooperative capacities, I divided them into groups where they participated in discussions and contributed towards presenting an improvisation. However, during these tasks, they often complained about children who did not share ideas during the discussion. This required further innovation on my part to ensure that each child contributed to the group activity. Slowly, the children began to interact more easily with one other. Especially useful were personal sharing sessions, during which each one shared what they did, for example, on New Year's Day. By this point, the earlier hesitation or insecurity to speak out had almost evaporated.

As the group interaction improved, so did the creative output. Children created poems while working together in groups. Many interesting group-level creations could now be witnessed: children collectively created group improvisations, group rhythms and still images. They also used body sounds in an innovative manner to create a body orchestra, and so on. At this point, children were well adjusted in the group and had a better understanding of each other. They also listened respectfully to others, while in the past everyone spoke at a tangent, not bothering to

listen to what others had to say. They often discussed and debated with their peers in order to arrive at a consensus on certain issues. For example, while working on the theme 'family,' they discussed who should head the family—father, mother or both. The entire group was divided almost into two halves with each child putting forth his or her views based on their own thoughts and life experiences. In these discussions, one could almost hear the sounds of cultural change.

In the end I was quite pleased at what we had accomplished together. The children now had skills for working collectively and were more attentive and empathetic to each other. The collective creations that they came up with were evidence of the power of the collaborative approach to augment creativity. At the same time, while the theater practice was developed in England, its success in the Indian classroom depended on the children's immersion in Indian culture. Collaborative games and theater were already familiar to the children. And while I could introduce these particular practices into the classroom, the children interpreted them in their own way. I felt that new seeds were now sown for possibly generations to come.[4]

Cultural Inquiry in a World of Change

As we find with all industrialized sectors of the world, contemporary Asian cultures are 'on the move.' In each of the above cases we find traditions dissolving, or being transformed by emerging conditions—economic, governmental, scientific, technological, ideological and more. And in each case, drawing from psychology and other social sciences, the professional enters into the mix as an agent of change. In Yang's case in Nanjing, Western ideas did not remain Western as they were imported into the Asian context; new hybrids emerged. For Wu in Taiwan there were already major organizational changes in motion as she added her professional expertise to the mix. Here it was essential to engage in a process of co-constructing the emergent organization. In Kyoto, Sameshima brought fresh ideas from her profession into a context in which the forces of modernization were struggling with pre-modern ways of life to achieve a viable balance. Sharma brought a hybrid change program into a school, and found that further innovations were required in order to achieve her goals. And while the rate of change may be

[4] For an expanded account of the program, see Sharma (2016).

slower in more remote parts of the world, there are few forms of cultural life that remain unaffected.

These transformations in world conditions place traditional research into culture in jeopardy. Given the global diffusion of the world's peoples, along with the globe spanning circulation of ideas, values and images on the internet, the idea of coherent, geographically based cultures becomes moribund. As Hermans and Kempen (1998) suggest, cross-cultural comparisons become irrelevant. Such a suggestion may be logically extended to research in cultural and indigenous psychology. In our view, an abandonment of these inquiries would be unfortunate. As argued elsewhere (Gergen, 2014), the traditional aim of social science to improve our abilities to predict is short-sighted. This is especially true in the case of studying culture. While such studies may contribute to educating those who will be working with colleagues from other cultures, there are other, more significant potentials for traditional research.

Emergent Cultures

One of the most interesting outcomes of the massive global transformations is the emergence of new patterning of cultural life. As various groups encounter new circumstances, the flow of culture yields new blends, and as the Internet enables the world's peoples to locate others who share their causes or curiosities, new forms of life emerge. Such cultural outcroppings have been common topics in anthropology and sociology. Researchers have variously turned their focus to emerging sub-cultures such as gay underground culture (Albrecht, 2016), nerd culture (Weldon, 2017), hip hop culture (Price, 2006), and so on. Psychologists have also begun to attend to these pockets of cultural life. For example, Gemignani (2011) and Perriera and Ornelas (2011) provide insights into immigrant groups; and Lieblich (2014) examines the ways in which elderly friends in an Israeli community sustain vitality together. Such sub-cultures continue to emerge; the variations are enormous, and there is substantial need for psychological inquiry.

Cultural Transformations

If culture is always in motion, a second line of significant inquiry opens up to cultural transformation itself. Rather than focusing on emerging sub-cultures, again in a stop-frame, the concern here is with the process

of change. This focus has become increasingly engaging in neighboring social sciences. As Bhatia (2018) points out, for example, "It is not surprising that the back and forth movement of migrants across the globe has coincided with the formation of new concepts, such as 'decentering,' 'hyperspace,' 'deterritorialization,' 'marginality,' 'borderlands,' 'transnational and diasporic spheres,' and 'core and periphery.'" In the same context, anthropologists turn their attention to the global flows of peoples, along with those of media, technology, ideas and habits (Appadurai, 2001; Clifford, 1997). For psychologists, perhaps the major contribution to understanding cultural change is represented in the rich body of work on multiculturalism (Leong et al., 2014), and most especially in multicultural identity (Benet-Martinez & Hong, 2014). The vistas of future inquiry in this domain are vast.

Future Forming Inquiry

As mentioned above, the traditional scientific aim of using research to enhance prediction and control is limited and is irrelevant to a great deal of inquiry into culture. At the same time, all attempts to describe and explain events are limited in their focus to what is before them. Whether in the natural or social sciences, all are representational, in the sense that they attempt to represent in words (or other symbols) a given state of affairs. However, in light of the present emphasis on cultural transformation, we now confront the utility of such attempts. If "all is flow," as the early Greek philosopher Heraclitus proposed, to what degree are we advantaged by research 'snapshots' at any given point in the changing character of cultural life? As indicated above, we are not arguing that inquiry into culture or its transformations is futile. But we are raising questions regarding limitations and possible alternatives—in this case to the representational tradition more generally.

As proposed elsewhere (Gergen, 2015) we might usefully turn our scientific efforts from representing contemporary conditions, to intervening in these conditions. There is considerable gain to be made in shifting the concern from 'what is' to 'what could be.' How can we as scientists join in the flow, shifting its direction or formation in such a way that we make a positive contribution to cultural life? Here the natural sciences furnish a model: their significance in the world largely depends not on what is written in journals and books, but on their various offerings to the world—in harnessing energy, curing illnesses, providing

low-cost housing and clothing, efficient transportation, and so on. The work of Wu, Samshima, and Sharma in the present offering moves in this direction. In these three cases, scholarly work has informed their work with orphans, the elderly, and school children, respectively. More extreme, is the award-winning work of Bhatia and the Friends of Shelter Associates who have to helped to provide sanitation for impoverished Indian communities.

Conclusion

Cultural change is inherent in the human condition. The challenge we confront as a community of inquiry is the rate of this change. It becomes increasingly difficult to draw boundaries around any cultural entity or to describe for more than a fleeting period its particular characteristics. As our case studies demonstrate, the blending of cultures is continuously generating hybrid forms, wholly new constellations of action. Furthermore, in their very attempt to apply their skills, social scientists enter into the process of cultural transformation. This is not an argument to abandon the traditional forms of cross-cultural, cultural, and indigenous studies now in place but rather to invite new and more contextually productive forms of inquiry. The study of newly emerging sub-cultures, inquiry into the transformational process, and future forming activities are among the most prominent. Indeed, the culture of inquiry must itself be transformed in order to remain of consequence.

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CHAPTER 4

The Foundations and Goals of Psychology: Contrasting Ontological, Epistemological and Ethical Foundations in India and the West

Anand C. Paranjpe

In his seminal work on the history and nature of science, Kuhn (1970) persuasively pointed out that the pursuit of knowledge in science happens within conceptual frameworks, which he called paradigms. These paradigms often involve foundational principles about the nature of reality and of knowledge, and ideas about legitimate goals for the pursuit of knowledge. In other words, the foundational principles involve ontological, epistemological and axiological principles. Many such principles are derived from the history of the wider society and culture, which ensconces, surrounds and nurtures the pursuit of knowledge. Such principles seep through textbooks and form an integral part of the tacit knowledge and unquestioned principles upon which inquiries in a given field are founded. Notwithstanding the debate over whether or not systems of psychology qualify for the exalted status of 'paradigms,' Kuhn's

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ideas about the relevance and nature of foundational principles may be viewed as equally applicable to systems of psychology. As sociologists of knowledge like Berger (1967) have pointed out, the broader culture and religion of a society and its institutions provide a “sacred canopy” under which the pursuit of knowledge can flourish. Now, in the twenty first century, as intercultural contact improves in an increasingly globalized world, the exchange and cross-fertilization of ideas across many such canopies promises a richer collective legacy of knowledge for humanity as a whole.

Until the middle of the twentieth century, a major part of the world was dominated by the colonial powers of mainly Britain and France, and during that period indigenous knowledge systems were subordinated to—and often denigrated by—knowledge systems of European origin. With colonial influence gradually receding, indigenous knowledge systems are beginning to find their legitimate place. This is particularly true with regard to indigenous psychologies (IPs). Almost every cultural tradition contains distinctive psychological insights originated and historically developed within their respective cultural realms. India and China, which have rich intellectual traditions matching the longevity and vigor of their European counterpart, have much to offer to enrich the enterprise of psychology. In the Indian tradition, Yoga is viewed as its most prominent system of psychology—although for various reasons it has been either mistaken for a system of philosophy rather than psychology or has been viewed as no more than a system of calisthenics. Nourished over a time span of over two millennia, Yoga has started to be known around the world, and various forms of meditation that originated in India have already begun to be part of a modern clinician’s toolkit.

Although cultural contacts between Europe and Asia have a long history indicated by the commercial activity over the Silk Route, Asian and European intellectual traditions nevertheless developed within relative isolation. Yoga has primarily developed within the context of spiritual pursuits, while modern psychology developed primarily within secular academic institutions. The marginalization of psychology of religion in mainstream psychology indicates its commitment to a secularist approach to science. Small wonder, then, that traditional Indian and modern Western approaches to psychology have developed along distinct lines. In modern psychology, behaviorism stands out as a distinctly indigenous system of psychology developed within the American cultural milieu. As I will try to show in the balance of this chapter, Yoga and behaviorism, particularly Skinner’s radical behaviorism, stand in sharp contrast to each other.

In choosing to focus on highly contrasting approaches to psychology, I do not wish to bolster the stereotype of the West as materialist versus the East as spiritual. Cultures are complex entities that resist placement into distinct black-and-white categories. It is well recognized that India has its own tradition of the materialist and hedonist system of Cārvāka and his followers, while on the European side there are the spiritual traditions of the Abrahamic religions as well as Neoplatonist mystics. Indeed, interest in spirituality, which was largely missing in psychology in the twentieth century, has recently resurfaced in the USA (Pargament, 1999). So, the purpose for choosing radical behaviorism and Yoga is not to suggest that the psychologies of the East and West shall not meet. Rather, the purpose is to point out how IPs can serve the needs of different types of clients found almost everywhere across the globe. Insofar as contrasting features can be complementary, they can together provide for a broader and richer psychology.

Before beginning a selective account of radical behaviorism and Yoga, I wish to enter a caveat. There is vast amount of literature on both behaviorism and Yoga, and there are ambiguities and controversies within each of them. Also, given the limited space available for this exercise, it is not possible to provide exhaustive treatment of these two systems. As such, my effort here will be to highlight their prominent features so as to point out both contrast and complementarity. I will not list their prominent features here, but point them out in the overviews in their separate accounts to follow. Given the predominance of American psychology around the world, Skinner's ideas are likely to be familiar to a majority of readers, and therefore I will start with Skinner first and then go on to Yoga. In each case, I will try to identify the principles of ontology and epistemology upon which the respective systems are founded, as well as the values and ideals that guide their praxis.

Radical Behaviorism of B. F. Skinner: An Indigenous American Approach to Psychology

Background of Radical Behaviorism

As Laurence Smith (1986) has noted, Skinner's radical behaviorism developed in tandem with the philosophy of logical positivism with the informal exchange of ideas between USA and Europe during the first half of the twentieth century. Overwhelmed by the remarkable

discoveries in quantum physics and theoretical breakthroughs by Einstein, the logical positivist philosophy of the Vienna Circle considered physics to be the ideal form of inquiry in any field of knowledge. Skinner's enthusiasm for science can be easily understood against this historical backdrop. Skinner's main source of inspiration, as Smith (1986) points out, was the work of the physicists Ernst Mach and Percy Bridgman. In addition, Skinner personally knew the prominent logical positivist philosopher Rudolph Carnap, and Carnap's student V. W. Quine was his colleague at Harvard. It makes sense, then, that we find parallels between the foundational principles of radical behaviorism on the one hand and logical positivism on the other—although Skinner also disagreed with logical positivists on several specific issues (see Smith, 1986, p. 286). Despite the fact there was no unanimity among the members of the Vienna Circle whose ideas came to be known as logical positivism, they generally favored a physicalist position in ontology, accepted public verification as an epistemic principle, and considered 'ought' statements to be meaningless, thereby indicating a value-free stance on ethical issues. (For a brief overview and critique of logical positivism, see Passmore, 1967). Against this background, we may take a look at Skinner's position in ontological, epistemological and issues with their parallels in logical positivism without trying to equate the two.

Basic Assumptions of Skinner's Approach

At one point Skinner unequivocally states, "[t]he physicalism of the logical positivist has never been good behaviorism" (see Blanchard & Skinner, 1967, p. 325). Notwithstanding this flat-out rejection of physicalism, he nevertheless stays close to physical pole of the mind–matter dualism as indicated by his repeated and pejorative references to "mentalism." Note, for instance, what he says about "acts of will, our thoughts, our sensations, our images" in his reply to the philosopher Blanchard's arguments affirming the reality of consciousness. Toward the end of the paragraph in which he mentions thoughts, sensations, images and other such events in the domain of consciousness, he says: "whether public or private, all the events described are *physical*" (Blanchard & Skinner, 1967, p. 328; emphasis added). Leaving aside the apparent contradiction in his position on physicalism, it should be clear that he does

not ascribe reality to events in the mind. In *Notebooks*, Skinner (1980) writes: “Mind is a myth, with all the power of myths” (p. 34).

Skinner’s rejection of the reality of the mind at least partly depends on the epistemic issue of how we know about events in the private domain of consciousness. In the same paragraph referred to above in which he speaks about acts of will, thoughts, sensations and other mental events, he says that “[t]hings of this sort *should* be seen with special clarity … But the fact is, they are not seen clearly at all. Two people rarely agree about them, and for good reason” (p. 328; emphasis original). Students of the history of psychology can quickly see that the reference to the last sentence in the words just quoted imply a reference to Watson’s (1913) declaration of the method of introspection as null and void since Wundt’s followers in Germany and the USA could not agree on what they found in the domain of consciousness using the method of introspection (see Boring, 1953; Danziger, 1990, pp. 44–48). In the history of psychology, the story of how Watson’s “methodological behaviorism” turned into “logical” or radical behaviorism at the hands of Skinner is too well known to be re-told here.

Verbal Behavior is one of the most well-known works by Skinner (1957), which was made particularly famous by its review by the linguist Chomsky. In this book, Skinner has a long chapter on thinking, which is one of the common mental processes. There Skinner initially admits that: “In a sense verbal behavior which cannot be observed by others is not properly part of our field” (p. 434). This statement indicates Skinner’s commitment to observation in the public domain as his favored epistemic principle. Nevertheless, he appreciates the fact that early behaviorists conceptualized thinking as sub-vocal *behavior* insofar as it brings this private phenomenon within the orbit of behaviorism. According to Skinner’s thinking, like all other forms of spontaneously and voluntarily initiated behavior, is an “operant”—like the pecking response of a pigeon, for instance. In his view, like all other types of operants, thinking can be directly and completely brought under the control of environmental factors, particularly by the linguistic community. This implies that thinking cannot only be studied as the behavior of the ‘other one,’ such as a scientist observing the thinker from the outside, but it can also be controlled from the outside. But then what about self-control with regard to the process of thinking? An answer to this may be found in *Analysis of Behavior*, a book providing a program for self-instruction by

Holland and Skinner (1961). In this book (on p. 302), they suggest that "the term voluntary control is a misleading description of operant behavior" because the so-called voluntarily controlled operants can be completely controlled by manipulating external conditions. An example of this that Holland and Skinner give is that of a mother who can control her own urge to eat a candy the same way as she controls a similar urge in her children—by keeping the candy jar out of sight (p. 305). Thus, in Skinner's view, self-control is possible only in an *indirect* way: by controlling conditions in the environment and *not directly* by the thinker herself.

Aside from thoughts, intentions and sensations, Skinner rejects the concept of self, which is closely associated with the mind. Unlike Hume (1739/1978, p. 251), who rejected a self-same and persistent image of the self since he could not find one such upon introspecting into his own mind, Skinner has a different reason for rejecting the self. In *About Behaviorism*, Skinner (1974) said that "[t]here is no place in the scientific position for a self as true originator or initiator of action" (p. 225). While rejecting causal efficacy of intentions, Skinner admits to causal agency only to conditions in the environment.

In *Beyond Freedom and Dignity*, Skinner (1971) takes a fully determinist position, completely denying the role of free will in his view of the cosmos. An implication of the denial of will, along with the denial of self as originator of action, is that there is no place for self-examination in Skinner's radical behaviorism. His outward gaze is consistent with his commitment to science, particularly physics, which is fixed on the objects in the "outer" world. In adopting the outward gaze of science, Skinner goes back to Francis Bacon, the father of modern science. Like Bacon, he believes that the goal of science is to control the forces of nature for the benefit of mankind, but while Bacon expected to control forces of nature, Skinner aimed at controlling the behavior of organisms, including, of course, humans. Following the lead of early behaviorists like Watson, Skinner viewed the prediction and control of behavior as the goal of psychology. Under the influence of behaviorism, generations of students of psychology have been told about this goal, but the question as to *who* would control *whose* behavior and to *what end* has been largely side-stepped. To his credit, Skinner (1953, Ch. XXIX) does discuss the issue of who *should* be the controller, but the issue is too complex to be discussed here.

It is silently and implicitly *assumed* that psychologists would use their power to control in a benign and benevolent way as parents and teachers would control their wards, or authorities involved in law enforcement would control the behavior of the criminals and convicted prisoners. Yet in a broader sense, the goal of control must imply a clear conception of what constitutes good behavior, and of the values that ought to guide human behavior at large. Unlike the logical positivists, Skinner did not think that 'ought' statements are meaningless. On the contrary, he was deeply involved in discussion of the goals for which science in general, and the techniques for behavior control he devised, were to be used. Such discussion cannot be found, nor would it be expected, in writings such as *The Behavior of Organisms* (1938) where he was writing as a scientist. Qua scientist, he would—and did—follow the guideline of a 'value-free' science. But while writing *Walden Two*, the novel in which he explained how behavioral technology could build a utopian society, he did write about the values to guide such an enterprise. In the twentieth chapter of *Walden Two*, the protagonist Frazier explains the distinctive marks of a 'good life': it consists of being healthy, having to undertake the absolute minimum of unpleasant labor, a lack of compulsion to work, scope for exercising one's talents and abilities, and in having intimate and satisfying personal contacts. In his preface to the 1969 edition of *Walden Two*, Skinner suggested that in his vision of the utopia, "people can live together without quarreling, can produce the goods they need without working too hard, [and] can raise and educate their children more efficiently" (p. ix). I cannot imagine why anybody would not want to live in such a society. Few would quarrel with this vision, although he has been heavily criticized for several other aspects of it.

Patañjali's Yoga: An Indigenous Indian Approach to Psychology

Background of Patañjali's Yoga

The historical origins of yoga are traced to a hoary past. Explicit references to the basic concepts of Yoga can be found in some of the principal Upaniṣads, which most probably pre-date the Buddha (sixth century BCE). Images of a man sitting in the lotus position indicate the origin of Yoga in the Indus civilization dating back to about 2500 years BCE.

Patañjali, who wrote the standard text of Yoga, the *Yoga-Sūtras*, probably belonged to the first or second century, CE. In writing this work he used the conceptual framework of the Sāṁkhya system, which is one of the six systems of philosophy of the Upaniṣadic (or the 'Hindu') tradition (as distinguished from the Buddhist tradition). Written in the cryptic style of aphorisms (called *sūtra*s), Patañjali's text needed explanations and elucidation that were provided by Vyāsa in the fourth century, CE. This was followed by numerous commentaries by several scholars, of whom Vācaspati Miśra (ninth century) is most well-known. (For English translations of these basic sources, see Prasada, 1912). There are numerous commentaries on the *Yoga-Sūtras*, as new translations and commentaries continue to be added. The literature on Yoga is inexhaustible.

In India, as in pre-modern Europe, there was no separate discipline of psychology; principles and techniques now considered to be part of psychology were embedded in various sources of classical literature in Sanskrit. When the British rulers set up modern universities in India, they included Yoga as part of the twin system of Sāṁkhya–Yoga philosophy. This is how it was treated in standard works on Indian philosophy (e.g., Dasgupta, 1922/1975; Radhakrishnan, 1927/1931) in the early decades of the twentieth century. Against this background, the label 'philosophy' was attached to Yoga regardless of the fact that it is without doubt the premier indigenous system of Indian psychology. The currently popular image of Yoga as a system of calisthenics designed for physical fitness is based on some, but not all, of its features. The very purpose of Yoga is to voluntarily control one's own mental processes until they come to a virtual stop, and thereby to realize the true nature of the Self in higher states of consciousness. Indeed, it is quite safe to say that Yoga as described in the *Yoga Sūtras* of Patañjali is India's indigenous system of psychology. Some recent publications, however, bring out the essentially psychological nature of Yoga as described by Patañjali (Paranjpe, 1984; Rao & Paranjpe, 2008).

Basic Assumptions of Patañjali's Yoga

The ontological foundations of Yoga are explicitly based on the basic concepts of the Sāṁkhya philosophy. According the Sāṁkhya system, reality is divided into two distinct realms: Puruṣa, which is the principle

of sentience, or the capacity for subjective experience, and Prakṛti, the objective principle of materiality (see Dasgupta, 1922/1975; Larson, 1969). The term Puruṣa is used in two slightly different ways. First, it differentiates the universal principle of sentience from the Prakṛti, the principle of materiality that manifests in insentient objects, atoms, rocks, chairs, mountains, clouds and so on, as well as in bodies of animals and humans. Second, it is also suggestive of an individual center of awareness, or the Self, in all individual human beings. While Puruṣa as the Self is said to be unchanging, individuals tend to identify their self with ongoing thought, feelings and action, which keeps continually changing along with everything else within the domain of Prakṛti. All changes in the domain of Prakṛti are said to happen as a result of the lawful interaction between the three components or 'strands' of Prakṛti. We need not go into the detailed description of the characteristics of the three strands or '*guṇa*'s of Prakṛti here.

With regard to Patañjali's view of the mind (which he calls the *citta*), it manifests itself in a variety of mental processes called the *vṛttis*. As described in the *Yoga Sūtras* (1. 5–11), these include the processes of thinking (whether in reaching valid conclusions or otherwise), imagining and construing, dreaming, and remembering. Patañjali considers the *citta* to be part of the domain of Prakṛti. Like everything in the "material" domain of Prakṛti, its processes are constantly in flux due to the continual interaction of the three strands. In other words, the mind too is material in nature, except that it is composed of a "subtle" form of matter as distinguished from "gross" matter, of which the body is made. The goal of Yoga is to attain the highest state of human existence, conceived to be the state of *kiavalya*, meaning the "isolation" of Puruṣa or an unchanging true Self from its entanglement with the continually changing Prakṛti. The way to do this is through the control of the flow of mental processes (*vṛttis*) until the flow comes to a full stop. Patañjali (in aphorism #1.12) suggests two main means for attaining this goal: first, untiring and repeated effort (*abhyāsa*), and second, completely overcoming desires for objects, whether seen or unseen (*vairāgya*, defined in #1.15). The *Yoga Sūtras* also provide a detailed and meticulous description of the method of concentrative meditation that helps in radically transforming not only the mind, but also the entire life of the meditator. The program is divided into eight steps.

Eight Steps of Yoga Practice

The *first* step involves disciplining one's conduct in life following, the avoidance of proscribed behaviors (stop killing and causing injury, telling lies, stealing, overindulgence, and covetousness). The *second* step requires the cultivation of a set of virtues (cleanliness, contentment, self-control, self-study, and devotion to God). The *third* and *fourth* steps involve, respectively, the practice of postures, and a series of breathing exercises. Indeed, comfort and stability are the only two features of a posture that Patañjali considers adequate as a means to stabilize the wandering mind. The proliferation of complex bodily postures is a later development of Yoga (called the *Haṭha* Yoga) that is often mistaken as the quintessence of Yoga. The *fifth* step involves turning attention inward into the contents and processes of the mind. This step is a necessary prerequisite for the beginning of a systematic and concerted attempt to *control* the processes of the mind, such as thinking, imagining, wishing, deciding and so on. The *Yoga Sūtras* present a vivid picture of the process that concentrative meditation leads to. In the *sixth* step, the stream of thoughts is slowed down, and its contents become uniform as thoughts are focused on a single object. Following this, in the *seventh* step, the same thought is retained in awareness. What the meditator experiences after this in the final—*eighth*—step is a series of states called the Samādhi. To put it simply, the stages involve a gradual process of emptying the contents of the mind including connotative and denotative meanings and the sensory bases of thoughts until ultimately experience is rendered totally empty or devoid of content. (For a more detailed discussion see Paranjpe, 1984).

When consciousness is emptied of all its contents, and the mental processes come to a stop, there is nothing *toward* which attention is *directed*. To put it in the light of modern psychology, this implies that, in such a situation, consciousness is not "intentional" as Brentano (1874/1974) called it. (This is a complex issue, and we will return to it in the last section of discussion to follow.) In other words, there is no experiencing subject as distinguished from the objects of experience; both subject and objects are fused together in a united existence. In Yoga and the Advaita Vedānta, which are arguably the most dominant systems of Indian thought, the state of consciousness as devoid of content and intentionality is not only strongly affirmed, but it is highly valued. Its valorization is based on following main claims. *First*, that its

experience is infinitely more positive than all the pleasures attainable by a strong and healthy person who may possess unlimited wealth and power, such as that of a king. *Second*, that the true Self as the unchanging foundation underlying the changing images of the ego is discovered in the experience of the non-intentional state of consciousness, a state that is dubbed the 'Fourth state' following the Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad (#12; see Radhakrishnan, 1953/1994, p. 701). *Finally*, subsequent to the experience of the fourth and highest state of consciousness, the true and permanent basis of selfhood having been discovered, the meditator no longer needs to pursue ever more alluring self-definitions, and lasting and undisturbed experience of peace is attained once and for all.

This is all right, one may say, but *where's the evidence*? This is an epistemological question, to which Vyāsa, the earliest major commentator of Patañjali, provides an answer in his commentary on aphorism #3.6. The proof of Yoga lies in *doing* Yoga (*yogo yogena jñātavyo*; *yogo yogat pravartate*), he suggests. In other words, if a person follows the procedures explicitly laid out in Yoga, she or he will attain the experiences as specified. This involves what may be called an *experiential verification* of Yogic claims. It obviously involves a subjective and private sort of verification, as distinguished from the verification by observation in the public domain demanded by the logical positivists and by Skinner.

Finally, we need to take a look at the axiological foundation of Yoga. The answer is suggested by the Sāṁkhya system where the very first aphorism states that its aim is to radically remove all forms of suffering. The way to do it is not by removing external stressors, but by directly experiencing the true Self which is beyond thinking, desiring, and feeling. The strategy here involves a transformation of the *subject* who enjoys and suffers rather than on removal of the objects that are supposed to cause pleasure or pain. This does not mean that there is no place for the removal of falling objects that may cause wounds, or agents that cause diseases. The Sāṁkhya aphorisms suggest that the removal of such suffering is left to physical means (such as moving away from a moving object, or using medical means to cure diseases). Sāṁkhya and Yoga focus on the discovery of the true Self, which transcends the mundane domain to which satisfaction and dissatisfaction belong. As indicated above, the true Self is realized by stopping the processes of thinking and feeling and the direct experience of a higher state of consciousness, which ensues from the stoppage of the mental processes. Such an experience is said to lead to a form of lasting peace, which is considered to be vastly more

satisfying than the best of worldly pleasures attainable through wealth and power. This implies a distinctly individualist Nirvana, and not a utopian state of society like that of Skinner's *Walden Two*. The recognition and valorization of a state of human existence putatively higher than all mundane sources of happiness attainable through wealth and power is a dominant theme of the Indian cultural tradition. This persistent theme of culture has dominated psychology in the Indian tradition, and it accounts for one of the important ways in which Indian psychology differs from its Western counterpart. The purpose here is to point out the foundational principles upon which the Yoga system is based, and not on defending or proving them.

Discussion

Yoga is no longer restricted to India, the land of its origin; it is now known around the globe. However, currently its image is mainly as a system of calisthenics useful for ensuring physical fitness. Although Yoga is also seen as useful in countering stress, the fact that bodily postures and breathing exercises are primarily meant to enable controlling the mind is not widely known. From the sketchy introduction presented above, it should be clear that Yoga is essentially a system of psychology. It is hardly surprising that the psychology of Yoga is quite different from most Western systems of psychology; given their origins in eras centuries apart, and in regions continents apart, some differences among them would be natural. However, the differences are significant—not marginal—especially when Yoga is compared with radical behaviorism.

Let us note once again the remarkable differences between their foundational assumptions: while Skinner dismisses mental events as simply a "myth", Yoga not only affirms that they are real, but also provides a time-tested methodology to help attain higher states of consciousness. Interestingly, Yogic view of mental processes is almost identical to Descartes' conception of the "cogito," which includes thinking, doubting, understanding, affirming, denying as well as imagining and feeling (see Wilson, 1969, in *Essential Descartes*, p. 174). Yet there is a radical difference between the ontological foundations of these two indigenous systems that provide the framework within which the nature of these processes is understood and dealt with. Skinner, working against the

historical backdrop of the Cartesian dualism, stays closest to the material pole of the mind–matter dualism. Although Yoga is founded on Sāṁkhyan dualism, the duality it postulates is vastly different from the Cartesian formulation. In Descartes's view, as with many of his followers in the Western tradition, consciousness is equated with the occurrence of mental processes. By contrast, in Sāṁkya–Yoga, Advaita Vedānta and other systems of Indian thought, the view of consciousness extends beyond mental processes to include a higher state of consciousness that is empty of content and devoid of the mental processes that constitute the wakeful state of consciousness. When experience is emptied of content by following techniques such as those described by Patañjali, the distinction between the experiencing subject and object of experience is also overcome. The experiencing subject and the objects of experience are fused together in a unitive experience.

The resulting state is thus beyond *intentionality*, which Brentano (1874/1974) described as the condition where consciousness is *about* something—thoughts are *directed* at objects of thought. Brentano indicated that intentionality is an unmistakable feature of consciousness. Following Brentano's footsteps, many of his main followers in the phenomenological/existential traditions suggested that consciousness is *always* intentional. Husserl (1931/1962), for instance, said: "every consciousness is the consciousness of something" (pp. 257–258). Following this lead, Sartre (1943/1966) says: "All consciousness, as Husserl has shown, is consciousness of something. This means that there is no consciousness … that … has no 'content'" (p. 11). While this view of consciousness seems to be entrenched within the phenomenological/existential stream of Western psychology, Skinner represents the behaviorist stream that dismisses the relevance of consciousness altogether. In the Indian tradition, however, the notion of a non-intentional state of consciousness is as persistent as it is central. In recent years, with increasing globalization, an international forum for the East–West exchange of ideas about the nature of consciousness has opened up in the form of the *Journal of Consciousness Studies.* In this forum, the non-intentional state of consciousness as described in Yoga as the highest state of Samādhi has been recognized as "pure consciousness" (Forman, 1990). Indeed, such recognition is an indication of one of the ways in which IPs are beginning to make a mark on the international scene.

Claims regarding the existence and nature of higher states of consciousness naturally raise the question of evidence. As noted, in the Yogic tradition, the proof of the pudding is said to lie in *experiential* verification, through actually *doing* or practicing yoga. Verifiability is surely the epistemic principle considered central to logical positivism, and although it is hard to find Skinner explicitly affirming the same, I see no deviation from it in Skinner's work. In his work, as with the logical positivists, verification implies observation in a public space, supported by replication and consensus among observers. To put it in a language that seems to be lately getting popular, while in Yoga there is reliance on *first person statements*, in Skinner as in much of modern science, truth can be ascertained via *third person statements*. A parallel distinction is between private and public, and unless consciousness and mind are to be ruled out of bounds for psychology, as Skinner and many other behaviorists have done, psychology cannot avoid first person statements. Insofar as this issue is crucial for IPs whose voices have been long suppressed, raising this issue to the forefront of psychology in the world at large could well be a major task ahead.

An even bigger challenge ahead for IPs is to help psychology to cope with the highly diverse and complex views of what constitutes a good life, or the varied conceptions of the ideal human condition. Here again, the contrasting pair of IPs presented here can suggest the scope of the task involved in this regard. Note how in developing his theory of learning following the steps of his forebear, Edward L. Thorndike (1932), Skinner tries to rid his brand of psychology of the slightest reference to even basic feelings of pleasure or pain attributable to animals in ingesting food or getting hurt. Thorndike had no problem in using terms such as satisfaction and annoyance (p. 176) implying subjective experience, even in describing the behavior of the cats and dogs used in his experiments. However, Skinner insisted on using the terms positive and negative reinforcement in terms of objectively observable phenomenon or the probability of repeatable responses even in the case of humans. Such an extreme case of meticulous avoidance of subjective feelings is rare even among other IPs of the USA such as humanistic psychology and many others. Yoga, by comparison, stands at virtually the opposite pole in holding feelings and subjectivity at the core of its enterprise. Patañjali speaks repeatedly of happiness (*sukha*) and suffering (*duḥkha*), and even refers (in #2.42) to unsurpassed levels of happiness (*anuttamaḥ sukhalābhaḥ*) attainable through the practice of Yoga. Moreover, the very

aim of Yoga is to experience purely a subjective experience untouched by any reference to objects, seen or unseen.

As noted before, in spite of his extreme disdain for subjective terms, Skinner does speak in *Walden Two* of a good life—presumably a style of living that one makes *feel* good. Note the expressions he uses in describing the life in the utopian or "ideal" society: There, he says, there will be "an absolute minimum of *unpleasant* labor", "*satisfying* personal contacts", and "relaxation and rest" (Skinner, 1948/1969, pp. 147–148; emphasis added). In my view, all these aspects of a good life as viewed by Skinner involve the mundane aspects of living in a world of objects. As noted earlier, Yoga considers overcoming the desire for objects, seen or unseen, as one of the two main means for attaining its goals. In other words, a yogi is expected to shun pleasures attainable through tangible or 'seen' objects, as well as 'unseen' objects of desire, such as fame. But this does not mean that Yoga aims at something otherworldly, such as pleasures in heaven. Rather, it aims at experiencing bliss—or "unsurpassed happiness"—attainable in this life through the discovery of the Self in the state of pure consciousness.

Given the sharp contrast between radical behaviorism and Yoga, one may wonder if we are comparing apples with oranges, as the expression goes. However, there should be no doubt that both radical behaviorism and Yoga are but differing perspectives on the *same* issue, namely mental processes such as thinking. There should be no doubt that the occurrence of mental processes is a panhuman phenomenon that is most commonly recognized around the world. As William James put it: "The first fact for us, then, as psychologists, is that thinking of some sort goes on" (1890/1983, p. 219). Both the indigenous systems discussed here are concerned with the ontological status of thinking, and about what we can *do* with it, and to what *end*. Ironically, both of these differing perspectives are interested in the possibility of *controlling* thinking and other mental processes as a means to improve the human condition. However, they go about it in radically different ways. For Skinner, committed as he is to the enterprise of 'science' as envisioned by Bacon, exercising control and bringing about beneficial changes is *the* thing to do. Like science, Skinner looks at the world 'out there' to exercise control. Mental processes can be controlled only from the *outside*; by arranging physical conditions in the environment. Skinner insists that, like the early behaviorist Max Meyer (1922), his is a psychology of the 'other one,' not about the self, whereas the entire focus in Yoga is on one's own self.

Interestingly, when Wundt started to develop psychology as a science, he turned his gaze inward with his method of introspection. However, what his followers like Titchener and other 'introspectionists' wanted to do was to *observe* the contents of consciousness and discover the elements from which consciousness was composed. The yogis were most interested in *controlling* the mental processes, and much less in *observing* their contents. More specifically, the aim of the contemplative search of the yogis was to find peace and bliss in the depths of the inner world hidden behind the smokescreen of the mind. The contemplative approach such as that of Yoga is certainly not the monopoly of the sages of India; it has been an integral part of religious traditions of East and also of the West. As the Bible says, "the kingdom of God is within you" (St. Luke, 17.21).

Skinner's Religious Background and the "Sacred Canopy"

There is a tendency in the West to strongly differentiate between religion and science. True, Yoga has been closely associated with the Hindu, Buddhist and Jain traditions. However, there has been little difficulty in incorporating Yogic and Buddhist techniques of meditation as part of the secular enterprise of modern clinical psychology. Reading the voluminous writings of Skinner makes it appear that his is a strictly secular enterprise uncontaminated by anything concerning religion. But let me note a couple of things he says toward the end of the last of the three volumes of his autobiography (Skinner, 1983).

"My early religious experience was important" says Skinner. Then he continues: "the point of [*Beyond Freedom and Dignity*] could be summarized as a scientific defense of the radical dissenting Protestantism of early 19th century England" (1983, p. 402). He goes on to quote many sentences from his own work with parallel statements from Jonathan Edwards (1703–1758), a Congregationalist American theologian, who was for some time the President of Yale University. It is as if Skinner virtually reinterpreted the religious doctrine of predestination by substituting a thoroughgoing environmental determinism for a total control on the world by an omnipotent God. What is more, Skinner also points out that his denial of the self is in line with a distinctly Christian perspective. Thus, he says: "Assigning one's achievements to one's genetic and environmental histories is an act of self-denial that would have been

understood by Tomas à Kempis" (1983, p. 408). À Kempis (1380–1471) was a medieval Christian monk and the author of the famous work called *The Imitation of Christ*. In that work, he essentially suggests the theme that humility and self-effacement is the true mark of becoming like Christ. Skinner adds that "[t]he theme turns up in mundane philosophy … and literature. … It is of course a strong theme in Eastern mysticism" (1983, p. 408). Needless to say, Yoga is in essence a form of Eastern mysticism!

There are two points that may be noted in what is just pointed out. First, that for Skinner's perspective as for Yoga, religion seems to provide what Berger (1967) has called a "sacred canopy"—a broad, all-encompassing framework that is like a large tent under which varied perspectives emerge and flourish. Second, the fact that Skinner mentions Eastern mysticism that promotes a denial of the self even as he implies and means it suggests that East and West can meet even where we may least suspect it.

From Contrast to Complementarity

Regardless of the sharp differences between radical behaviorism and Yoga, neither of the two perspectives needs to be seen as exclusive to cultures of their origin. Indeed, additionally, neither is irrelevant in the other's land of origin. These systems are not emic systems designed to suit the specific conditions pertaining to the cultures of their origin. Rather, they are systems of potential universal relevance: universal in the sense of being appropriate for persons with specific needs no matter what part of the world they may belong to. There are good reasons why behavior modification is relevant in India to patients of certain forms of pathology such as obsessive compulsive behavior, and to students who need rewards in order to make progress in their learning. Also, Yoga appeals to a number of North Americans not simply as a system of calisthenics, but as one of the pathways to higher reaches of human happiness. There are deeper existential needs of select groups of people for whom various techniques of meditation developed in indigenous traditions of the East have legitimate appeal and genuine utility. Behavior modification and teaching machines can be used meaningfully and effectively in meeting the needs of mental patients and students of certain types anywhere in the world.

Varied indigenous systems of psychology have developed in long traditions in a way that effectively fulfills the differing needs of different types of clientele. If this is correct, then the way to go is to adopt a pluralist approach to psychology, and not to shun IPs in the name of universal 'science' where one size fits all.

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PART II

Current Scholarships in Asian Indigenous Psychologies, with Special Focus on Contributions to Theory Construction and Methodological Innovations

CHAPTER 5

The Story of Culture in Psychology and the Return Journey to Normology: Comments on the Global Relevance of Asian Indigenous Psychologies

Chi-yue Chiu, Yuan-yuan Shi and Letty Y.-Y. Kwan

In this chapter, we will tell two stories. The first story is about the changing views of culture in Western psychology, and the second story is about our return journey from personology to normology. The moral of the stories is: all psychological theories are indigenous creations. They are theoretical constructions inspired by the intellectual traditions that the theorists are exposed to and often the result of the theorists' intentional or unconscious attempts to combine inspirations and insights from these traditions.

This view is consistent with Donald's view of cultural evolution. According to Donald (1991), cultural evolution ensues from a creative process whereby one thought triggers another, leading to the chaining and progressive modification of thoughts and actions. This process, which has been referred to as *ratcheting* in anthropology, accounts for

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the unique human capability to cumulate modifications of their creative productions over time (Tomasello, 2001).

Figure 5.1 illustrates this process with the example of the evolution of polycultural psychology. The spheres represent individual theorists and the networks within the spheres represent the theorists' world-views. The dashed lines represent the pattern of social transmission. The curved arrows represent (a) the creative contribution from the theorists to a school of thought in psychology or (b) the inspiration of a school of thought to the theorists. In essence, a new school of thought emerges when individual theorists receive and combine inspirations from divergent schools of thoughts. For example, the Michigan School of Cultural Psychology championed by Richard Nisbett and Hazel Markus, who were thought leaders in social cognition, emerged from the creative synthesis of social cognition and cross-cultural psychology (Fiske, Kitayama, Markus, & Nisbett, 1998), which is supported by the social transmission of ideas among the theorists.

We echo Gergen's (Gergen et al., 2018) call to refrain from treating *culture* in psychology as independent, free-standing entities, because all



Fig. 5.1 Social transmission enables the evolution of ideas in culture and psychology

cultures are hybrids and in continuous transformation. Like Gergen, we believe that psychology, with a healthy shift in emphasis toward "cultures in the making," will be more prepared to benefit from cross-fertilization. We also agree with Bhatia and Priya (2018) that a culturalist agenda that seeks to recover culturally essentialized ideas for a society from its pre-colonial or ancient traditions may foster the growth of 'pure,' tribalist identities. Although successful implementation of this agenda may create the perception of a culture-inclusive science that resists the hegemonic domination of Western psychology, it can also discourage intercultural learning and fuel resistance to developing a truly culture-inclusive psychological science that treats all cultural traditions as intellectual resources for its growth.

Story 1: Culture in Western Psychology

Cross-Cultural Psychology

Early studies of culture in psychology were motivated by the attempt to answer the question of whether cognitive, linguistic, perceptual and moral reasoning abilities are learned or innate (Segall, 1979). The nativist view holds that humans have an innate ability to develop their abilities and individuals are biologically programmed to master more sophisticated skills at different stages of development. Support for this view came from the evidence that although the cultural environment may affect the speed of skill acquisition, the sequence by which different skills are mastered is universal. For example, individuals from all societies master pre-operational thoughts before they do concrete and formal operational thoughts. Likewise, individuals from all societies are able to generate pre-conventional moral explanations before they do conventional or post-conventional explanations.

Meanwhile, there was also evidence from early cultural research that perceptual skills are nurtured. For example, natives who had not previously been exposed to a 'carpenter world' were relatively unskilled in the application of monocular depth cues to perceive depth in two-dimensional drawings (Segall, Campbell, & Herskovits, 1966). These discoveries inspired John Binnie-Dawson, an Australian who taught at the University of Hong Kong to develop a bio-social approach to psychology, in order to study "the way in which adaptation to different biological environments results in the development of adaptive

socialization processes, which influence particular habits of perceptual inference, personality traits, cognitive processes and psychological skills" (Binnie-Dawson, 1982, p. 397). This approach also foreshadows the recent surge of interest in the ecological approach to culture and cultural evolution (Oishi & Graham, 2010).

Walt Lonner (2013), Senior Editor of the *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology* (*JCCP*), recalled that before the International Association of Cross-Cultural Psychology (IACCP) was established, Yale anthropologist George Murdock had collected many documents and reports around the world to create the Human Relations Area Files, cross-cultural methods were taught in anthropology, and Wilhelm Wundt had published the famous *Volkerpsychologie*. However, it was not until the 1960s that the term *cross-cultural psychology* began to receive some attention in psychology. In 1966, Leonard Doob, Editor of the *Journal of Social Psychology*, initiated Cross-Cultural Notes as a brief section in his journal. The *International Journal of Psychology* published John Berry's 'Directory of Cross-Cultural Psychological Research' in 1968. *JCCP* was inaugurated in 1970.

In 1972, John Binnie-Dawson organized the inaugural conference of the IACCP in Hong Kong, and *JCCP* became the official journal of the IACCP. Several years later, 21 international scholars were named as the Honorary Fellows of the IACCP, in recognition of their contributions to cross-cultural psychology. They were John W. Berry (Canada), Deborah L. Best (USA), Michael H. Bond (Hong Kong), Jerome Bruner (USA), John L. M. Dawson (Hong Kong), Rogelio Diaz-Guerrero (Mexico), Geert H. Hofstede (The Netherlands), Gustav Jahoda (UK), Çigdem Kağitçibaşi (Turkey), Daphne M. Keats (Australia), Walter J. Lonner (USA), Ruth H. Munroe (USA), Charles E. Osgood (USA), Janak Pandey (India), Ype H. Poortinga (The Netherlands), Shalom H. Schwartz (Israel), Marshall H. Segall (USA), Peter B. Smith (UK), Durganand Sinha (India), Harry Triandis (USA), and Herman A. Witkin (USA).

In 1998, Marshall Segall, Walter Lonner and John Berry published an article in *American Psychologist*, entitled 'Cross-Cultural Psychology as a Scholarly Discipline: On the Flowering of Culture in Behavioral Research.' In this article, the authors claimed that cross-cultural psychology is an increasingly important part of modern psychology. The status of cross-cultural psychology has changed from a minority movement to a respectable subfield in psychology. Nonetheless, cross-cultural

psychology is not a monolithic knowledge tradition. Instead, within the discipline, there are noteworthy conceptual differences regarding the ways in which culture and behavior interrelate.

A major research goal in cross-cultural psychology is to explain similarities and differences in behaviors across societies. A major perspective is that all societies need to solve similar problems in the coordination of individual members' goal-directed behaviors. How these problems are solved in a certain society depends in part on its distinctive physical and social ecology. For example, Shalom Schwartz (2009) contends that there are three problems that all societies need to address. First, how should autonomous or socially embedded individuals be in terms of the way they relate to the group? Second, in order to elicit cooperative and productive activities in the society, to what extent should social arrangements treat individuals as equally worthy moral agents who voluntarily seek to transcend self-interests, and to what extent should social arrangements rely on the assignment of individuals to hierarchical roles? Third, to regulate use of scarce human and natural resources, to what extent should social arrangements privilege harmony with, and submission to, the natural and social order, and to what extent should they emphasize mastery, control and change of the status quo? Variations in the preferred answers to these questions place societies in different positions along the dimensions of autonomy vs. embeddedness, egalitarianism vs. hierarchy, and harmony vs. mastery.

Cultural Psychology

Now enters cultural psychology. Unlike cross-cultural psychology, the primary concern of cultural psychology is not to uncover the pan-cultural, universal dimensions that explain cultural similarities or variations in behaviors. Instead, the major objective of cultural psychology is to understand the reciprocal influence of culture and psychology.

Cultural psychology is a product of intellectual hybridity. The 1991 *Psychological Review* article published by Hazel Markus and Shinobu Kitayama is a landmark publication in cultural psychology. Hazel Markus, an American social psychologist, was a champion in social cognition research, and is particularly well known for her research on self-schema. Shinobu Kitayama brought knowledge of Japanese culture to the table and transformed Hazel Markus's self-schema theory into a theory of culture and self. The theory starts with the assumption that

cultural experiences shape the individual's self-schema, which produces schematic influence on the individuals' cognition, motivation, emotion and behaviors. The greater prevalence of the independent self in American context and that of the interdependent self in the East Asian context together establish East–West differences in basic psychological processes.

Another seminal paper in cultural psychology is the 1999 *American Psychologist* article published by Kaiping Peng and Richard Nisbett. Like Hazel Markus, Richard Nisbett was famous for his social cognition research on biases in social inferences, and Kaiping Peng contributed his Chinese experiences to the development of the theory of culture and thought. The theory argues that culture shapes individuals' thought processes, such that individuals who grew up in an interdependent culture tend to think more holistically, whereas those who grew up in an independent culture tend to think analytically. A major contribution of cultural psychology is that it highlights the influence of cultural experiences on basic social cognitive processes and surprises mainstream psychologists with the findings that phenomena that were previously assumed to be universal (e.g., self-enhancement biases, cognitive dissonance, the fundamental attribution error) are products of cultural learning (e.g., Nisbett, Peng, Choi, & Norenzayan, 2001).

Indigenous Psychologies

An intellectual relative of cultural psychology are the IPs practiced in Asia (Pandey, Singha, & Bhwauk, 1996). The goal of IPs is to establish local systems of psychologies rooted in indigenous cultural traditions. A common practice in IPs is to identify indigenous concepts in a local cultural heritage, infuse them with psychological meanings, and use these concepts to offer more culturally grounded understanding of behaviors in the local contexts and beyond.

Some successful examples are Kuang-Hui Yeh's study of relating autonomy, which is grounded in the characteristic sociality of Chinese culture. Relating autonomy privileges the "volitional capacity to act by emphasizing the harmony of self-in-relation-to-others, the quality of interpersonal relationships, and self-transcendence" (Yeh, Bedford, & Yang, 2009, p. 213). Relating autonomy broadens the psychological construction of individuating autonomy in mainstream psychology, which emphasizes the "volitional capacity to act against social constraints

and offers a route to achieve an independent self-identity by expressing individualistic attributes and distinctions" (Yeh et al., 2009, p. 213). Relating autonomy exists not only in contemporary Taiwan, but also in the USA. Furthermore, compared with individuating autonomy, relating autonomy is more predictive of individuals' psychological adjustment in the interpersonal domains.

Another successful application of IP is the development of the Chinese Personality Assessment Inventory (CPAI) by Fanny Mui-Ching (Cheung et al., 1996). The construction of the CPAI started with a thorough review of classical and contemporary Chinese literature, person descriptions used by Chinese people from different sectors, and recent personality research on the Chinese people. Based on this review and inputs from psychologists from Hong Kong and Mainland China, many indigenous Chinese personality constructs (e.g., harmony, *renqing* or relationship orientation, thrift—extravagance, defensiveness, graciousness—meanness, face, family orientation) were included in the inventory (Cheung et al., 1996). Psychometric analysis results show *interpersonal relatedness is* a major Chinese personality factor, and its content is not covered in the Five Factor Model (Cheung et al., 2001). Moreover, this factor can be used to characterize the personality traits of both Chinese and European Americans (Cheung et al., 2008).

A third example is Yuanyuan Shi's study of modesty in Chinese culture. Based on a prototype analysis of Chinese lay concepts and the interactionist perspective on personal preferences and norms (Chiu & Chao, 2009), Shi (2016) differentiated authentic modesty from tactical modesty. Authentic modesty refers to the awareness and expression of modesty that are motivated by internalized modesty-pertinent values or beliefs. By contrast, tactical modesty refers to acting in modest manners out of sensitivity to and compliance with situational requirements, without internalization of the modesty-relevant values or beliefs. A series of studies have been carried out to characterize authentic and tactical modesty and to identify their adaptive values. The results suggest that whereas authentic modesty promotes the development of a coherent and integrated self-concept, tactical modesty fosters the person–environment fit and cohesiveness of the ingroup. This research shows that a theoretical insight that originates from observing indigenous phenomena can be generalized to different contexts and societies.

There are four similarities in these three research examples. First, the investigators sourced theoretical inspirations from Chinese culture.

Second, the investigators applied established methods in psychology to measure their indigenous constructs and to document the incremental explanatory utility of these constructs. Third, in all three research examples, the investigators attempted to establish the global relevance of their constructs. Finally, in all three examples, the investigators engaged in a global dialogue on fundamental issues in psychology (e.g., the nature of autonomy, the structure of personality, amd forms of self-presentation).

Dynamic Constructivism

Like cultural psychology, dynamic constructivism (Hong & Chiu, 2001; Hong, Morris, Chiu, & Benet-Martinez, 2000) is a hybrid theory. It has received theoretical inspirations from cross-cultural psychology and social cognition research. From cross-cultural psychology, we learned that individuals in a society reach a consensus on how to make sense of their shared experiences and what should be done to maximize the collective good. Moreover, these consensual beliefs and values differ across different social and physical ecologies (Chiu, Leung, & Hong, 2010). From our research on lay theories or worldviews, we learned that the consensual beliefs and values in a culture can guide individuals' cognitive, emotional and behavioral responses to their experiences (Dweck, Chiu, & Hong, 1995). From the knowledge activation theory in social cognition, we learned that the effects of consensual beliefs and values affect behaviors only when such beliefs and values have been activated. Moreover, a belief or value has higher probability of being activated when it has been frequently or recently applied in order to comprehend the reality (Chiu & Hong, 2007). More importantly, the synthesis of these theoretical insights into a theory is motivated by observations of cultural frame switching among Hong Kong Chinese.

Hong Kong was a British colony before it was handed over to China. People in Hong Kong have been exposed to both Chinese and Western cultures. As such, they have acquired knowledge about the consensual beliefs and values in Chinese culture as well as those in Western culture. Cueing the Chinese (Western) culture would increase the cognitive accessibility of its associated beliefs and values, which in turn, would orient the individuals to display behaviors that are typical in Chinese (Western) culture. Earle (1969) was the first to observe that Hong Kong Chinese reported higher dogmatism when they responded to the Chinese (vs. English) version of the dogmatism measure. A more robust

demonstration of cultural frame switching was reported by Ying-yi Hong, Chi-yue Chiu and Tracy Kung in 1997. In their experiment, Hong Kong Chinese was primed with pictures that symbolize Chinese culture, pictures that symbolize Western culture or pictures unrelated to any particular culture. Next, they were presented with a picture that showed a single fish swimming ahead of a school of fish and were asked to explain why this had happened. Results showed that culture priming increases the likelihood of making responses that are typical in the primed culture. For example, priming the American culture increases the likelihood of offering a dispositionist attribution (the lead fish wants to get the food first) and priming Chinese culture increases the likelihood of providing a situational explanation (the lead fish is being chased by other fish). Subsequent studies show that culture priming also affected spontaneous self-concepts (Hong, Ip, Chiu, Morris, & Menon, 2001) and cooperative behavior (Wong & Hong, 2005) of the Hong Kong Chinese. Moreover, the priming effect is automatic (does not require conscious deliberation) (Fu, Chiu, Morris, & Young, 2007). In short, through their bicultural experiences, Hong Kong Chinese have developed separate bodies of cultural knowledge about Chinese and Western cultures. Moreover, the same individual may display typically Chinese responses in one situation (in which Chinese culture has been primed) or typically Western responses in another situation (in which Western culture has been primed). Subsequently, cultural frame switching has been reported in other bicultural samples (Chiu & Hong, 2006). This is a noteworthy example in which a local cultural phenomenon has inspired a new theory of culture and psychology that emphasizes the dynamic, intermittent and situated (vs. static, steady and general) nature of cultural influence.

Polycultural Psychology

Despite their specific emphases, IP, cultural psychology, cross-cultural psychology and dynamic constructivism share the same culturalist assumption: that is, cultures have independent, ancient origins and are therefore historically stable. In 2015, Michael Morris, Chi-yue Chiu and Zhi Liu proposed a polycultural psychology that emphasizes the hybridity of cultures. According to this view, cultures are constantly interacting with each other and are hence continually evolving. For example, Zen Buddhism, a Sinicized branch of Buddhism, has gone through major transformations in its history.

Polycultural psychology is also a theoretical hybrid. It builds on dynamic constructivism and source inspirations from research on globalization, intergroup relations and behavioral neuroscience. For example, polycultural psychology posits that intercultural contacts can lead to progressive changes enabled by the creation and incorporation of innovative ideas and practices from diverse cultures. Progressive changes ensue from integrative responses to the inflow of foreign cultures; these changes occur when people in the culture view ideas and practices in foreign cultures as intellectual resources and are motivated to recruit these resources for creative conceptual expansion (Chiu, Gries, Torelli, & Cheng, 2011). This type of reaction to foreign cultural inflow is analogous to cool reactions in behavioral neuroscience (Metcalfe & Michel, 1999). Intercultural contacts can also result in nativism that values a return to indigenous traditions. Nativism is often accompanied by exclusionary reactions that oppose to foreign cultural influence (Chiu et al., 2011). This type of reaction is analogous to hot reactions in behavioral neuroscience (Metcalfe & Michel, 1999).

Like IPs, polycultural psychology also received inspiration from local cultural phenomena. However, its goal is not to explain the local phenomena, but to develop new theories of intercultural interaction based on these phenomena. Let us take integrative responses to foreign culture as an example. Stephan Chow, a Hong Kong movie producer, was famous for his use of cultural hybridity in his movies. In his movie *Shaolin Soccer*, he created comic effect in the football field by playfully mixing elements of Chinese martial art with soccer (a European sport). Likewise, in his movie *Kung Fu Hustle*, he mixed typical Hong Kong movie elements (e.g., martial art, gangster fight) with memorable scenes from Hollywood movies. In an interview, he explicitly mentioned that, "I love Hollywood movies – I grew up on them, I love them, and I use a lot of elements of them in my films… And I think that my willingness to incorporate so many Western elements in my films will, in a way, humanize these films for American audiences" (Chiu & Cheng, 2007).

There is now clear evidence that receptiveness to foreign cultural inflow fosters creativity (Leung & Chiu, 2010). When individuals are exposed to two cultures simultaneously, they will spontaneously attend to the differences between the cultures. Awareness of cultural differences in turn sensitizes them to alternative ways to think and solve problems, destabilizes existing cognitive structures, induces cognitive dissonance,

and facilitates the generation of creative ideas (Leung, Maddux, Galinsky, & Chiu, 2008). These effects are particularly pronounced among individuals who are open-minded (Leung & Chiu, 2008).

However, exposure to foreign culture can also result in exclusionary reactions (Torelli, Chiu, Tam, Au, & Keh, 2011). There is consistent evidence that inflow of foreign culture may be seen as a threat to one's own culture (Chiu & Kwan, 2016). One may be concerned that foreign influence will lead to cultural contamination, cultural erosion and foreign domination (Yang, Chen, Xu, Preston, & Chiu, 2016). Responses to this concern vary, including negative evaluation of foreign cultures, isolation of the foreign cultures in one's society, and maintenance of the purity of one's cultural tradition (Wu, Yang, & Chiu, 2014; Yang et al., 2016). Exclusionary responses are likely to occur when foreign practices have infiltrated into the culture's sacred practices or when foreign symbols are placed in the culture's holy space (Wu et al., 2014; Yang et al., 2016). Individuals are likely to exhibit exclusionary reactions if they are culturally conservative, strongly identify with their culture, and view defense of their cultural worldview as a means to affirm their purpose in life (Torelli et al., 2011).

Research on the exclusionary reactions to foreign cultural inflow owes its inspiration to a local cultural phenomenon in China. In 2007, a Starbucks coffee shop in the Beijing's Imperial Palace Museum was forced to close its store after a Chinese opinion leader posed his view on the coffee shop: "The Forbidden City is a symbol of China's cultural heritage. Starbucks is a symbol of lower middle class culture in the West. We need to embrace the world, but we also need to preserve our cultural identity. There is a fine line between globalization and contamination… But please don't interpret this as an act of nationalism. It is just about we Chinese people respecting ourselves. I actually like drinking Starbucks coffee. I am just against having one in the Forbidden City." This post was followed by a massive online campaign to request the removal of the coffee shop from the Forbidden City (Chiu & Cheng, 2007). This post helped to identify several conditions that can trigger exclusionary reactions to foreign culture: intrusion of an American symbol in a place that symbolizes Chinese culture, concern with cultural contamination, and salience of the Chinese identity. These processes have been systematically investigated in polycultural research (Chiu & Kwan, 2016).

The research reviewed above concerns how lay people relate to their culture and foreign cultures. Interestingly, researchers may also relate to cultures in the same way lay people do (Chiu, Kwan, & Liou, 2013). We have learned four lessons from the story of culture in psychological research. First, cultural researchers are not immune from the influence of their own cultures. The cultural experiences they are familiar with often inspire their research and theories. As such, all psychological theories are to some extent IPs, regardless of whether or not the researchers have used nativist indigenous concepts in ancient traditions to guide theory development. Second, the influence of culture on psychology is not categorical. Instead, it is partial and plural. That is, most individuals have been exposed to more than one culture and have acquired knowledge from different cultures. The influence of any one culture on behavior is not static, steady and general, but rather dynamic, intermittent and situated (Hong et al., 2000). Third, the search for independent, free-standing and historically stable cultural traditions is bound to fail, because all cultures are hybrids and in continuous transformation (see Gergen et al., 2018). Thus, a culture-inclusive psychology is one that acknowledges the constant interactions between cultures, and seeks to understand how cultures evolve continually through these interactions (Morris, Hong, Chiu, & Liu, 2015). Fourth, a culture-inclusive psychology should also be one that treats other cultures as intellectual resources for creative conceptual expansion. Nurturing a polycultural mindset, or the belief that cultures are always in the making, will foster the creation of innovative theoretical hybrids that advance our science (Chiu et al., 2013). By contrast, nurturing a culturist mindset, or the belief that cultures have independent, ancient origins and are historically stable, may reinforce nativism and exclusionary cultural identities (Bhatia & Priya, 2018).

Story 2: The Return Journey to Normology

In 2015, Michael Morris, Ying-yi Hong, Chi-yue Chiu and Zhi Liu published a paper entitled ‘Normology’ in *Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes*. Normology refers to the science of norms, which concerns how the characteristic pattern of thought and behavior of society emanate from individuals’ shared social context. Normology is markedly different from Henry Murray’s notion of personology, which refers to how the characteristic pattern of thought and behavior of a person emanate from his or her internal traits and processes.

The Journey to Personology

In our early research on the Chinese conception of justice, we adopted an IP approach to uncovering the meaning of justice in Chinese culture. We started our inquiry by systematically reviewing how the concept of justice was represented in the canons of Confucianism. This analysis led us to the hypothesis that in Chinese culture, justice means adherence to role expectations (Chiu, 1991a). That is, people are assigned to social roles, and there are injunctive norms that prescribe what people should do in their roles. Justice is done when people adhere to these norms. By contrast, an injustice is registered when people are found to have willfully violated these norms (Chiu & Hong, 1997). A series of empirical studies were carried out in Hong Kong and the results confirmed this hypothesis (Chiu, 1991b, 1991c).

Although this analysis highlighted the centrality of norm adherence in justice judgment, it does not pin down the psychological processes that mediate how Chinese people assess justice or make moral judgments. To fill this knowledge gap, we appropriated analytical tools from American personality psychology. We reasoned that individuals are like lay scientists: they construct lay theories in order to understand their experiences. Some individuals believe that people have fixed moral dispositions. Others believe that the moral character is malleable. We hypothesized and found that individuals who believe in fixed morality tend to subscribe to a duty-based morality, believing that duties provide the ultimate justifications for moral decisions. By contrast, individuals who believe in malleable morality tend to subscribe to a rights-based morality, believing that human rights provide the ultimate justifications for moral decisions (Chiu, Dweck, Tong, & Fu, 1997). Lay theories of morality affect how people select information to justify their moral decisions. For example, in the courtroom, jurors who believe in fixed morality attend to cues that can help to diagnose the moral character of the defendant and base their verdict on the defendant's inferred moral character. By contrast, jurors who believe in malleable morality carefully scrutinize case-specific evidence and base their verdict on a systematic review of the evidence. Fixed theorists also believe in punishing the transgressors, whereas malleable theorists believe in rehabilitation (Gervey, Chiu, Hong, & Dweck, 1999).

Not surprisingly, there are more fixed morality theorists and fewer malleable morality theorists in Chinese culture than in American culture (Chiu et al., 1997). This finding seems to provide an explanation of why

norm adherence and violation is a major criterion for judging morality in Chinese culture. However, the explanation appears to contradict the emphasis on self-cultivation in Confucian thought. If Confucianism encourages individuals to develop their virtues, it should also emphasize the malleability of morality. This explanation also reduces a cultural phenomenon to the personal beliefs of individuals.

Communicative Action: Preparation for the Return Journey

In 1998, David Ho and Chi-yue Chiu published an article in *Cultural Psychology* and tried to argue for the use of collective representations instead of individual representations to understand cultural phenomenon. This proposal was based on our study of communicative action in Hong Kong. When people formulate a message for others, they want to express their communicative intention. However, communicators also take into account the common ground with the audience when they construct messages for a certain audience. That is, the speaker will formulate messages that are believed to be comprehensible to the audience. To accomplish this task, the speaker will need to construct a representation of the distribution of knowledge in the audience. This representation takes the form of, "I know most people in the audience know x but not y" (Lau, Chiu, & Hong, 2001). Speakers may also have the motivation to formulate messages that are believed to be agreeable to the audience. Thus, the speaker will also construct representations of the distributions of values and beliefs in the audience. These representations take the form of, "I know most people in the audience value x but not y," and, "I know most people in the audience believe in x but not y."

Extrapolating from this analysis, we believe that many forms of human behaviors are communicative actions (Lau, Chiu, & Lee, 2001). When people plan their behaviors, they intend their behaviors to be intelligible and acceptable by others. Therefore, people will spontaneously construct collective representations and use these representations to guide their behaviors. With this idea in mind, we began our return trip to normology.

The Return of Normology

The major proposition of normology states that individuals routinely construct representations of how widely known or shared a certain idea, value or belief is in a certain group based on the observable or simulated

responses of other people. Moreover, these perceived social distributions of ideas, values and beliefs can influence the individuals' communicative actions without intention or awareness (Chiu, Gelfand, Yamagishi, Shteynberg, & Wan, 2010).

This proposition challenges an entrenched personological bias in American social psychology. American social psychology also recognizes the importance of normative influence on behavior. However, it assumes that individuals will comply with situational norms only when they are under situational demand. For example, when individuals have incomplete information on how they should behave in the situation, they follow what the crowd does. Alternatively, when the situation rewards norm compliance and punishes deviance, individuals will be pressurized to follow norms. Following one's preferences is believed to be a spontaneous and even automatic response, whereas taking heed of situational norms is assumed to be an unnatural, effortful process. Normology corrects this bias by assuming that people routinely construct norms, which can inadvertently influence behaviors (Leung, Au, & Chiu, 2014).

How do people construct representations of how widely shared a certain idea is in a culture? In a series of studies carried out in Singapore, Letty Kwan, Suhui Yap, and Chi-yue Chiu (2015) presented novel names or objects subliminally to the participants. Some names or objects were presented frequently and some were presented infrequently. Subsequently, participants were asked to judge the familiarity of the names or objects to their peers. The participants could not consciously register the names or objects they were subliminally exposed to and were unable to recall how frequently they had seen these names or objects. Nonetheless, they consistently judged the more frequently presented names or objects to be more familiar to their peers. What this result implies is that people construct a social distribution of knowledge through the process of implicit learning. They unconsciously register how frequently they have encountered a certain event in their experiences. Moreover, they infer that a frequently encountered event is also an event frequently encountered by others. In other words, people who are frequently and unconsciously exposed to a certain entity (including artifacts, people, groups, ideas and practices, etc.) assume that this entity is widely known in one's society. These familiarity perceptions form the experiential-cognitive bases of descriptive norms. The question is whether these representations influence behaviors.

The personological bias is evident in both cross-cultural and cultural psychology. Cross-cultural psychology assumes that through socialization, people have internalized the dominant values or beliefs in their culture. Similarly, cultural psychology assumes that cultural experiences can shape the individual's self-schema. Thus, internalized values, beliefs and self-schema should mediate people's behaviors.

The evidence for these assumptions is weak. Research has uncovered many cross-cultural differences in behaviors. However, when the key cultural values or beliefs that are supposed to mediate these differences (e.g., individualism vs. collectivism, independent self vs. interdependent self) were measured as personal preferences, they often did not mediate the behavioral differences. Instead, the perceived distributions of these values or beliefs mediated these behavioral differences (Kwan, Chiu, & Leung, 2014; Zou et al., 2009). For example, compared with Chinese, Americans make more trait inferences and fewer situation inferences from behaviors. This cultural difference is unrelated to the relative popularity of dispositionism (the belief that personal dispositions determine behavior) in the USA (vs. China), but can be explained by the greater perceived prevalence of dispositionism in the USA (Zou et al., 2009).

The personological bias is also evident in dynamic constructivism. Dynamic constructivism assumes that priming a certain culture will activate the lay theory typical in the primed culture, which in turn biases behavioral responses. For example, priming American culture activates the lay belief in dispositionism, which orients the individual to make trait attribution (Hong et al., 2000). This assumption, though plausible, has not received any empirical support. By contrast, there is some evidence that when a Hong Kong Chinese person talks to an American (another Chinese person), they retrieve from memory the lay belief that is perceived to be popular in American (Chinese) culture and tune their behaviors to be consistent with the retrieved belief (Leung, Lee, & Chiu, 2013). This finding suggests that in social interaction, people attain interaction goals by automatically attending to the group identity of the interaction partner and retrieving from memory the pertinent perceived norms to guide ongoing interaction.

It is interesting to note that although cross-cultural psychology, cultural psychology and dynamic constructivism seek to explain collective, cultural phenomena, they have inherited a personological bias from American social psychology. Asian culture-inspired normology helps to correct this bias.

This does not imply that people only follow perceived norms and never follow their personal preferences. In fact, both personal preferences and perceived norms influence behaviors. However, the relative influence of personal preferences and perceived norms depends on many factors. For example, because normative responses are expected to be acceptable and even welcome by others in the society, people in need of firm answers to their questions are more likely to follow norms (Chao, Zhang, & Chiu, 2010). People may also follow the norms in a social group to signal their membership in and identification with the group (Kreuzbauer, Chiu, Bae, & Lin, 2014). Personal preferences are more predictive of behaviors in individualist cultures, whereas norms are more predictive of behaviors in collectivist cultures (Kwan, 2016; Savani, Wadhwa, Uchida, Ding, & Naidu, 2015). Norms are more predictive of social behaviors and personal preferences are more predictive of individual behaviors. For example, in one study, Letty Kwan and Chi-yue Chiu (2016) tried to predict how often Singaporean car owners would take public transportation instead of driving. The predictors were the car-owners' pro-environment attitude and the perceived norms of driving in Singapore. Only a pro-environment attitude predicted higher frequency of taking public transportation when the car owners traveled alone. However, when the car owners traveled with other adults, only the perceived social desirability of driving predicted higher frequency of driving instead of taking public transportation.

Finally, an individual's personal preferences may or may not align with perceived norms. When personal preferences and perceived norms in the group are in alignment, group identification tends to be high (Wan, Chiu, Peng, & Tam, 2007; Wan et al., 2007; Zhang & Chiu, 2012). By contrast, when personal preferences do not align with perceived norms, individuals will follow perceived norms only when the norms can be enforced effectively (Su, Chiu, Lin, & Oishi, 2016).

Let us return to the question of why fulfillment of role expectations is a major criterion in justice judgment in Chinese culture? A possible answer is: Chinese expect most people in their culture to value fulfillment of role expectations. Therefore, they base their justice judgment on the extent to which the target of the judgment has fulfilled his or her role expectations, not necessarily because they truly believe in the desirability of fulfilling role expectations, but because they anticipate these judgments to be intelligible to their peers.

Conclusion

Our return journey stops here. In this chapter, we used the story of culture and the return journey to normology to address the potential contributions of Asian IPs to a globalized psychological science. The two stories may appear to be unconnected, but they are related. Both stories illustrate the seemingly inescapable conclusion that psychological knowledge is culture-bound. All theorists receive their inspirations from local phenomena and are influenced by the ideas and practices in their culture. Even cultural theories that seek to explain collective phenomena may embody an entity view of culture or a personological bias. This conclusion implies that foreign cultural knowledge can only offer partial explanations of local phenomena, and therefore provides the motivation for developing IPs. Explaining local phenomena with an imported psychology lacks ecological validity, whereas an indigenous psychology should be hailed as a knowledge system of the local, by the local and for the local.

Nonetheless, it is fallacious to conclude that due to the culture-dependency of psychological knowledge, we should categorically reject foreign theories. All theories have their cultural blind spots—what we do not observe from one indigenous viewpoint, we can see clearly from another indigenous angle. From this perspective, psychologies of foreign origin (including US-made or Europe-made psychologies) can serve important epistemic functions. Specifically, they confront the researcher with alternative viewpoints that are grounded in different cultural logics. These alternative viewpoints may destabilize the researcher's knowledge structure, evoke cognitive dissonance and motivate theoretical innovations.

Likewise, Asian IPs can offer refreshing perspectives to the global family of psychologies and inspire the creation of cultural hybrids. These cultural hybrids increase theoretical plurality in the psychological science of culture and advance the field. However, some conditions must be met for the potential creative benefits of Asian IPs to be actualized. First, we need to shift the emphasis from cultures as independent, historically stable entities to cultures in the making. Second, we need to recognize that cultural influence on behaviors is partial, plural, dynamic, intermittent and situated. Third, we need to embrace foreign cultural ideas and practices as precious resources for expanding the conceptual boundaries of cultural percepts.

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CHAPTER 6

Paternalistic Leadership: An Indigenous Concept with Global Significance

Tzu-Ting Lin, Bor-Shiuan Cheng and Li-Fang Chou

Over the past two decades, scholars have argued that the prevailing leadership and its construct is deeply influenced by culture, and have emphasized that leadership may be a common phenomenon in the world, but that the content of leadership is embedded in culture. With the cultural differences, the relationship between the concept of leadership and its effectiveness differs (ref. Chemers, 1993; Hofstede, 1980; House, Hanges, Javidan, Dorfman, & Gupta, 2004). For example, Weber (1947) described paternalism as one of the most elementary types of traditional domination. However, he ignored the fact that paternalism also involved leader support, protection, and care to their subordinates (Redding, Norman, & Schlander, 1994). Westwood and Chan (1992) defined paternalism as a fatherlike leadership style in which strong

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authority is combined with concern and considerateness. Therefore, to understand China, and perhaps most non-Western societies, Weber's typology of domination and particularly his analysis of traditional domination, should not be used directly as a summary of an underlying reality (Hamilton, 1984). Specifically, Ip (2009) indicated that Confucianism is still a resilient cultural tradition that can be used as a sound basis of business practice and management model for Chinese corporations. After conducting a series of studies with the emic approach, researchers found that the leaders in Chinese organizations had a significant leadership style named paternalistic leadership (PL). It was defined as "a style that combines strong discipline and authority with fatherly benevolence" (Farh & Cheng, 2000, p. 91) and contains three important elements: authoritarianism, benevolence and moral character. Authoritarian leadership (AL) refers to a leader's behavior that asserts absolute authority and control over subordinates and demands unquestionable obedience from subordinates. Benevolent leadership (BL) means that the leader's behavior demonstrates individualized, holistic concern for subordinates' personal or familial well-being. Moral character leadership (CL) can be broadly depicted as a leader's behavior that demonstrates superior personal virtues, self-discipline, and unselfishness. The study also found that such leadership is prevalent in Chinese organizations both at home and abroad (Cheng, Farh, & Chou, 2006).

Recently, there have been several international journals (e.g., by Hernandez, Eberly, Avolio, & Johnson, 2011; Pellegrini & Scandura, 2008, etc.) as well as book chapters (e.g. by Chen & Farh, 2010; Farh, Cheng, Chou, & Chu, 2006; Farh, Liang, Chou, & Cheng, 2008; Wu & Xu, 2012), discussing the theory and concept of PL. In view of the importance of PL theory in the international academic areas, Wu and Xu (2012) referred to it as the most popular research topic and concept on Chinese organizations in the past decade. Jackson (2016) also concluded that, "clearly there is still much scope, and a need, to further study and refine our knowledge of paternalistic leadership within the mainstream of leadership studies, and to incorporate into cross-cultural management studies a consideration of organization life in the context of the majority world" (p. 7).

Thus, the purpose of this chapter is to take stock of literature of PL theory and offer suggestions to guide future research. First of all, this article reviews the 'past' of PL theory. As for the origins of PL theory, this article presents the construction process of the ternary model of the PL.

As for the establishment of the theory, this article concludes by discussing the relevant research results of PL, including those of the direct effects on follower attitude and behavior, and its possible mediating and moderating variables. Then, this article examines and explores the 'present' of PL theory, including of several important research topics such as gender issues, sport leadership, and cross-cultural analysis. Along with that, this article further presents the independent research results of each ternary concept. Finally, this chapter attempts to discover the 'future' of PL theory, by putting forward the prospect of future research to further deepen this theory and to fully demonstrate its validity and importance.

The 'Past' of Paternalistic Leadership Theory

The Origins of Paternalistic Leadership Theory

Although using scientific concepts to conduct the research into Chinese leadership by idiographic approach started late, the relevant research into PL theory has accumulated a large number of results in recent years. In the embryonic stage of the PL study, there were three significant qualitative studies on the observation and interviews of CEOs of Chinese family businesses (Cheng, 1995; Redding, 1990; Silin, 1976), and a theoretical research (Westwood, 1997). These initial studies of Chinese leadership research pointed out that the Chinese leaders showed some significant similarities in leadership style, which generally included the authoritarian style of controlling subordinates, establishing an image of moral model, and showing different care and benevolence to individual subordinates. These leadership behaviors were indicative of the meaning of the traditional culture under the paternalism and humanism. For example, in the patriarchal atmosphere, the organization would show a strict hierarchical system and vertical obligations. As for humanism, it is based on the establishment of individual relationships to show favoritism and control (Redding, 1990).

Later, based on the research results above, Farh and Cheng (2000), applied an iceberg concept to explain the cultural roots of the PL from the perspective of cultural analysis. As stated earlier, they defined PL as: "*a style that combines strong discipline and authority with fatherly benevolence and moral integrity, couched in a personalistic atmosphere*," which contains three important elements: authoritarianism, benevolence, and moral character. However, the definition has been proposed for more

than a decade, and has gradually shown some problems. For example, the definition of "personalistic atmosphere" in the original definition easily leads to a discussion of the relationship between PL and differential leadership (Cheng, 2005). In addition, "fatherly benevolence" is likely to be misleading, suggesting that only male leaders will show PL. Finally, the original definition did not cover the main purpose of PL and its impact mechanism. After reviewing the relevant literature and theoretical implications of PL, Lin, Cheng, and Chou (2014b) revised the definition as "*a style that combines strong discipline and role authority with elderly benevolence and moral character model, in order to maintain the role obligation and collective harmony among leader and followers, couched in an atmosphere of relationalism*." More details can be found in their article.

The Establishment of Paternalistic Leadership Theory

To conduct a critical review of PL, we searched Chinese and English databases in common use based on the keyword '*paternalistic leadership*.' The result indicated that there are three important timepoints in the development of PL history (see Table 6.1). First, Farh and Cheng (2000) and Cheng, Chou, and Farh (2000) built the foundation of PL theory and initiated the follow-up series of related research. Second, the research of Cheng, Chou, Wu, Huang, and Farh in 2004 established the ternary theory model of PL, and thus promoted the rapid development of organizational and leadership research in Chinese. Finally, Pellegrini and Scandura (2008) published a literature review, which enabled PL to be emphasized in the international mainstream, and to arouse great interest among international scholars. Together, previous research confirmed PL to be one of the mainstream issues of today's organization and management research.

After the collection of relevant empirical studies, we integrated the issues and contexts of relevant research, in order to glimpse the whole panorama of PL research. The results are shown in Fig. 6.1, including the direct effects of subordinate attitudes and behavior, as well as the mediating and moderating effects between/on such relationships. According to Fig. 6.1, the findings of PL show the following points: (1) The research results are fruitful, while outcome variables cover the important variables of various organizational and management literature. Most of the results indicated that PL has a significant predictive effect

Table 6.1 Important time-points in the development of paternalistic leadership research[a,b]

	Before 2000[f]	*2001~2004*[g]	*2005~2008*[h]	*2009~2012*[i]	*2013~2016*	*Total*
Chinese Journal[c]	6 (0.7%)	11 (1.4%)	51 (6.2%)	85 (10.4%)	114 (14.0%)	267 (32.7%)
English Journal[d]	0 (0.0%)	34 (4.2%)	94 (11.5%)	174 (21.3%)	248 (30.4%)	550 (67.3%)
SSCI Journal[e]	0	4	9	41	58	112 (13.7%)
Total	6 (0.7%)	45 (5.5%)	145 (17.8%)	259 (31.7%)	362 (44.3%)	817 (100.0%)

[a]Revised from Lin, Cheng, and Chou (2014a)
[b]The numbers in brackets represent the percentage of the total
[c]The sum of the search results based on the keyword 'paternalistic leadership' in Traditional Chinese e-Journals Database (CEPS) and the keyword 'paternalistic leadership' in the Simplified Chinese e-Journal Database (CJTD) on January 18, 2017 (same below)
[d]The search results based on the keyword 'Paternalistic leadership' in Google Scholar Database was assessed by the first author, and the papers with a perceived focus on this topic, as opposed to a mention of this topic was reserved
[e]The search results based on the keyword 'paternalistic leadership' in Web of Knowledge (SSCI) Database was assessed by the first author, and the papers with a perceived focus on this topic, as opposed to a mention of this topic was reserved
[f]Key papers: Farh and Cheng (2000) with a total of 186 citations; Cheng et al. (2000) with a total of 197 citations. These citation values are as published in the Google Scholar database on March 13, 2017 (same below)
[g]Key paper: Cheng, Chou, Wu, Huang, and Farh (2004) with a total of 494 citations
[h]Key paper: Pellegrini and Scandura (2008) with a total of 355 citations
[i]Key paper: Lin, Cheng, and Chou (2014a), in which they organized relevant search results until 2012

on subordinate/follower attitude and behavior. (2) PL has additional explanatory effects, compared with other key leadership styles, such as transactional leadership, transformational leadership, charismatic leadership, servant leadership, spiritual leadership, ethical leadership, humble leadership, and so on. That is, PL could be a more applicable and effective leadership style in Chinese contexts. (3) In addition to business and educational context mentioned above, the researchers also found that PL has significant effects in various contexts, such as sports training, military, hospital, police office, prisons, and so on. This again shows the cross-context applicability of PL. (4) In contrast to the interactive perspective of Farh and Cheng (2000), the researchers also aimed to explore the intermediary mechanism of PL effectiveness from different perspectives, such as subordinate interpretation perspective, or subordinate



Fig. 6.1 The overall arrangement of past research results of paternalistic leadership

development perspective. (5) Researchers began to be interested in the group level, which caused the continuous accumulation of findings from a team and an enterprise. They not only validated the overall effect of the PL on team and enterprise outcomes, but also tried to discuss the possible intermediary mechanism. (6) Compared with other types of research, the investigations into the moderating variables of PL effectiveness are relatively less, which requires more researchers to make unremitting efforts in this area. (7) In general, pervious research lack explorations of the antecedents of PL.

Overall, despite the fact that vigorous development of PL research has provided a rich and well-built research basis for the future exploration, there are still many research topics that deserve the concern and inquiry of the scholars. The following will further discuss the research gaps in PL theory and make suggestions for future research.

The 'Present' of Paternalistic Leadership Theory

Leader Characteristic: Gender Issues

According to the gender role theory (Eagly, 1987), gender roles can be attributed to the two characteristics (Eagly, Wood, & Diekman, 2000): agentic trait (more masculine) and communal trait (more feminine). Eagly and Johnson (1990) reviewed the past leadership literature, and concluded that all the leadership behaviors could be divided into two types: agentic role and communal role behaviors. In fact, due to the ternary elements of the PL model—AL, BL, and CL, represent the masculine, feminine, and gender neutral characteristics, respectively—the theory is particularly suited to examine the gender differences of leadership behaviors and effectiveness (Lin & Cheng, 2007; Lin, Cheng, Kuo, & Tsai, 2009). Specifically, because AL includes arbitrary, controlling and dominating behaviors, it should be considered to have agentic role behaviors. And since BL contains concerns, care, and tolerance toward subordinate's concerns, it should be considered to have communal role behaviors. Finally, CL emphasizes the leader's ethical conduct, accomplishment, and public–private distinctions, which is a general and cross-context leadership style (Ambrose & Schminke, 1999; Hsu, Huang, Cheng, & Farh, 2006). Therefore, it should not be subject to gender differences.

The findings of Lin and Cheng (2007) and Wang, Chiang, Tsai, Lin, and Cheng (2013) stimulated some profound discussion on the gender effects of PL. Female leaders, on the one hand, had to demonstrate leadership behaviors that were inconsistent with their own gender role, in order to establish the authority of the leader role; but on the other hand, the female leader had to face the dilemma that such leadership behaviors would result in negative reactions and behaviors from subordinates. On the whole, it highlights the dilemma and difficulties faced by female leaders in the context of Chinese organizations.

Cross-Context Verification: Sport Leadership

In Chinese, sports leaders often take the role of not only the coach but also of father. They need not only to take the responsibility of training and directing, but also of life management and career guidance of the athletes, which is very similar to the connotation of PL (Hsu, 2007; Kao, 2004).

Kao and Chen (2006a) applied the case study method to reexamine the behaviors of coaches, and their relationship with sports performance, life norms and career development. They proposed a conceptual model of didactic leadership to clarify the dual relationships of AL and BL of coaches, which is consistent with previous studies (Cheng, 1995; Silin, 1976; Westwood, 1997; Westwood & Chan, 1992). Again, taking baseball team as an example, the results of a case study from Cheng and Kao (2008) confirmed that a sports team is a family-like context, and the coach would demonstrate authoritarian, benevolent, moral character to lead the team.

Sports leadership research in Taiwan has also accumulated a lot of practical results to explore the PL of the sports coach, and the impact of this on sports team performance and attitude effect. Overall, the results of relevant research indicated the significant influences of the paternalistic coaches on their athletes. Among them, the combination of AL and BL can mostly effectively improve the effectiveness of sport teams (Yen, Tseng, & Kao, 2008; a more detailed review can be found in Lin & Lien, 2016). However, although the above results are rich, many of them suffered the doubts about the common method variance (Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee, & Podsakoff, 2003). In addition, the existing literature mostly focused on student athletes, who are still in the training stage of their career. Future research could focus on coaches and players of professional teams, and even for the elite team (e.g., the national team), in order to explore how the coaches shape the authority and benevolence of their leadership over a short time. In addition, the research variables applied are mostly subjective perception at the individual level. Future research can involve some objective sport performance as criteria, such a, competition performance, ranking, average winning percentage, and so on (Kao & Chen, 2006b). As for sports team coaches, research could explore the effect on overall team performance and team cohesion at the team level. Finally, considering the differences in the nature and characteristics of various sports, the concepts and effects of the PL may be distinct. For example, tennis coaches and athletes often have a one-on-one, dyadic relationship, but a volleyball coach and athlete would involve a one-on-many, average team leadership model. Future studies can further explore the differences between these models and their unique effects.

Cross-Culture Analysis

Although the beginning of the PL is observed in Chinese organizations (Cheng et al., 2006; Farh et al., 2006), the researchers found that PL is also popular in cultural regions with high power distance, such as East Asia, South Asia, Middle East, Southern Europe and South America (Cheng et al., 2004; Pelligrini & Scandura, 2008). However, in other regions of the organizational context, does the PL also have a stable ternary structure? For example, Çalışkan (2010) applied Cheng's et al. (2000) scale on Turkish workers, but failed to confirm the original triad model. Instead, she found four behavioral dimensions, namely authoritarian, normative authoritarian, benevolent and family-like leadership. Therefore, in order to test the validity and measurement invariance of Cheng's PL-style scale, Cheng et al. (2014) sampled the employees from four East Asian societies, namely Taiwan, mainland China, Japan and South Korea, and applied structural equation model to conduct correlation analysis. Based on the recommendations of cross-cultural research scholars (van de Vijver & Leung, 1997), they refined a short-term PL scale and established evidence of its applicability and generalizability to facilitate the emerging cross-cultural research on PL.

After confirming the generalizability of the PL, Boer et al. (2011) further validated its cross-cultural validity. They collected systematic samples of ten cultural societies, including East Asia (Taiwan, mainland China, Japan, South Korea), Southeast Asia (Thailand), Latin America (Mexico), Western Europe (Belgium), Eastern Europe (Hungary, Russia, Ukraine), including of a total of 3670 full-time employees. They applied cross-level cross-group analysis to test the cross-cultural equivalence of PL effectiveness at the societal level, and to identify the level of psychological universal of each leadership styles, according to Norenzayan and Heine's (2005) suggestions. The measures of PL effectiveness included subordinates' ratings of work drive and organizational commitment and supervisors' ratings of employees' job performance and altruism (towards co-workers). The results of cultural generalizability analysis found that the average PL in the ten cultural societies generally had a significant cross-level effect on subordinate attitude at the individual level, which represents the universal average PL effectiveness. In addition, their results were consistent with previous research (e.g., Bass, 1997; den Hartog et al., 1999; Dorfman & House, 2004), which indicated that some leadership behavior may only be effective in special cultural

contexts, but also that the effectiveness of some leadership behavior will be universal. The average PL effectiveness has a considerable degree of cultural generalizability and cultural particularity.

Independent Studies and Model of Each Dimension of Paternalistic Leadership

Although PL has accumulated considerable research results, let us return to the theory itself—there are still some essential problems to be solved. For example, what is the relationship among the ternary facets of the PL? What construct can be called a PL? Must it be one involving all three dimensions? Or would only one of them be sufficient to represent the term 'paternalistic leadership'? As for the construction of the multi-dimensional conceptual model, Law, Wong, and Mobley (1998) suggest that three research trails can be used in terms of the theoretical proposition and data characteristics of the conceptual model: latent model, aggregate construct and profile model (Wong, Law, & Huang, 2008).

Even though in the definition of Farh and Cheng (2000), PL should be a profile model (Farh et al., 2008), scholars have regarded it as three leadership styles or dimensionalities and have considered their different degrees of influence on subordinate effectiveness. In addition, although most of the research is still discussed with the whole triad model, in recent years, many studies have begun to explore the unique connotations and effects of each ternary PL, in which the most research has been conducted on AL (see a critical review of Chou, Cheng, & Lien, 2014). In addition, when comparing the ternary PL, some researchers found that AL can be divided into two dimensions: one dimension stressed the authority and control, namely 'authoritarian,' and the other stressed the norms and standard, namely 'normative authoritarian' (e.g., Çalışkan, 2010). The latter is similer to 'authoritative leadership.' After an in-depth analysis of Fajia's ideology, Chou, Chou, Chen, and Ren (2010) argued that the concept of AL includes control over subordinates themselves (Juan-Chiuan, AL) and over subordinates' task components (Shang-Yan, authoritative leadership). They also developed a new subscale of Shang-Yan (authoritative) leadership, which obliged subordinates to follow the 'normative system.' Together, they further clarify the different effects of two concepts on psychological empowerment, and reexamine the effects of 'benevolent authoritarianism.'

As for benevolent and moral leadership, independent research is still in the initial stages, with relatively little empirical research having been carried out. In terms of BL, Wang and Cheng (2010) first explored the relationship between BL and creativity, as well as the moderating effect of creative role identity and work autonomy on such relationships. Chan and Mak (2011) further examined the mediating mechanism of BL effectiveness. In addition, Wu, Hu, and Jiang (2012) explored the antecedent variables of BL. Their findings indicated that there was a positive relationship between subordinate loyalty and BL, and that the leader's altruistic personality and the subordinate's perceived organizational support would moderate such a relationship. By re-analyzing the cultural implications of BL, Lin and Cheng (2012) identified two constituent behavioral dimensions of BL: life-oriented and work-oriented considerate behaviors, and revised the original scale. The former involves the leader's greetings and care for follower's private life, and the latter involves the leader's education and training for follower's career development. Based on two samples of leader–follower dyads, they tested a preliminary model concerning the antecedents and the consequences of dual dimensions of BL. Overall, this study extended BL theory by providing an integrative mechanism, and emphasized the important role of life-oriented BL.

As for CL, researchers began to focus on its relationship with psychological empowerment. For example, Li, Wu, Johnson, and Wu (2012) found that such relationship would be mediated by justice perception. In addition, Wu (2012) indicated that trust in supervisor and psychological empowerment mediated the relationship between moral leadership and work performance. In addition, there are researchers devoted to redefining the behavioral dimensions of CL. Based on the research of Hsu et al. (2006), Wang, Chiang, Chou, and Cheng (2017) conducted a series of studies on the concepts of CL in Chinese business organizations and re-developed its measurement, including five stable dimensions: integrity, open-mindedness, incorruptibility, honesty and impartiality. They further compared their findings to that of similar Western leadership and found that even when controlling for ethical leadership (Brown, Treviño, & Harrison, 2005), perceived leader integrity, and idealized influence, CL still had an extra predicting effect on subordinate results in Chinese organizations. More review on CL can be found in Wang (2014) as well as Wu and Zhu (2014).

However, the independent scale development of three PL dimensions would cause two problems. First, due to the lack of an integrated revision scale, new research could only use the original volume, or select

needed items based on the research interest, which would lead to problems when comparing results from different studies. Second, although such studies are followed by rigorous scale development processes (e.g. Hinkin, 1998), owing to the fact that the studies developing a new ternary PL scale would have their own research purpose, the method and procedure of scale development could differ between studies. If a future researcher assembles three scales into a new version of the PL scale, would it cause any problem of constructing conflict? Could it reflect and accurately measure the operational definition of each dimension of PL? Therefore, it is necessary to apply the revised operational definition of PL in order to develop and examine a new integrated scale for future research.

The 'Future' of Paternalistic Leadership Theory

With the elaboration of the construction, development and status of PL, the phenomenon of Chinese indigenous PL is generally described as above. Based on the understanding of PL, we then step forward to indicate a few research issues and future directions for considering theory with the expectations to deepen PL theory and to increase its robustness, rigor and applicability.

Deepening the 'Inside Out' Strategy of Emic Perspective Research

There are three major approaches to studies of cultural behaviours and organizational behaviors (OB): emic perspective, etic perspective and integrative framework (Morris, Leung, Ames, & Lickel, 1999). Cheng (2005) further subdivided emic perspective into two research strategies: 'outside in' and 'inside out.' The former explores the current topics or phenomenon in the West in a localized way based on the context of Chinese culture while the latter focuses directly on critical issues and phenomenon in the context of Chinese culture. In the trend of globalization, the inside out strategy of the emic perspective is used to make generalizations in other cultural areas; it can then have dialogue with Western OB theory and highlight the importance of Chinese OB research. As one of the rare inside out strategies of the emic perspective, PL is also the Chinese OB theory constructed by full cycle of research approach[1] to observe Chinese businesses, induce propositions

[1] Full-cycle research begins with the observation of naturally occurring phenomena and proceeds by traveling back and forth between observation and manipulation-based research settings, establishing the power, generality, and conceptual underpinnings of the phenomenon along the way (Chatman & Flynn, 2005).

of phenomenon, make cultural analysis and make deductions (Cheng, Wang, & Huang, 2009).

However, it is still necessary for research into PL to be to conducted in more depth and to a greater degree of completeness with the emic perspective forming the research base of the etic perspective and integrative framework. Firstly, though Farh and Cheng (2000) had indicated the social cultural factors (including familism and Confucian ethics) that triggered PL behaviors, empirical studies seldom explored the cultural antecedents of PL. For example, will leaders' pan-familism, social orientation, harmony motives, and *Zhong-Yong* thinking (Chinese Naïve Dialecticism, or so-called *Yin-Yang* Perspective, see more in Yang, 2010), or organizational familial dominance and climate affect leaders' demonstration of PL behavior? In addition, along with changes in society and values led by globalization, the past studies explored the moderated effect of subordinates' tradition of obedience to PL authority (Cheng et al., 2004; Pillutla, Farh, Lee, & Lin, 2007), but have seldom explored the factors pertaining to other culture-related values, thinking models, or perceived cultural situations. Many social psychologists have taken different views to analyze Chinese cultural concepts, such as Yang and Lu's (1993) Chinese relational self, Leung, Brew, Zhang, and Zhang's (2011) motivation of harmony, and so on. Through understanding the changes in cultural concepts from the Chinese employees, we can further understand the effects of PL in modern Chinese organizations and the possibility for it to be applied to other cultural areas.

Clarification of Stigma on Authoritarian Leadership

Stigma of Authoritarian Leadership

For Western culture stressing freedom and equity, patriarchy or AL are regarded as negative leadership behaviors (Yukl, 2010). Along with Western researchers' increasing focus on abusive supervision, AL seemed to be regarded as dark leadership, or an antecedent factor of abusive supervision. For example, Aryee, Chen, Sun, and Debrah (2007) suggested that a leader with high AL tends to display abusive supervision and increases the negative relationship between supervisor's interaction justice perception and abusive supervision. Kiazad, Restubog, Zagenczyk, Kiewitz, and Tang (2010) pointed out that a supervisor's high Machiavalianism will lead to a subordinate's stronger feeling of abusive supervision, with mediation of AL behavior. Moreover, a

subordinate with lower organizational basic self-esteem will more easily regard AL behavior as abusive supervision. However, according to the views of cultural psychology, the social norms, such as communality, obligation and respect for authority, are emphasized in Chinese society while autonomy, rights and self-actualization are valued in a society of individualism (Triandis, 1995). In addition, several concepts as explored in the literature, such as the importance of family for an interdependent self (Markus & Kitayama, 1991). Chinese parenting styles (Lin & Wang, 1995) and pan-familism characteristics (Yang, 1988), together contributed to revealing the difference in leaders' power basis between Chinese and Western organizations and the implicitness of AL within Chinese subordinates' recognition. Therefore, is it true that, as negatively labeled by Western researchers, AL in Chinese organizations leads to serious harm to organizational effectiveness and employees' health?

Strict and Development-Oriented Authoritative Leadership

In fact, Chou et al. (2010) made some preliminary clarifications to this question. They argued that the concept of AL includes control over subordinates themselves and subordinates' task components, and named the former *Juan-Chiuan* leadership and the latter *Shang-Yang* leadership. *Juan-Chiuan* leadership focuses on absolute obedience and more is equivalent to the English term 'authoritarian leadership,' while *Shang-Yang* leadership focused on didactic discipline strictly and is more equivalent to English term 'authoritative leadership.' They further clarified their different effects on psychological empowerment, and reexamined the effects of 'benevolent authoritarianism.' They found *Juan-Chiuan* leadership had negative effects on the psychological empowerment dimensions of meaning, self-determination and impact, whereas *Shang-Yang* leadership had positive effects on the psychological empowerment dimensions of meaning, competence and impact. In addition, there were significant interaction effects between benevolence and authoritarianism on meaning, self-determination and impact when leaders demonstrated high *Shang-Yan* leadership. Specifically, the positive effects of *Shang-Yan* leadership were strengthened and the negative effects of *Juan-Chiuan* leadership were weakened when they accompanied BL.

In ancient China, the school of thought called legalism (Waley, 1939) believed that tactics and power are the critical strategy for achieving civil obedience. However, along with modernization and institutionalization

of business organizations, is it time to tease out *Juan-Chiuan* and *Shang-Yan* leaderships to clarify the contents and functions and their differential adaption? The meanings and connotations of *Shang-Yang* leadership are more consistent with the indigenous perspectives of high power distance cultures and the positive effects on subordinate's effectiveness. Maybe the modernized PL should remove the component of *Juan-Chiuan*. We argue that future conceptions of the PL should adopt the term 'authoritative leadership' instead of AL or authoritarianism.

Reconsideration of the Theory Level

Among all the OB issues, the level of leadership study is the most complicated. Besides leadership theory and levels of construct, it also involves a practical organizational level or organizational hierarchy.

Views of Structural Functionalism

Dubin (1979) subdivided leadership into leadership in organizations and leadership of organizations. The former means the leadership existing in all levels of organization, which affects subordinates' completion of tasks, while the latter means the leadership existing at the highest level of the department of the organization, which focuses on the strategy planning for whole organization, also called strategic leadership. Since all the leaders at different levels within the organization must perform different leading tasks under different environmental complexity, they will need different cognitive abilities (Katz, 1974; Mumford, Campion, & Morgeson, 2007). Meanwhile, due to functional differences between different levels in the organization, the authority and the resource that a leader can control and the implicit cognition required to be accepted as legitimate leader by subordinates are also different (Katz & Kahn, 1978).

Therefore, the concept of PL first originated from researchers' observation of Chinese business owners, and was then expanded to include the study of supervisors at different levels as well. In recent years, the ***strategic leadership*** of high-level leaders or CEOs to lead the enterprise in question on how to respond to globalization and operational challenges is getting much attention (Chou, 2015). From the concept of leadership development, display of PL behavior at different organizational levels reflects the development characteristics of leadership. That is, the order of PL emphasized is: AL with awed subordinates → BL that involves

caring for subordinates → moral leadership with fair and impartial virtues (Cheng et al., 2009). Furthermore, along with the institutionalization of modern Chinese organizations, PL behavior at the level of the CEO mainly demonstrates moral leadership. As for benevolent and AL, these are now replaced by the operation of the organizational culture or human resources strategy.

Views of Interpersonal Interaction

Leadership is a process of social influence, and the interaction distance between the leader and the subordinate will also affect the content and effect of leadership. After Bogardus (1927) proposed the concept of **leadership at a distance**, direct and indirect leadership became another starting point for the discussion on level issues of leadership. Direct leadership means the leadership behavior towards immediate subordinates and its effects on them. Most leadership studies have focused on direct leadership. Indirect leadership focuses on the style, image or climate built by the leader in order to explore the effect of non-immediate leader (at least two levels higher). Because the understanding of the indirect leader primarily comes from the direct leader or the transmission from other media, it will be in favor of thinking, vision, story or image clues of the whole department or organizational effectiveness of the upper level leader. Therefore, the subordinate tends to deify the higher level leader, or feel touched by the built image (Larsso, Sjöberg, Vrbanjac, & Björkman, 2005).

Since the cultural analysis of PL emphasizes relationalism and interpersonal interaction and most existing studies focus on the leader–subordinate dyadic level, the effect of indirect PL on employees and its conjunct effects will be a future direction of study for the further exploration of PL. Next, along with the growth of virtual work groups/teams and matrix organizations, the functions and effects of direct PL also deserve further examination.

Psychological Theories to Explore the Mediation and Moderation Roles of PL

The mediation mechanism in Western leadership studies (such as social exchange, social learning or social identity) and contingent perspective are often used to further explore mediation and moderation models of the relationship between PL and subordinate effectiveness. In the

future, we can integrate psychological theories to explore the mediation and moderation roles of PL to enhance the theory foundation of PL. For example, we can use the relationship between the identity of leader and demonstration of PL to further understand if PL plays a mediation role. According to the individual self, relational self and collective self from self-identity orientation (Sedikides & Brewer, 2001), will subordinates connect to leaders' authoritarian, benevolent, and moral leadership behavior, respectively? Or, can leader–subordinate relational identity (Tsai, Cheng, & Chou, 2015) be used to clarify the demonstration of PL behavior more clearly? Those research questions need to be tested empirically in the future.

Generalization and Cross-Cultural Research in PL

Flowering of PL Under Globalization

As mentioned above, in recent years, PL has been getting more and more attention in the Middle East, South Europe and South America (Pelligrini & Scandura, 2008), South East Asian countries (such as Vietnam and Thailand) (Ardichvili & Dirani, 2017), and even African areas (Jackson, 2016). The empirical studies from these areas also support the effects of PL on subordinate effectiveness. From a cultural perspective, is it because that these areas share some of the same cultural characteristics (collectivism or high power distance) with Chinese society? Or, does Confucianism infiltrate business operations in these areas because of the subtle influence of Chinese immigrants or cultural interaction under globalization? Or, do the contents of PL reflect the nature of social influence in the organization process although it is never valued by Western researchers or practitioners? This is worth further exploration.

Cross-Cultural Research for PL

Compared with other leadership theories, the cross-cultural comparative studies of PL are still quite lacking. The chief editor from *International Journal of Cross Cultural Management* published a paper 'Paternalistic leadership: The missing link in cross-cultural leadership studies?' (Jackson, 2016). It was indicated in the paper that in the non-Western majority world, PL is common and has positive effects. However, due to negative interpretations (paternalism remains linguistically and conceptually gendered and freedom-expropriating) by leadership researchers

from the Western area, PL has long been ignored. The majority of MBA students in many countries are taught a great deal about Western mainstream leadership knowledge (such as transformational leadership) but they are unable to be sure whether this knowledge would be useful to their business organizations in their own countries. On the contrary, they have scarce knowledge of the PL with positive effects. Therefore, conducting cross-cultural studies with dialogues with mainstream leadership theories will be an important research direction.

Conclusion

In summary, it has been over ten years since Farh and Cheng (2000) proposed the preliminary model of PL and a great deal of research has been conducted since. Using a systematic review of the theory, this chapter set out to integrate existing research results and to highlight the critical issues of theory with the expectation of reaching a consensus for PL theory studies in Chinese areas or in global psychology. In doing so, we hope to illustrate an integrated framework of PL theory, to encourage scholars advocating a full-cycle approach (Chatman & Flynn, 2005) to conduct PL research, to advance the coherence of Chinese research in this topic, as well as to contribute to the Chinese and even global leadership literature and organization management practice.

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CHAPTER 7

Toward a Spirituality-Based Theory of Creativity: Indigenous Perspectives from India

Dharm Prakash Sharma Bhawuk

Introduction

In mainstream Western literature, creativity is often studied as a universal process or etic (Amabile, 1982, 1996; Helie & Sun, 2010; Sternberg & Lubart, 1995), often completely neglecting or marginalizing the role of culture in shaping creativity. Even the cross-cultural etic–emic approach essentializes the inherent emic nature of creativity in favor of the etic

Harvard–Kyoto protocol for transliteration for *devanagarI* is used for all *saMskRita* and *hindI* words and names, and the first letters of names are not capitalized. All non-English words are italicized.

अ a आ A इ i ई I उ u ऊ U ए e ऐ ai ओ o औ au ऋ ṛ R ॠ ṝ RR ऌ lR ॡ lRR अं M अः H क ka ख kha ग ga घ kha ङ Ga च ca छ cha ज ja झ jha ञ Ja ट Ta ठ Tha ड Da ढ Dha ण Na त ta थ tha द da ध dha न na प pa फ pha ब ba भ bha म ma य ya र ra ल la व va श za ष Sa स sa ह ha क्ष kSa त्र tra ज्ञ jJa श्र zra.

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(Ng, 2003, 2005; Runco, Johnson, & Raina, 2002; Rudowicz, 2003; Triandis, 1994; Zha, Walczyk, Griffith-ross, Tobacyk, & Walczyk, 2006), limiting the study of human creativity to the cultural context of the West Hennessey and Amabile (2010) presented a framework for the study of creativity, and proposed that it needs to be studied at all levels—neurological, affect/cognition/training, individual/personality, groups, social environment, culture/society, and systems approach. They also recommended the need for an interdisciplinary approach and multi-level analyses. In their review, they readily agreed that the established Western theories such as the intrinsic motivation principle of creativity (Amabile, 1996) or methods such as Consensual Assessment Technique (Amabile, 1982) were not expected to hold in a non-Western culture, but stopped short of presenting an approach to build models and theories that were grounded in culture. This paper addresses that gap.

Other reviews (Baas, De Dreu, & Nijstad, 2008; Runco, 2004; Sternberg & Lubart, 1995) have similarly sidestepped culture'sCulture influence on creativity. Runco (2004) briefly noted the influence of social processes on creativity, including family, educational setting, and organizational setting, but did not include culture and society. There is some cross-cultural research on comparing various aspects of creativity (Lubart, 1990; Ng, 2003, 2005; Runco et al., 2002; Zha et al., 2006) but most of them are driven by a pseudo-etic approach where culture is viewed as a moderating variable rather than an antecedent of creative behaviors or processes and barely brings out the influence of culture on creativity. And despite Runco's (2004, p. 679) observation that creativity as a "field has spread the conceptual umbrella too far," cultural influence on creativity remains outside the field, which is addressed in this paper.

Synthesizing indigenous and cross-cultural perspectives, and focusing on the domain of spirituality, *bhAwuk* (2003) developed a model in which creative behavior is an outcome of the reciprocal relationship among culture, *zeitgeist* (Boring, 1955), and geniuses, in which culture is presented as an outcome of ecology and history. This general model of creativity presented culture as having a central role in research on creativity; however, it neglected the bi-directional nature of variables, which was later addressed in another publication (*bhAwuk*, 2011). The model consists of two relational networks: first, ecology, history and culture have reciprocal relationships; and second, culture, *zeitgeist* and geniuses

also have reciprocal relationships. Thus, culture is the link between ecology and history on the one hand as the antecedent, with *zeitgeist* and geniuses as its consequence. Over a period of time, *zeitgeist* is appropriated by history, as it goes from being recent history to simply become a part of history.

Building on the premise that culture shapes creativity (*bhAwuk*, 2003, 2011), and since Indian culture has valued spirituality for thousands of years, I first show how creativity is grounded in spirituality in India and then go on to link spirituality with the Indian concept of self, which includes a metaphysical self. The Indian concept of self allows us to examine the external and internal journeys that people pursue, and the various practices such as meditation that are used for the internal journey that further help to connect spirituality and creativity. Next, employing the methodology for developing indigenous theories proposed by Hwang (2007), which calls for a synthesis of research in the lifeworld and microworld,[1] I present the spirituality-based theory of creativity from the Indian perspective. The theory from the microworld is derived from the *upaniSads* (specifically from the *bRhadAraNyakopaniSad*), which are the repository of Indian philosophical theories. The theory is further corroborated by the teachings of two Indian saints, *ramaNa maharSi* and *nisargadatta mahArAja*. The paper ends with a discussion of the implications of the spirituality-based theory of creativity for the extant Western theories and global psychology.

Spirituality and Indian Culture

It is important to note the relevance and importance of spirituality in the Indian culture. Moore (1967) distilled 17 themes from a thorough study and analyses of Indian philosophical thoughts. The most important theme, he concluded, was spirituality: "a universal and primary concern

[1] Lifeworld refers to knowledge created by people to solve problems of daily life, and wisdom is the highest form of coded knowledge in the lifeworld. On the other hand, researchers develop theories to explain phenomena or to solve problems in the lifeworld, and accumulation of a body of knowledge leads to the creation of specific or discipline-based microworlds that are necessarily academic in nature. It is posited in this paper that Indian philosophical texts like the *upaniSads* constitute the microworld, whereas the dialogues of knowledge seekers with saints constitute knowledge in the lifeworld.

for, and almost a preoccupation with, matters of spiritual significance" (p. 12). In stating how closely Indian philosophy is related to life, the general agreement seems to be that truth should be realized, rather than simply known intellectually or cognitively. This further emphasizes and clarifies spirituality as the way of living; spirituality is not merely about knowing the truth but about becoming one with the truth (Sheldon, 1951). Thus, the approach to truth is introspective.

The fascination with spirituality or the metaphysical is also growing in the West among medical practitioners and others working in the health-care industry (*bhAwuk*, 2012; Koenig, 2008; Rosenthal, 2011; Young & Koopsen, 2009) as well as those who deal with uncertainty in the market or the environment (Taleb, 2007). Taleb (2007) illustrates this beautifully in the following words:

> But all these ideas, all this philosophy of induction, all these problems with knowledge, all these wild opportunities and scary possible losses, everything palls in front of the following **metaphysical consideration**. I am sometimes taken aback by how people can have a miserable day or get angry because they feel cheated by a bad meal, cold coffee, a social rebuff, or a rude reception. Recall my [earlier] discussion … on the difficulty in seeing the true odds of the events that run your own life. **We are quick to forget that just being alive is an extraordinary piece of good luck, a remote event, a chance occurrence of monstrous proportions. Imagine a speck of dust next to a planet a billion times the size of the earth. The speck of dust represents the odds in favor of your being born; the huge planet would be the odds against it**. So stop sweating the small stuff. Don't be like the ingrate who got a castle as a present and worried about the mildew in the bathroom. Stop looking the gift horse in the mouth—**remember that you are a Black Swan**. (Taleb, 2007, p. 298; emphasis added)

Taleb (2007) claims that we are all Black Swans in our uniqueness and in our interconnectedness; and our very existence is an act of the most creative process. This is where Indian culture, which is generally agreed upon as emphasizing the spiritual aspect of our being in our seemingly material existence (*bhAratI*, 1985; *bhAwuk*, 2003, 2012; Moore, 1967), and its unique contributions to creativity synthesizing the material and the spiritual, becomes relevant. Unlike what Popper claimed, the spiritual journey is also guided by falsification, as illustrated in the following dialogue:

Q (Knowledge Seeker): Which ideas are wrong and which are true?

NM (*nisargadatta mahArAja*): **Assertions are usually wrong and denials—right.**

Q: One cannot live by denying everything!

NM: **Only by denying can one live. Assertion is bondage. To question and deny is necessary. It is the essence of revolt and without revolt there can be no freedom.**

There is no second, or higher self to search for. You are the highest self, only give up the false ideas you have about your self. Both faith and reason tell you that you are neither the body, nor its desires and fears, nor are you the mind with its fanciful ideas, nor the role society compels you to play, the person you are supposed to be. Give up the false and the true will come into its own.

You say you want to know your self. You are your self – you cannot be anything but what you are. **Is knowing separate from being?** Whatever you can know with your mind is of the mind, not you; about yourself you can only say: 'I am, I am aware, I like it.' … **But whatever can be described cannot be yourself, and what you are cannot be described. You can only know yourself by being yourself without any attempt at self-definition and self-description.** Once you have understood that you are nothing perceivable or conceivable, that whatever appears in the field of consciousness cannot be your self, you will apply yourself to the eradication of all self-identification as the only way that can take you to a deeper realization of yourself. **You literally progress by rejection – a veritable rocket.** To know that you are neither in the body nor in the mind, though aware of both, is already self-knowledge. (*nisargadatta*, 1973, pp. 494–495; emphasis added)

The foregoing, however is not a ban on activities. Do whatever you want, but never forget the reality, never forget what you really are. You are not the body, you are not the food, and you are not this vital air (*prANa*). Whatever has appeared is a state and as such has to go. (*nisargadatta*, 2006, p. 2; emphasis added)

Thus, falsification can be applied to spirituality, in contrast to what Popper (2002) proposed, and must be applied to get rid of the acquired "self definition and self description" to know the self. As stated by *nisargadatta mahArAja*, in spirituality we "literally progress by rejection" for "assertion is bondage."

Indian Concept of Self and Spiritual Journey

The Indian concept of self consists of gross and subtle elements, which can be further categorized as physical, social and metaphysical selves (*bhAwuk*, 2011). More specifically, in the Indian worldview there is a social self that is ever expanding by additions of various social roles and attributes. Though it is subtle, it has concrete attributes and also has psychological characteristics. The physical self and sense organs are the grossest. The internal self that consists of *ahaGkAra, manas,* and *buddhi*, is also called *antaHkaraNa*[2] or the internal organ or agent. Beyond all this is *Atman*, which is the subtlest (*bhAwuk*, 2011). This conceptualization of self is captured schematically in Fig. 7.1.

In understanding the Indian concept of self it is important to appreciate that both in the outer and inner directions, the self grows to infinity. Outwardly, the social self is ever expanding and is an outcome of our thinking and is driven by social comparison, external achievement orientation, and instinct of accumulation (me-me and more-more); and inwardly, the self shrinks socially at first but becomes infinite by merging with the *brahman* and thus all distinct physical–mental beings that we think we are become one universal self without any differentiation (*bhAwuk*, 2011). This is captured schematically in Fig. 7.2. This representation is useful in showing the two basic motivations, and the unity of the two. It should be noted that research into attention shows that there is value in classifying attention as internal and external (Chun, Golomb, & Turk-Browne, 2011), and the model presented in Fig. 7.2 is consistent with this taxonomy. The internal and external journeys start in either direction depending on where we focus our attention—on the internal or the external elements of life.

The inward and outward journey and their unity are explained again and again by the wise ones. When the two paths are contrasted and one

[2] See *bhAwuk* (2011, chapter 4), for a definition and discussion of *manas*, *buddhi*, *ahaGkAra*, and *antaHkaraNa*A. The closest translation of *ahaGkAra* would be ego, which comes at the cost of much loss of meaning. People often use mind for *manas*, which is simply wrong, since *manas* is the locus of cognition, affect and behavior, whereas mind is only cognitive. And *buddhi* is closest to the super-ego in Freudian parlance, but without ego, which makes the similarity rather superficial. And *antaHkaraNa* is the composite internal organ or agent combining *manas*, *buddhi* and *ahaGkAra*. *Adisankara* also includes *citta* in the definition of *antaHkaraNa* (see *bhAwuk*, 2014 for a discussion of *citta*).



Fig. 7.1 Indian concept of self



Fig. 7.2 Outward-focused expanding self and inward-focused contracting self

is forced to choose between the two, the wise ones are quite categorical in pointing out the importance of the internal journey. Also, they emphasize that we should just be, beyond the creativity of mind. In other words, being is valued over the creativity of the mind. It is implicit that being is more creative than what the mind can achieve.

Both spiritual masters identified the two directions of human journey; in one we have "the outgoing mind," and in the other we have "the Heart-going mind" or "the resting mind" (*ramaNa*, 2000, pp. 21–22). We can see that the outward journey is characterized by "grasping and holding" (*nisargadatta*, 1973, p. 506) onto objects and ideas, and thus the social self grows ad infinitum. The outward journey is all about mind and memories ("You are a creature of memories; at least you imagine yourself to be so" *nisargadatta*, 1973, p. 506). On the outward journey people are concerned about themselves, and are focused on self-interest ("To be selfish means to covet, acquire, accumulate on behalf of the part against the whole" *nisargadatta*, 1973, p. 488).

The internal journey begins by removing restlessness from the mind—"External contacts, contacts with objects other than itself, make the mind restless. Loss of interest in non-Self is the first step. Then the habits of introspection (*manana*) and concentration (*nididhyAsana*) will follow. They are characterized by the control of external senses" (*ramaNa*, 2000, p. 20). On the inward journey, we receive guidance from all around us and we are certain internally what we should be doing—"Accept no guidance but from within. Keep quiet and look within. Guidance is sure to come. You are never left without knowing what your next step should be" (*nisargadatta*, 1973, p. 488). The internal journey is beyond experiential and personal: "Mere book learning is not of any great use. After realization all intellectual loads are useless burdens and are thrown overboard as jetsam. Jettisoning the ego is necessary and natural" (*ramaNa*, 2000, p. 24).

When on an internal journey, we are not grasping and holding or coveting and acquiring—"The *jJAni* is not grasping and holding" (*nisargadatta*, 1973, p. 506). When one is on the internal journey, his or her maturity is reflected in not being selfish: "Love is not selective, desire is selective. In love there are no strangers. When the center of selfishness is no longer, all desires for pleasure and fear of pain cease; one is no longer interested in being happy; beyond happiness there is pure intensity, inexhaustible energy, the ecstasy of giving from a perennial source (*nisargadatta*, 1973, p. 489)." The advanced pursuant of spirituality naturally feels as though "I am the world, the world is myself," and lives in the "vastness beyond the farthest reaches of the mind" (*nisargadatta*, 1973, p. 507) and becomes that vastness, which is love, himself or herself.

nisargadatta mahArAja defined creativity as an attribute of life. “One of the attributes of life, of the vital air, is getting concepts, ideas and creation, over and over again. Who understands this? A person who has searched for himself. Only when you do that, you become aware of all this” (*nisargadatta*, 2006, p. 9). He also defined problem solving as an approach to withdraw from the level of the problem to another level: “By meditating which means giving attention, you become fully aware of your problem. Look at it from all sides, and watch how it affects your life. Then leave it alone. You can’t do more than that. No problem is solved completely, but you can withdraw from it to a level on which it does not operate” (*nisargadatta*, 1973, p. 133; emphasis added). As noted above and seen in the discussion so far, spirituality and synthesizing contradictions, or accepting the opposites as truth, are two key features of the Indian culture (*bhAwuk*, 2011). Since the syntheses of opposites leads to creativity, in the Indian culture, creativity is based on spirituality and permeates daily life.

Spirituality and Creativity

Spirituality is found to influence creativity and cognitive ability through the practice of meditation, and there is much research finding to support this, especially using Transcendental Meditation (TM), which is a particular type of meditation (Aron & Aron, 1982; Aron, Orme-Johnson, & Brubaker, 1981; Dillbeck, Assimakis, Raimondi, Orme-Johnson, & Rowe, 1986; Forem, 1973; Mason, 1994; Orme-Johnson & Barnes, 2014; Rosenthal, 2011; Roth, 2011; Travis, 1979, 2012; *yogi*, 1953). *maharSi maheza yogi* founded TM on the Indian spiritual wisdom that attachment results from thoughts (*dhyAyato viSayAnpuMsaH saGgasteSUpajAyate*, BG 2.62; see *bhAwuk*, 2011, chapter 6 for a model derived from the *bhagavadgItA* that elucidates how attachment results from thoughts). Therefore, we need to go beyond thoughts. To go beyond thoughts, we need to meditate regularly or chant a *mantra*, and practitioners are advised to practice TM for 20 minutes in the morning before breakfast and 20 minutes in the evening before dinner (*yogi*, 1953). Meditation camps have been organized all over the world, and TM has been a global phenomenon with its positive effects found across cultures. TM has been referred to as the Spiritual Regeneration of the world Movement (SRM). *maharSi* went on more than 10 world tours,

initiated more than 4 million people, and trained more than 40,000 teachers and initiators (*bhAwuk*, 2003, 2011; Forem 1973; Mason, 1994).

More than 600 academic research articles using people who practiced TM published in scientific journals have shown significant difference within and between subjects on such measurements as oxygen consumption, heart rate, skin resistance and electroencephalograph (Orme-Johnson & Barnes, 2014; Rosenthal, 2011; Roth, 2011; Travis, 2012; Wallace, 1970). During meditation, oxygen consumption and heart rate decreased, skin resistance increased, and electroencephalograph showed changes in certain frequencies. Further, meditators were found to be less irritable than non-meditators (Wallace, 1970). TM practitioners of all ages have also shown improved scores on tests of both cognitive and affective functioning, including variables such as "fluid intelligence" and "field Independence," which are found to become stable after the age of 17 (Aron et al., 1981; Dillbeck et al., 1986; Rosenthal, 2011; Roth, 2011; Travis, 1979).

In many experimental studies using a control group design, TM is found to have helped people with stress reduction, depression, and burnout (Elder, Nidich, Moriarty, & Nidich, 2014), blood pressure (Bai et al., 2015), and reduced usage of psychotropic medications among military service members dealing with anxiety and post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) management (Barnes, Monto, Williams, & Rigg, 2016). It is also found to have enhanced creativity, and many professional artists and musicians have credited their achievements to the practice of TM (Forem, 1973; Mason, 1994; Rosenthal, 2011; Roth, 2011). The credibility of TM as a science can be seen in its acceptance in schools since it helped students become creative (Mason, 1994; Rosenthal, 2011; Roth, 2011). A meta-analysis of mood and creativity research (Baas et al., 2008) showed that positive moods, particularly positive, activating, and promotion-focused moods, produced more creativity ($r = .15$) compared with neutral moods. This finding was generalizable across populations and components of creativity such as fluency, flexibility, originality, and the Eureka experience. Since TM helps to reduce stress and enhance well-being and mood, it is not surprising that TM fosters creativity.

Thus, there is sufficient evidence to believe that various practices of spirituality cannot only help us in our inward journey, but also facilitate

our creative achievements in the outward journey. The practice of spirituality integrates the seemingly different and exclusive external and internal journeys we embark upon by the integration of brain functions (Rosenthal, 2011; Roth, 2011; Travis, 2012). Travis (2012) reviewed the literature on the effect of meditation on the brain (see also Travis & Shear, 2010), and observed that different meditation practices created unique brain patterns. In another meta-analysis, it was found that different meditation practices have different outcomes but generally impact emotionality and relationship issues, attention and cognition, in decreasing order of effect (Sedlmeier et al., 2012). Thus, different physiological consequences at the brain or behavioral level could result from different spiritual practices.

Leisure has been viewed as a spiritual need by some (Doohan, 1990) and as a source of spiritual well-being and mental health by others (Heintzman, 2002). Thus, spirituality is connected to creativity not only through such practices as meditation (Rosenthal, 2011) discussed above but also through leisure, which has some bearing on creativity. It is clear that the outward journey is characterized by relentlessly pursuing objects, goal, and ideas leading to speedup, which is "an employer's demand for accelerated output without increased pay" (Bauerlein & Jeffery, 2011). A focus on productivity has not only led to the dumbing down of America (Bluestone & Bluestone, 1992) in the mindless simplification of work found in fast food restaurants but has also increased the demand for multitasking and the use of telephone and e-mail at home to perform work-related tasks. Speedup is not conducive to creativity and often causes stress; spiritual practices help to avoid the demands of speedup.

McEwen (2011) noted that at least a third of the people in the USA report that they have no time to reflect on what they are doing, and always feel rushed. Only focusing on the outward journey often leads to such consequences. She argued that being silent and purposefully not doing anything, e.g., simply having a cup of coffee, doing yard work, listening to music, and so forth lead to creativity. Csikszentmihalyi (1996) noted how many European physicists discovered their most influential ideas while climbing mountains or gazing at stars. Purposefully not doing anything work related is a process of simply being, or cultivating an internal journey. Thus, cultivating spiritual practices is much needed, not only to pursue an internal journey, but also to have some balance in life and to be creative.

Toward a Spirituality-Based Theory of Creativity

All theories are grounded in our worldview, and so it is important to reflect on the theory of knowledge in the Indian context before presenting a theory of creativity. *bhAwuk* (2011) discussed the epistemology and ontology of Indian psychology using verses from *IzopaniSad* and the *bhagavadgItA*, which support each other. The very first verse of *IzopaniSad* succinctly captures the epistemology and ontology of Indian psychology: (1) everything in this universe is covered by or permeated by its controller or *brahman*[3]; (2) protect yourself through renunciation or enjoy through renunciation[4]; and (3) do not covet or desire, for whose is wealth (i.e., all that is accumulated is left behind when one dies)? The verse provides an answer to the epistemological question of what knowledge is. Knowing that "everything that is around us is permeated by *brahman*" is knowledge. Alternatively, what is considered knowledge can be broken down into three parts: the controller, self and everything around the self, and the controller covering or permeating self and each of the elements around the self. Knowledge, it is implied, is not knowing what we see around us in its variety as independent entities and agents, but to realize that each of the elements is permeated and controlled by *brahman*. Verses from the *bhagavadgItA* (13.1, 13.2, 13.11, 18.20, 18.21, 2.16, 2.40) further support these ideas (*bhAwuk*, 2011).

Everything in this universe is covered by its controller. This also addresses the ontological quest (i.e., what is the being or self?) by affirming that the self is *brahman* or controller of the universe. The self and everything in the environment is *brahman* because *brahman* permeates everything. Thus, self, environment, and *brahman* are ontologically synthesized into one whole spiritual entity here—everything originates from and enters into the formless *brahman*. Knowing that this is the only knowledge

[3]Controller is one of the attributes of *brahman*, and is not the only one. *brahman* cannot be captured by any one label or by many labels, and so any attempt to describe it is avoided except when a sincere student approaches a teacher; and even then the teacher is quite circumspect. The Western readers can translate *brahman* as God, if they can remember that *brahman* has many attributes that are similar to the Abrahamic God (Armstrong, 1993), yet the differences are no less significant.

[4]The spirit of *niSkAma karma* or *karmayoga*—being absorbed in the work. To be doing it blissfully means to enjoy it, but not to worry about it or even want the fruits of the work means renunciation. To put it another way, when one renounces the material life, then one is in joy.

succinctly captures the epistemology. Thus, epistemology and ontology merge in Indian psychology. "*brahman* exists and *brahman* is the being" addresses the ontology, and knowing this—that *brahman* exists and permeates everything—addresses epistemology. In Western tradition there is much concern about the conflation of epistemology and ontology (Sismondo, 1993), whereas in the Indian worldview they fit snugly together.

nisargadatta mahArAja emphasized the oneness of *brahman*, self, and other elements of the creation in his teachings. "Your interest in other is egoistic, self-concerned, self-oriented. You are not interested in others as persons, but only as far as they enrich or ennoble your own image of yourself. And the ultimate in selfishness is to care only for the protection, preservation and multiplication of one's own body. By body I mean all that is related to your name and shape—your family, tribe, country, race, and so on. To be attached to one's name and shape is selfishness. A man who knows that he is neither body nor mind cannot be selfish, for he has nothing to be selfish about. Or, you may say, he is equally 'selfish' on behalf of everybody he meets; everybody's welfare is his own. The feeling 'I am the world, the world is myself' becomes quite natural; once it is established, there is just no way of being selfish. To be selfish means to covet, acquire, accumulate on behalf of the part against the whole" (*nisargadatta*, 1973, pp. 488–489). When asked if he could love another person as a person, he replied, "I am the other person, the other person is myself; in name and shape we are different, but there is not separation. At the root of our being we are one (*nisargadatta mahArAja*, 1973, p. 489).

Similarly, *ramaNa maharSi* emphasized that the ultimate objective of all teachings is to lead one to know the self. "Different seers saw different aspect of truths at different times, each emphasizing a particular view. Why do you worry about their conflicting statements? The essential aim of the *veda* is to teach the nature of the imperishable *Atman* and show us We are That (or imperishable Atman). Then treat all the rest as *artha vAda* (auxiliary arguments) or expositions for the sake of the ignorant who seek to trace the genesis of things!" (*ramaNa*, 2000, p. 29). These ideas resonate with what was presented from *izopaniSad* above.

Synthesizing this Indian worldview with the two paths discussed above, and knowing that creativity requires incubation or delving into oneself, it is posited that all creativity is spiritual in nature with consequences for internal and external journeys. This is captured in the

bRhadAraNyakopaniSad (2.4.5) elegantly in the dialogue between *yAjJavalka* and *maitreyi*. *yAjJavalka* said, "A husband is dear not for the love of the husband but for the love of the *Atman*. A wife is dear not for the love of the wife but for the love of the *Atman*. Sons are dear not for the love of the sons but for the love of the *Atman*. Wealth is dear not for the love of the wealth but for the love of the *Atman*. The world is dear not for the love of the world but for the love of the *Atman*. Gods are dear not for the love of the Gods but for the love of the *Atman*. Any being is dear not for the love of the being but for the love of the *Atman*. All are dear not for the love of all but for the love of the *Atman*. O *maitreyi*, it is the *Atman* that should be seen; one should listen (or *zravaNa*) about it; one should reflect (or *manana*) on it; one should meditate (or *nididhyAsana*) on it. By seeing it, listening about it, knowing all that is to be known is known."[5] *yAjJavalka* gives eight examples (i.e., husband, wife, sons, wealth, world, Gods, any being, and all) to emphasize that it is not the outside world that gives us pleasure (or *priya*) but the self within, thus contrasting the external and internal journeys. Then he provides the three-pronged method of *zravaNa-manana-nididhyAsana* to begin the internal journey.

The process of the internal journey explained by *yAjJavalka* is captured in Fig. 7.3. In the Indian tradition, it should be noted right at the outset that the process of learning and creativity are not separate, for they are conjoined processes—one learns as one creates and one creates while learning. This is particularly so in the pursuit of spirituality where learning involves discoveries, which is one of the definitions of creativity. Such discoveries are experiential and subjective. The spiritual journey

[5] *bRhadAraNyakopaniSad* 2.4.5. *Sa hovAca na vA are patyuH kAmAya patiH priyo bhavatyAtmanastu kAmAya patiH priyo bhavati. na vA are jAyAyai kAmAyajAyA priyA bhavatyAtmanastu kAmAya.jAyA priyA bhavati. na vA are putrANAMkAmAya putrAH priyA bhavantyAtmanastu kAmAya putrAH priyA bhavanti. na vA are vittasya kAmAya vittaM priyaM bhavatyAtmanastu kAmAya vittaM priyaM bhavati. na vA are brahmaNaH kAmAya brahma priyaM bhavatyAtmanastu kAmAya brahma priyaM bhavati. na vA are kSatrasya kAmAya kSatraM priyaM bhavatyAtmanastu kAmAya kSatraM priyaM bhavati. na vA are lokAnAM kAmAya lokAH priyA bhavatyAtmanastu kAmAya kAmAyalokAH priyA bhavanti. na vA are devAnAM kAmAya devAH priyA bhavaty Atmanastu kAmAya devAH priyA bhavanti. na vA are bhUtAnAM kAmAya bhUtAni priyANi bhavatyAtmanastu kAmAya bhutAni priyANi bhavanti. na vA are sarvasya kAmAya sarvaM priyaM bhavatyAtmanastu kAmAya sarvaM priyaMbhavati. AtmA vA are drSTavyaH zrotavyo mantavyo nididhyAsitavyo maitryyAtmano cA are darzanena zravanena matyA vijnAnenedaM sarvaM viditam.*



Fig. 7.3 Spirituality-based process of creativity

is marked by significant behavioral and attitudinal changes meeting the usefulness and change criteria of creativity. One starts by *zravaNa* or listening to the teacher about *Atman*, which captures the general process of sense input. This is the beginning of all learning and creativity. To create something new we need to learn the body of knowledge that already exists. This is akin to declarative knowledge (Anderson, 2015) or the preparation stage in creativity literature (Wallas, 1926).

The next step is *manana*, or reflecting on the concepts received from the teacher. The student takes charge of learning in this stage, and the teacher is only a facilitator and is helpful in clarifying the doubts that arise in the mind of the learner. This step is similar to associative knowledge (Anderson, 2015) in that the learner is synthesizing the external knowledge internally in his or her own experience. Applied to creativity, it encompasses the two stages of incubation and intimation (Wallas, 1926). Incubation gets deeper with intimation, associating what is learned from outside with what is experienced internally. This step is also similar to the generative process (memory retrieval, association, and analogical transfer) of the Genplore theory of creativity (Finke, Ward, & Smith, 1992).

Finally, the learner moves to *nididhyAsana* or deep meditation in which the thought is internalized, and the *Atman* is known. Applied to spiritual practices, *nididhyAsana* is the translation of thought into behavior—speak the truth, do not get angry, love all, and so forth are no longer thoughts but through deep meditation become one's habit.

The gap between thought and action is completely eliminated through *nididhyAsana*. This process is supported by *abhyAsa* or practice as shown at the center of Fig. 7.3. Thus, the idea of practice is that a learner needs to translate the reflected upon ideas into behavior. This is how the external journey is constantly guided by the internal journey, and the two become integrated. Unless the internal experience is transformed into one's daily living, one does not make spiritual progress and knowledge remains cognitive. This is similar to the stage of automaticity in the knowledge acquisition paradigm (Anderson, 2015) and the learner lives the idea that he or she has learned. In creativity literature, it is similar to illumination and verification (Wallas, 1926), for verification confirms that the idea learned is practicable. This step is also similar to the exploratory process (attribute finding, conceptual interpretation, and hypothesis testing) of the Genplore theory of creativity (Finke et al., 1992).

Maturity on the internal journey is measured by the degree of *vairAgya* or detachment, which is also shown at the center of Fig. 7.3. When one has no attachment, there is no anger (see *bhAwuk*, 2011 for a model from the *bhagavadgItA*). When attachments are weakened, one finds speaking the truth less of a challenge, and loving all becomes easier. Even in our external journey, it becomes easier to work and live with other people when we do not bring any attachment to the interaction or relationship. Thus, there is value in the cultivation of *vairAgya*. It is no surprise that *kRSNa* tells *arjuna* that one needs to cultivate *abhyAsa* and *vairAgya* to harness the powerful and mercurial *manas* or mind (*bhagavadgItA*, 6.35). Thus, *abhyAsa* and *vairAgya* are necessary and complementary aspects of the process of creativity. This is corroborated in the teachings of *ramaNa maharSi* as illustrated below.

In response to the question of how the mind is to be eliminated, *ramaNa maharSi* instructed: "The mind is by nature restless. Begin liberating it from its restlessness; give it peace, make it free from distractions, **train it to look inward**, **and make this a habit**. This is done by ignoring the external world and removing the obstacles to peace of mind External contacts—contacts with objects other than itself—make the mind restless. Loss of interest in non-Self (*vairAgya*) is the first step. Then the habits of introspection (*manana*) and concentration (*nididhyAsana*) will follow. They are characterized by control of external senses, internal faculties (*sAma*, *dAma*, etc.) ending in *samAdhi* (undistracted mind)" (*ramaNa*, 2000, p. 20). He further instructed that this process leads to: "1. Conquest of the will—development of

concentration; 2. Conquest of passions—development of dispassion; 3. Increased practice of virtue—equanimity to all; *ramaNa*, 2000, p. 22; emphasis added).”

yAjJavalka further stresses the importance of knowing the self (2.4.6[6]), “The world deserts him or her who knows the world but not the *Atman*. Gods desert him or her who knows Gods but not the *Atman*. Beings desert him or her who knows beings but not the *Atman*. Everything deserts him or her who knows everything but not the *Atman*. Thus, all that is here is what the *Atman* is.” *yAjJavalka* uses four examples (i.e., world, Gods, beings and everything) to emphasize the futility of all efforts if one is not pursuing the knowledge of *Atman* or self through spiritual practices. Thus, all is *Atman*, and we must pursue the knowledge of *Atman*. If *Atman* is known, all is known; but if *Atman* is not known, nothing is known, and all is lost. This is captured in Fig. 7.4, where we see that sense input (e.g., *zravaNa*) leads to the initial exploration of the world, which gets more involved with the process of reflection (*manana and nididhyAsana*) and creation (creation involves action and is as such different from reflection). This process is cyclical, and is applied to different contexts again and again, ad infinitum. It should be noted that in the Indian worldview, all is lost if *Atman* is not known, which is much like what Jesus said: “For what profit is it to a man if he gains the whole world, and loses his own soul? Or what will a man give in exchange for his soul (Matthew: 16.26)? But seek first the kingdom of God, and His righteousness, and all these things shall be added to you (Matthew: 6.33).”

What *yAjJavalka* tells *maitreyi* provides an *adhyAtmika* or spirituality-based theory of creativity. All creativity is coming from *Atman* or *brahman*. Thus, the two paths, external and internal, that were discussed above merge into one—the journey of knowing the self. The external journey is merely a reflection of the internal journey. We have further support for this in the tradition. *ramaNa maharSi* clearly states: “If you see the Self—pure and simple—it is *nivritti*; if you see

[6] *bRhadAraNyakopaniSad 2.4.6: brahma taM parAdAdyo'nyatrAtmano brahm veda kSatraM taM parAdAdyo'nyatrAtmanH kSatraM veda lokAstaM parAduryo'nyatrAtmano lokAnveda devAstaMparAdAduryo'nyatrAtmano devAnveda bhUtAni taM parAdAduryo'nyatrAtmano bhUtAni veda sarvaM taM parAdAdyo'nyatrAtmanH sarvaM vededaM brahmedaM kSatramime lokA ime devA imAni bhUtANIdaM sarvaM yadayamAtmA.*



Fig. 7.4 Outward journey and creativity

the Self with the world, it is *pravritti*. In other words, inward-turned mind (*antarmukhi manas*) is *nivritti*; outward-going mind (*bahirmukhi manas*) is *pravritti*. Anyway, there is nothing apart from the Self. Both are the same" (*ramaNa*, 2000, p. 190). On another occasion, he noted: "*vritti* is of short duration; it is qualified, directed consciousness; or absolute consciousness broken up by cognition of thoughts, senses, etc. *vritti* is the function of the mind, whereas the continuous consciousness transcends the mind. … After thoughts subside, the light shines forth" (*ramaNa*, 2000, p. 221).

Creativity researchers have primarily focused on the outside journey, and they get closer to the internal journey when they begin to examine the process of creativity (e.g., the flow theory of Csikszentmihalyi, 1996, or the incubation and intimation stages of Wallas, 1926/1962). In the Indian worldview the internal and external are synthesized, and the value of the external world and creativity in it is enriched by being in balance in the internal world. An artist's art is but a reflection of his or her *Atman*; a scientist's invention is but a reflection of his or her *Atman*; a musician's music is but a reflection of his or her *Atman*; this paper is

but a reflection of my *Atman*; thus, anything and everything that we do is but a reflection of our *Atman*. *nisargadatta mahArAja* succinctly explained it in the following words: "Discoveries are made by the scientists; they receive help from their own consciousness; that knowledge 'I Am' itself. But what it is they don't know. They cannot get hold directly of whatever they discover. Various books have been written but ultimately *kRSNa*, not a person but consciousness in form, has written about itself, what it is" (*nisargadatta*, 2006, p. 38).

And since we are *brahman*, and *brahman* permeates *Atman* and everything that is in the universe, all creativity is *brahman*'s manifestation. This perspective frees us from the self-centered and selfish pursuits and presents us with unlimited or infinite energy to play and create, and to enjoy our creation and creativity. The creator, the creation, and the process of creating all merge into one smooth harmonious whole when the knower, known and knowledge become one (see Fig. 7.5). *nisargadatta* (1973, p. 488) guided a seeker with these words quoted earlier: "The ultimate in selfishness is to care only for the protection, preservation and multiplication of one's own body … family, tribe, country, race, and so on. … A man who knows that he is neither body nor mind … is equally 'selfish' on behalf of everybody he meets; everybody's welfare is his own. The feeling—'I am the world, the world is myself'—becomes quite natural."

In the advanced stage, the self, others and the environment all merge in unity in what is called *sahaj samAdhi* or a daily state of living in harmony (see Fig. 7.6). *nisargadatta* (1973, p. 489) further emphasized that when the creator, the creation, and the process of creating becomes one, a view emerges: "I am the other person, the other person is myself; in name and shape we are different, but there is not separation. At the root of our being we are one." He emphasized that, "love is not selective, desire is selective. In love there are no strangers. When the center of selfishness is no longer, all desires for pleasure and fear of pain cease; one is no longer interested in being happy; beyond happiness there is pure intensity, inexhaustible energy, the ecstasy of giving from a perennial source" (p. 489). This is the spirituality-based theory of creativity, mysterious but real, encompassing all, sharing with all, and loving to all.

Of course, we have to take this theory in the cultural context, and cannot impose it on other cultures, for ontological questions such as, 'What is a being?' or 'Who are we?' are always answered in the cultural context. Also, truth, knowledge and beliefs, which constitute the



Fig. 7.5 Convergence and creativity in inward journey

elements of epistemology, are socially constructed; thus, they necessarily are cultural artifacts. This may seem like a relativist position, and can be questioned and debated, but as psychologists delving in indigenous psychology we perhaps have no choice but to take the relativist position to allow free dialogue between disparate cultural beliefs about who we are, what truth is, and ways to learn truth. In the spirit of starting such a dialogue, extant Western theories of creativity are examined in light of the spirituality-based theory of creativity.

Discussion

The spirituality-based theory of creativity, is further supported in the Indian philosophical tradition (*bhAwuk*, 2011; Moore, 1967), in creators' introspective reports (Ghiselin, 1985), in the value of positive mood for creativity (Baas et al., 2008) and the value of spirituality for positive mood (Rosenthal, 2011), in what we know about nonlinear brain dynamics (Freeman, 2008), and in various aspects of the



Fig. 7.6 Divergence and creativity in inward journey

functioning of human brain and creativity (Baumeister, Masicampo, & Vohs, 2011; Cai, Mednick, Harrison, Kanady, & Mednick, 2009; Chun et al., 2011; Dietrich, 2004; Dietrich & Kanso, 2010; Heatherton, 2011; Helie & Sun, 2010).

Researchers have noted that the early association of creativity with mysticism and spirituality might have hindered the growth of the field since spirituality and the scientific approach are not viewed as compatible (Isaksen, Puccio, & Treffinger, 1993). The long history of creativity in the domain of spirituality in India (*bhAwuk*, 2003, 2011) invites researchers to relinquish this mindset that spirituality and creativity cannot go hand in hand. Spirituality has emerged in the field of positive psychology and has also made much contribution to the field of wellness, to name a just a few emerging areas of research. Hence, any further forced separation of spirituality and creativity may only hurt the study of creativity. This paper is a small step toward demystifying the link between spirituality and creativity through other areas of research such as meditation (particularly TM), well-being, leisure studies and mysticism. The basic principle of falsification (Popper, 2002) is pursued in the practice of spirituality

in India, and this should further encourage people to attempt to bridge spirituality and creativity. Finally, the discussion above does show that the proposed spirituality-based theory of creativity is compatible with other extant theories of creativity and enriches them by stretching them rather than taking anything away from them.

According to the Indian worldview, creativity is bidirectional: the outward creativity is ever growing and transient, but this too is a reflection of the real self; and the inward creativity is implosive and the richness can only be subjectively experienced, beyond any description of the experience. Can the inward journey be called a journey in creativity? If definition is about discovery and about newness, the inward journey meets both of these criteria—dropping our social and other selves one by one means change and the creation of a new perspective of oneself, which meets the newness criterion, and the indescribable experience of the self or reality meets the criterion of discovery.

The synthesis of the internal and external journey not only supports the holistic view but also provides a synthesis of material and spiritual worldviews. The slow process of *neti-neti* (the process of distancing oneself from the physical-social-psychological self by saying, "I am not this" to experience the *Atman*) that leads to dropping elements of social selves is compatible with the evolutionary process noted by Gardner (2001). Further, spirituality is shown to add value to the material product-oriented creativity by improving the capacity of individuals through the practice of meditation. Thus, the spiritual and material journeys are not exclusive but rather complementary in nature, which is a holistic perspective that characterizes Eastern cultures as discussed in the extant literature (Nisbett, Peng, Choi, & Norenzayan, 2001).

The incubation theory of creativity suggests that solutions to problems emerge spontaneously when people do not work on them for some time. Cai et al. (2009) found that a day long incubation did not have significant difference on the measure of Remote Associates Test (RAT) between the three groups conditioned to REM (rapid eye movement) sleep, non-REM sleep, and quiet rest. They further tested if priming (a surrogate for prior exposure) of associative networks would have an impact on the RAT score, and found that people in the REM condition did significantly better (40% more compared with the benchmark morning condition) than the non-REM and quiet-rest conditions, but there was no effect of day-time sleep on RAT test-retest score. Thus, these findings were not a function of quantity (total sleep time) but

quality (specific sleep stages) of sleep, and support the conclusion that REM enhances creativity (the integration of unassociated information) by forming associative networks in the brain significantly more than for participants who were in the non-REM sleep and quiet-rest conditions. They theorized that once some nodes are activated, the brain subconsciously spreads their activation, and this happens mostly in REM sleep when cholinergic and noradrenergic neuromodulation occurs. Research with TM practitioners, compared with a control group, shows that they have a significantly higher order-creating capacity of the brain measured as a ratio of high frequency REM to low frequency REM (Meirsman, 1991), thus presenting evidence that spirituality enhances creativity not only through incubation but also through enhancing the quality of REM sleep among meditation practitioners.

Helie and Sun (2010) integrated explicit and implicit processes to present the Explicit–Implicit Interaction (EII) theory of creative problem solving, which provided a detailed process-based explanation for each of the stages presented by Wallas (1926/1962), such that a computational model could be implemented. The five principles are: coexistence of explicit and implicit knowledge (and that they are different), simultaneous inaction of explicit and implicit processes, redundancy in their representation, integration of outcomes of both the processes, and iterative processing with the possibility of bidirectionality. These five principles are supported by three axioms: the presence of metacognitive monitoring processes, subjective thresholds operating as criteria, and a negative relation between confidence and response time. The external and internal paths discussed above capture the explicit and implicit dimensions of EII and the five principles. The two paths and their parameters are different (EII Principle 1), are available simultaneously at any moment (EII Principle 2), the external is a reflection of the internal ("they frequently amount to re-descriptions of one another in different representational forms"; EII Principle 3), and balancing external and internal is necessary for progress on either path ("the integration … may lead to synergy"; EII Principle 4). Also, a person constantly shuttles between internal and external journeys (which is similar to "reversing the direction of reasoning"; EII Principle 5). Since spirituality involves cognition, emotion and behavior, whereas the EII theory is a cognitive theory of creativity, it is possible that the spirituality-based theory of creativity is more generalizable than the EII theory, though that needs to be examined in future research.

Dietrich and Kanso (2010) reviewed research on creativity that employed various neuroimaging and neuroelectric techniques. They concluded that prefrontal cortex plays a key role in divergent thinking (Guilford, 1950). However, both activation and deactivation of prefrontal cortex was found to facilitate artistic creativity as well as insight, suggesting that there are different kinds of creativity—some result from the engagement of prefrontal cortex whereas others from its disengagement. Divergent thinking was not related to right or left brain, and rather both hemispheres of the brain were involved in such thinking. Similarly, the right hemisphere of the brain did not dominate the left hemisphere in the Eureka experience. Thus, creativity is a collective effort of different parts of the brain. Since meditation helps different parts of the brain to work together better, these findings are consistent with the suggestion that spirituality fosters creativity.

According to Dietrich (2004), the spontaneous search for knowledge in the emotional domain related to spiritual experience, revelation or epiphany is characterized by the sudden appearance of neural activity capturing emotions in the working memory, and there is not much direct evidence for connecting creativity to brain mechanisms. Since spirituality pertains to holistic human experience that cannot be limited to cognitive psychology, and, in brain research, much less is known about the spontaneous experience of emotion, which is quite basic to spiritual experience, we are perhaps not yet ready to bridge spirituality and neuroscience. The review by Dietrich (2004) needs to synthesize the findings from research on TM into neuroscience. Human brain is by nature quite plastic, and the practice of TM transforms our brain and enhances interconnectivity between different parts of the brain, which facilitates all four types of creativity posited by Dietrich (2004). Thus, the spirituality-based theory of creativity has some potential to enrich the field of brain research pertaining to creativity because it points us toward neglected pathways.

Rubenson and Runco (1992) presented an economic theory of creativity grounded in human capital or potential, suggesting that, at the individual level, creativity is a function of initial endowment in the person and the investment that person makes in himself or herself to develop this creative ability by learning the necessary knowledge, skills and attitude (KSAs) and constantly improving upon them through practice. This theory assumes that human beings are driven by utility alone. However, Etzioni (1993) proposed that human beings are motivated by both pleasure and morality. The outward journey pertains to the pleasure motivation and the inward journey to the morality motivation.

The inward journey is guided by *lokasaGgraha* or working for the benefit of the society, which is consistent with Etzioni's proposal that the collectivity be used as the unit of analysis rather than the individual. Thus, the economic theory of creativity is limited to the material domain whereas the spirituality-based theory of creativity provides a synthesis of the material and the spiritual domains. The value of practice or *abhyAsa* is noted in both theories, marking some similarity between the two.

Sternberg and Lubart (1991) proposed an investment theory of creativity where they posited that creative people buy ideas low and sell them high. Buying low here means that creative people invest their time and effort in ideas that are not known or are yet to become popular. This theory is also limited to the material domain, and focuses on buying low and selling high, or what *nisargadatta mahArAja* called "grasping and holding." Though it builds on intrinsic motivation, it seems to focus on the utility of pleasure and self-interest, and as noted above it is time to think beyond them to include the morality dimension of human motivation presented by Etzioni (1993).

To summarize, the field of creativity research continues to ignore spirituality, and the focus on novelty and productivity continues to be driven by their association with economic gain. *nisargadatta* (1973, p. 496) cautioned us, "When you desire and fear, and identify yourself with your feelings, you create sorrow and bondage. When you create with love and wisdom, and remain unattached to your creations, the result is harmony and peace." Therefore, the spirituality-based theory of creativity is an invitation to cultivate spiritual practices to develop world peace through creativity.

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CHAPTER 8

Super-Ordinary Bias Among Japanese: Is It Unique to Japanese Culture?

Megumi M. Ohashi and Susumu Yamaguchi

According to mainstream psychology, individuals value being unique (e.g., Snyder & Fromkin, 1980) and positively distinguished from others (e.g., Rosenberg, Schooler, & Schoenbach, 1989). Although there has been abundant evidence supporting this view, we introduce a different phenomenon from an indigenous perspective: Japanese may value being similar to others rather than being unique. Before we describe our findings so far in Japan, let us briefly review how mainstream psychology in the USA has typically understood individuals.

Mainstream View of Individuals

In addition to the value of uniqueness and positive distinctiveness, mainstream psychology has stressed the value of self-esteem, which is "defined by how much value people place on themselves" (Baumeister, Campbell,

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Krueger, & Vohs, 2003). Baumeister et al. (2003) explained self-esteem as perception rather than reality. According to them, self-esteem "refers to a person's belief about whether he or she is intelligent and attractive" and thus "it does not necessarily say anything about whether the person actually is intelligent and attractive" (p. 2).

Many studies have shown that self-esteem can strongly influence people's thought, moods, and behavior (e.g., Swann, Chang-Schneider, & McClarty, 2007). For example, self-esteem was found to be positively correlated with life satisfaction (Diener & Diener, 2009), happiness or mental health (Taylor & Brown, 1994), performance, interpersonal success, and healthier lifestyles (Baumeister et al., 2003). It was also found to be negatively correlated with problematic behaviors. Low self-esteem during adolescence has been shown to increase the likelihood of negative outcomes in adulthood, such as financial problems and unhealthy behaviors (Orth, Robins, & Roberts, 2008; Trzesniewski et al., 2006).

This idea is also supported by a tremendous amount of studies showing various kinds of self-enhancing tendencies in all generations in North America and Europe. Self-enhancing tendencies are tendencies in which people to exaggerate how good they think they are. Alicke (1985), for example, asked college students to rate the degree to which various traits characterized the respondents themselves and the average college student. It was shown that participants rated themselves to be characterized more by desirable traits compared with the average college students, and less by undesirable traits. Another study with nearly 1 million high school students in the United States also demonstrated this tendency (Dunning, Meyerowitz, & Holzberg, 1989). The study revealed that about 70% rated themselves above the median in leadership ability, and 85% rated themselves above the median in their ability to get along well with others. Moreover, 25% even placed themselves in the top 1%. We can say that they have biased self-views because, for example, statistically 70% of people cannot be better than median. This phenomenon, therefore, is named *the better-than-average effect* (Alicke, Klotz, Breitenbecher, Yurak, & Vredenburg, 1995) or *the above average effect* (Dunning et al., 1989). As another example of self-enhancing tendencies, people are known to attribute outcomes differently depending on success or failure, which is called *self-serving attribution* (e.g., Davis & Stephan, 1980). People tend to attribute their success to internal factors, such as 'Because I'm good at it,' or 'Because I tried hard,' while attributing their failure to external factors, such as, 'Because I had bad luck,' or 'Because the task

was too difficult.' People attempt to keep their positive self-esteem by self-enhancement.

Such bias is also found in the prediction of one's future. Many studies have shown that people tend to overestimate the likelihood of experiencing positive events and underestimate the likelihood of experiencing negative events (e.g., Weinstein, 1980, 1987). For example, people tend to predict that their possibility of running into a car accident is lower than the average person who belongs to the same gender and same age group. On the other hand, people tend to predict the possibility of having their achievement published in the newspaper is higher than the average person. In summary, people's predictions on their future tend to be biased toward optimism, a phenomenon named *unrealistic optimism* by Weinstein (1980).

Given the abovementioned studies, most psychologists in North America and Europe have taken it for granted that people are motivated to possess, enhance and maintain positive self-esteem (Taylor & Brown, 1988). Indeed, Rosenberg et al. (1989) called such tendencies "fundamental human motivation." Indeed, one of the most popular textbooks in the USA summarizes the literature on self-esteem and self-enhancement as follows: "Evidence suggests that most people go out their way to maintain self-esteem and to sustain the integrity of their self-concept. To preserve their self-image, people engage in a variety of forms of self-enhancement: People take steps to view their own actions and behaviors as consistently positive." (Gerrig & Zimbardo, 2010, pp. 428–429). In summary, there is the overwhelming support for people's tendency to strive for unique excellency and claim their superiority.

However, from an indigenous perspective, we question the strength of fundamental human motivation in Japanese culture. Although we do not deny the existence of such motivation for higher self-esteem (Yamaguchi et al., 2007; Yamaguchi, Lin, Morio, & Okumura, 2008), we will argue that the strength of such motive is not omnipotent but often gives way to another motive, which will be discussed below. This is because in Japanese culture, and most likely in the other Asian cultures as well, pursuit of self-esteem often causes conflict with others.[1] This possibility of interpersonal conflict in the pursuit of higher self-esteem would lead

[1] It is interesting to note that the interpersonal cost of the pursuit of higher self-esteem has been highlighted in North America as well (Crocker & Park, 2004). Our argument is that the cost is even higher in Japan and the other Asian countries.

people to seek a harmonious way of attaining positive self-view. If it were possible to feel positive about oneself without comparison to others, would this not be enough to achieve positive self-esteem?

Does Everyone Seek to Be 'Positively Unique'?

A number of investigations have shown that many self-enhancement biases are less prevalent in Japan (and the other Eastern cultures, such as China and Korea), than in Western cultures such as the USA, Australia, Canada and the countries of Western Europe. This cultural difference has been confirmed with a variety of methodologies. For example, the better-than-average effect is less prominent in Japan (e.g., Brown, 2007; Ito, 1999). That is, most Japanese students evaluated themselves primarily as average or slightly better than average. It is also revealed that Japanese people rarely employ self-serving attribution, which is prevalent among North Americans and Europeans (e.g., Kashima & Triandis, 1986; Kitayama, Takagi, & Matsumoto, 1995; Muramoto, 2003). In addition, the distribution of self-esteem scale score is not positively skewed among Japanese, and they are less apt to avoid the negative implications of failure by belittling the importance of a task or by reminding themselves that they have many other positive qualities (Heine, Lehman, Markus, & Kitayama, 1999). Reviewing the fact that the self-enhancing tendencies are less prevalent among East Asians, including the Japanese, Heine et al. (1999) concluded as follows: "The empirical literature provides scant evidence for a need for positive self-regard among Japanese and indicates that a self-critical focus is more characteristic of Japanese" (p. 766).

With these cultural differences, we can understand that the existing psychological theories and concepts are not universal but deeply enmeshed with Euro–American values, such as rational, liberal and individualistic ideals (e.g., Kim & Berry, 1993; Shweder, 1991; Yeh & Sundararajan, 2018). A review by Henrich, Heine and Norenzayan (2010) concluded that members of Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich and Democratic (WEIRD) societies cannot be representative of human beings overall. The domains reviewed were broad and are associated with fundamental aspects of psychology, such as motivation and behavior. It is reasonable, therefore, that we question whether motivations for being positively unique is operative in other cultures as well. Indeed, some researchers have argued that the need for being positively unique is not universal but rooted in Western cultures, so that self-enhancing

motivation must vary across cultures (e.g., Heine et al., 1999; Markus & Kitayama, 1991). Heine (2011), for example, claimed that unlike North Americans of European descent, "East Asians tend to be more concerned about face, and they employ preventive, self-improving tactics to ensure that they maintain this [positive self-views]" (p. 284).

In summary, the literature indicates that Japanese (and Asians in general) show less self-enhancement compared with Westerners. Some researchers argue that Japanese (and Asians) do not need to have positive self-esteem (e.g., Markus & Kitayama, 1991). However, we think that positive self-esteem is important for Japanese and Asians as well. Indeed, we argue that Japanese seek positive self-esteem in a different way. In the following sections, we will describe what we have found based on indigenous perspectives along with evidence provided by the other Japanese researchers.

Indigenous Psychology of 'Being Ordinary' *(futsu)*

According to indigenous psychology (IP), theories, concepts and methods need to be developed from within a particular culture, using a bottom-up approach (Kim, 2001). Enriquez (1993) termed such an approach *indigenization from within* (IP-within). In IP-within, theories, concepts and methods are developed internally, and indigenous information is considered the primary source of knowledge (Kim, Park, & Park, 2000). That is, researchers themselves are assumed to be culturally embedded and thus are not free from cultural values and history. This is probably the most stringent and idealistic version of IP proposed by Berry (1989).

Based on this line of approach, we argue that the pursuit of positive self-esteem can take a different route other than becoming uniquely positive. Specifically, we focus on the Japanese concept of being ordinary, or *futsu*, which often carries positive connotations in terms of self-evaluation in Japanese culture.

Futsu is a Japanese word expressing ordinary, common, average and normal. This word is used in various situations in Japan. It can describe things, events, situations and people. According to sociolinguistics, the existence and frequent use of certain words in a language implies that they establish vital cultural concepts (Trudgill, 1974). In addition, words that are used daily are thought to reflect folk psychology, which plays a vital role in people's thoughts and actions (Bruner, 1990).

Indeed, a folk psychology is expected to provide a system by which people organize their experience in, knowledge about, and transactions with the world (Bruner, 1990). Thus, such words reflect how the Japanese make judgments.

Japanese dictionaries define *futsu* as follows (Hayashi, 1986; Kindaichi et al., 1997):

1. The same as many other people and things. Common (Antonyms: rare, different, special).
2. Medium degree. Common degree (Antonyms: extraordinary, inferior).

As is clear from these definitions, the word carries both positive and negative connotations. However, when it comes to description of people, it has positive connotations. Indeed, Ohashi and Yamaguchi (2005) asked Japanese university students ($N=150$) and adults ($N=61$) to evaluate one of six target persons, who were described either as "ordinary," "ordinary in a good sense," "ordinary in a bad sense," "non-ordinary," "non-ordinary in a good sense," or "non-ordinary in a bad sense." The results revealed that, as expected, an "ordinary" person, as compared with a "non-ordinary" person, was more likeable and they were perceived as having desirable traits to a greater extent. Moreover, impressions about an "ordinary" person were close to those about people who were "ordinary in a good sense," whereas the impressions about a "non-ordinary person" were close to those about people who were "extraordinary in a bad sense" (student sample) or at least worse than "non-ordinary people in a good sense" (adult sample). These results indicate that being ordinary is associated with more desirable traits and higher likeability in Japanese culture.

Studies using the 'false grade feedback' method have also revealed similar tendencies. Ohashi (2008) asked Japanese adults to evaluate a psychological test being developed to measure social sensitivity or cognitive structuring ability, after receiving bogus feedback about their performance on the tests (high, average or low). It was shown that the participants were satisfied with being average as well as when they received a high score. Sano and Kuroishi (2009) examined the effects of performance feedback more straightforwardly, using state self-esteem and emotions as dependent variables. It was shown that Japanese students who received "superior" or "middle" feedback reported higher

state self-esteem and more positive emotions than those who received "inferior" feedback. These sets of data unanimously indicate that being average or ordinary has a positive connotation in Japan.

Recently, Sano, Kuroishi, and Ikui (2013) investigated the meaning of ordinary by interviewing 54 college students. They asked the participants about the meaning of ordinary, the good points and bad points of being ordinary, the consequences of being ordinary, and so on. The most common effect associated with being ordinary was the feeling of relief, followed by ambivalent feelings (relief and uneasiness at the same time). This reflects the image of being ordinary. Their data showed that many participants listed good relationships with others around them as a positive aspect of being ordinary, and lack of individuality as a negative aspect of being ordinary.

In addition, possible selves of Japanese and Japanese–Americans tend to be negative as following studies show. It was also shown that the absence of negative factors affects the mental health of Japanese more than the presence of the positive factors (Kitayama & Karasawa, 1995), and Japanese show more negative emotions toward a higher achiever compared with Australians (Feather & McKee, 1993). Studies on regulatory focus also indicate that East Asians tend to focus on whether something negative is there or not, which is called prevention focus, whereas Europeans and Americans tend to focus on whether something positive is there or not, which is called promotion focus (Elliot, Chirkov, Kim, & Shelden, 2001; Lee, Aaker, & Gardner, 2000). With prevention focus, Japanese people attempt to come closer to being ordinary, which is desirable in the culture. In addition, Japanese students showed less need for uniqueness than American students (Okamoto, 1991). Rather than claiming uniqueness and excellence, Japanese tend to show modesty in their discourse (e.g., Lebra, 1976) and therefore social pressure not to stand out has been observed in Japan (e.g., White & LeVine, 1986). Some researchers have suggested that Japanese are especially sensitive about not fulfilling the expectation of others and meeting a criterion. Unemori, Omoregie, and Markus (2004), who compared possible selves, pointed out that Japanese and Japanese–Americans tend to be concerned with inter-personal matters like career and education themes, whereas European–Americans focus on intrapersonal themes consistent with cultural emphases on uniqueness and independent development.

This is in accordance with Oyserman, Coon, and Kemmelmeier (2002), who thoroughly reviewed studies comparing Americans and

Japanese with regard to collectivism and individualism. Their focus was on collectivism and individualism, but they also reviewed many other related traits. They concluded that the extent of uniqueness is most profound difference in self-construal of Japanese and Americans. That is, Japanese think of themselves as being more ordinary than Americans consider themselves to be. This result indicates that people in each culture think they possess a desirable trait: being ordinary for Japanese and being unique for Americans.

Why does being ordinary have positive connotations in Japan? One line of explanation would be in terms of the fundamental differences in priorities between the Japanese (and Asians in general) and North Americans. Being 'ordinary' does not contradict the traditional values of Japanese culture, which have been claimed to be established in previous studies (Heine et al., 1999; Hendry, 1986; Kitayama, Markus, Matsumoto, & Norasakkunkit, 1997; Markus & Kitayama, 1991). We think collectivism may well explain the Japanese tendency to be modest rather than unique. Collectivism is related to a value, focusing on which people give priority, when goals of individual and goals of their in-group are not compatible (e.g. Triandis, 1995). Collectivism, the opposite of individualism, represent cultures in which people tend to give more priority to their in-groups than to themselves. According to this line of explanation, being ordinary is inconsistent with Western cultural values. In fact, North Americans and Europeans tend to regard being average as undesirable (Alicke et al., 1995; Dunnig et al., 1989). As Brown (2007) discussed, "[I]n the United States, where competition and achievement are strongly emphasized, to be less than "above average" may be experienced as a form of failure" (p. 1). Although this line of explanation may appear persuasive, a closer look at the available evidence indicates that Japanese (and Asians in general) are not fundamentally different in terms of their pursuit for positive self-esteem. It has been shown that Japanese do show above average effect when it comes to collectivistic traits (such as warmth), which are not in conflict with other people's interests (Ito, 1999; Sedikides, Gaertner, & Toguchi, 2003). Self-esteem is positively associated with psychological well-being and life satisfaction in Japanese (for review, see Yamaguchi et al., 2008) as in North America.

Thus, from an indigenous perspective, we focus on what behavior is most adaptive in the Japanese (and Asian) cultural milieu. Our assumption is that people are concerned with maximizing their positive outcome and minimizing their negative outcome in social interactions. In Japan, it is

safer to show modesty and to hide one's high self-esteem when the relationship with counterpart is competitive. Being ordinary would be satisfactory in such a situation. On the other hand, when Japanese feel safe to self-enhance as in a family setting, they would do so, because they can feel better about asserting their superiority, just like North Americans.

Thus, one explanation for the desirability of being ordinary is that rather than explicitly seeking personal happiness, the Japanese tend to show their modesty and maintain harmonious relationships with important others, which result in behaviours emphasizing ordinariness and similarity with others. In such a cultural milieu, people may well hold a belief that being *ordinary* is safe and also beneficial for their psychological well-being.

The Existence of Super-Ordinary Bias Among Japanese

Not only do Japanese people expect that they are ordinary, they may overestimate their ordinariness, because being ordinary is safe and thus comfortable in Japan. We hypothesized that Japanese people would pursue being ordinary to the extent that they hold an exaggerated sense of being ordinary, because being ordinary is desirable for them.

In a previous study, we demonstrated this bias in future prospects (Ohashi & Yamaguchi, 2004). We hypothesized that Japanese people would tend to perceive themselves as being extremely ordinary, so much so that their self-predictions about future life events were biased (*super-ordinary bias*). Specifically, it was expected that Japanese people would overestimate the likelihood of experiencing common events (such as getting married or catching the flu) and underestimate the likelihood of experiencing rare events (such as winning a lottery or being murdered) compared with the average person. In Study 1, Japanese college students were asked to estimate the relative likelihood of experiencing 40 future life events on an 8-point scale, in which commonness and desirability were controlled. An index of super-ordinary bias was calculated by subtracting the mean estimate of relative-likelihood for rare-events from that of common events. The results confirmed the hypothesis. That is, Japanese people overestimated the relative likelihood of experiencing common events and underestimated the relative likelihood of experiencing rare events, as expected. Furthermore, in Study 2, the finding was successfully replicated in a laboratory setting in which participants were exposed to a real desirable or undesirable event. In that study, we

constructed a situation in which the participants were ostensibly assigned either to a desirable event condition or an undesirable event condition, with the commonness of the event being controlled independently of its desirability. An index of the super-ordinary bias was calculated by subtracting the mean estimate of the relative likelihood for rare events from that for the common events for a sample. Finally, in Study 3, the finding of Study 1 was replicated again with randomly sampled Japanese adults (age range: 25–69 years). In addition, the size of bias was found to be positively correlated with the tendency to view oneself as being ordinary in Study 1 and 3. Thus, the super-ordinary bias was demonstrated to be robust: it was replicated in three different samples (i.e., female junior college students, students at a top-level university, and randomly sampled adults), using three different methods (i.e., a questionnaire study, a laboratory experiment, and a mail survey).

Meaning and Value of Being Ordinary

The super-ordinary bias is based upon the logic that Japanese are inclined to think of themselves as very ordinary because they regard ordinariness as desirable. In other words, we assume considering ourselves to be ordinary contributes to positive self-image. Some may argue, however, that such a motivation does not apply to East Asians, including the Japanese (for a review, see Heine, 2003), because some have claimed that the Japanese perceive themselves negatively (e.g., Heine, Takata, & Lehman, 2000). On the other hand, other studies have revealed that Japanese manifest a predisposition toward the ordinary or in some cases above-average (e.g., Brown & Kobayashi, 2002; Ito, 1999; Sedikides et al., 2003). These studies asked respondents to evaluate themselves and an average person of their age in terms of several attributes. Results showed that self-evaluations were more favorable than evaluations of the average undergraduate on personality attributes such as kindness and diligence, which were rated as important, and less favorable on attributes such as appearance, abilities, financial resource and so on.

Although the explicit self-esteem of Japanese tends to be negative or not positive, their implicit self-esteem is known to be positive and comparable to that of North Americans. Japanese implicit self-esteem measured by the Implicit Association Test was found to be as high as North Americans (Yamaguchi et al., 2007). Japanese people also exhibit the name-letter effect (e.g., Kitayama & Karasawa, 1997). Therefore, it is

reasonable to assume that the Japanese possess self-serving motivation. Furthermore, in a set of experiments, Japanese participants exhibited a self-effacing tendency when no reason for their self-evaluation was provided, whereas they exhibited a self-enhancing tendency when they were offered a monetary reward for the correct evaluation (Yamagishi et al., 2012), which obviously implies Japanese high self-esteem. In addition, the average of Japanese self-evaluation was not lower than that of North Americans when the participants were provided with a monetary reward for the correct evaluation of their performance level. Based upon these findings, it can be argued that the Japanese modesty observed in self-evaluation is a 'default strategy' to avoid offending others. It can be understood as the return of normology suggested by Chiu, Shi, and Kwan (2018). They suggested that shared ideas, values and beliefs in a group can influence the individuals' behaviors without awareness, termed *normative influence on behavior*. They argued that "when they have incomplete information on how they should behave in the situation, they follow what the crowd does (p. 105)." In the case of expression of self-esteem, Japanese and probably Asians in general perceive that people in their culture believe that one should not self-enhance in public.

The same considerations must be operative when it comes to ordinariness. Japanese people would not be satisfied with being ordinary but feel safer in terms of maintenance of interpersonal relationships (by not hurting other's feelings). Many argue that Japanese values are now being Westernized. For example, specialists come to be valued more than generalists, and authorities in education tend to encourage praising rather than scolding children. According to Matsumoto (2002) who examined shifts in the Japanese way of thinking with regard to seven typical cultural attitudes, differences between adults and university students are not due to age itself but reflect a real shift in Japanese culture. Culture may influence people in such a way that those who do not hold traditional Japanese values still behave in a 'Japanese-like' manner because they need to be accepted by peers and important others such as a supervisor or boss in an organization.

There are data supporting this idea. Using collectivism value and interdependence value, Hirai (1999) and Hashimoto (2011), respectively, reported that Japanese people did not value collectivistic ways of thinking or interdependent ways of thinking, whereas they believe that Japanese in general value interdependence and collectivism. In other words, the estimated social values have been found to be rather

Table 8.1 Desirability of 'ordinary' describing people

	Japanese			*Americans*			*t value (Japan–US comparison)*
	M	*SD*	*t value*	*M*	*SD*	*t value*	
My idea	3.76	(1.69)	−1.8+	3.54	(1.58)	−2.5*	−1.0
My friends' idea	3.94	(1.34)	−0.6	3.78	(1.36)	−1.4	−0.9
My parents' idea	4.47	(1.60)	3.2**	3.92	(1.54)	−0.5	−2.4*
Idea of people in general	4.57	(1.60)	4.1***	4.07	(1.37)	0.4	−2.3*

Note Higher mean indicates more favorable evaluation of 'being ordinary'
*$p < .05$, **$p < .01$, ***$p < .001$

traditional than the personal value operative in modern times. This is a reasonable interpretation of their findings. However, it should be noted also that there remains room for an alternative interpretation. That is, the term, 'Japanese in general,' used in their studies to measure the estimated social values may mean 'older Japanese.' If this is the case, the difference might be a mere reflection of the generation gap. Ohashi (2006, 2007) addressed this issue.

In unpublished articles, Ohashi (2006, 2007) attempted to compare the perceived value of others of similar ages and that of the respondents themselves. Ohashi (2006, Study 6) asked Japanese and American college students to indicate whether 'ordinary' in the phrase 'He/She is ordinary' had a positive connotation or negative connotation, on an 9-point Likert scale, ranging from 0 (*very negative*) to 8 (*very positive*). They answered how they evaluate themselves, as well as how they evaluate their parents, their close friends, and how people in general would evaluate them. As shown in Table 8.1, there were no cultural differences in the respondents' personal evaluation. Both Japanese and Americans rated 'being ordinary' as neutral when they were asked for their opinions. Cultural differences emerged, however, when they were asked about people in general and their parents. Japanese students believed that people in general and their parents would perceive 'ordinary' as significantly positive, and therefore it is necessary to behave as ordinary in order to give a good impressions to their parents and to people in general. There was no cultural difference in the estimated perception of friends across the two cultures. This result suggests that Japanese

students perceive that being ordinary is desirable only for older Japanese. It is likely that there exists a generation difference in desirability of ordinariness.

Another study employed a paradigm of impression formation (Ohashi, 2007). Japanese college students were asked to read brief descriptions about six target figures (four figures were ordinary and two were less ordinary) selected from a preliminary survey. They were asked to rate their impressions and at the same time estimate impressions of their classmates about each figure. A 2(target-type: ordinary figures or less ordinary figures) × 2(evaluator: self or classmates) analysis of variance showed the significant interaction effect of target-type and evaluator. That is, the respondents themselves preferred ordinary figures to less-ordinary figures, and the difference was significantly greater for estimated impressions of their classmates. This pattern indicates that Japanese students think their classmates would like ordinary target people much more than they themselves do, whereas their classmates dislike less ordinary target people much more than they themselves do. Such findings imply that preference of ordinariness may be a tactic to gain acceptance by those people around them, who are supposed to value being ordinary.

East Asians are motivated to maintain harmonious relationships and this can be facilitated by acting in ways that are consistent with the behaviours of others. In fact, Japanese are found to conform more than North Americans (Bond & Smith, 1996) and try to fit in rather than to change others (Morling, Miyamoto, & Kitayama, 2002). Motivation to fit in or to avoid standing out from a group would be more powerful in East Asia, including Japan than in Western cultures where controllability and independence, as well as uniqueness, are emphasized.

Super-Ordinary Bias in Other Cultures

Is *super-ordinary bias* unique to Japanese? We attempted to probe this phenomenon from an indigenous perspective. It does not necessarily mean that the phenomenon can be seen in only Japanese culture. Rather, from the perspective of IP, it is desirable to test the universality of locally found phenomena across cultures. Indeed, it is likely that we find similar phenomena in cultures other than Japan, as long as ordinariness is at least sometimes adaptive irrespective of the strength of motivation for self-enhancement. As Chiu, Shi, and Kwan (Chapter 5) argued, “All theories have their cultural blind spots—what we do not observe from

one indigenous viewpoint, we can see clearly from another indigenous angle." It is possible that North American psychologists cannot see the phenomenon of super-ordinary bias due to the individualistic values they hold. Instead of super-ordinariness, 'super-uniqueness' (the opposite of super-ordinariness) was intensively studied in North America (e.g., Snyder & Fromkin, 1980), suggesting that the super-ordinary bias falls in the blind spot of North American psychologists.

According to social-linguists (e.g., Trudgill, 1974), the existence of a term implies that the concept represented in the term has a unique significance in that culture. English has such words as 'ordinary' and 'common,' which mean something similar to the Japanese word, '*futsu*.' Thus, it is possible that being ordinary is valued to some extent in North America, as in Japan.

Ordinariness can be valued in Western cultures, because one needs to take cultural values and rules, mimic other members' behaviour, and behave 'ordinarily' in order to become a proper member in any culture. Otherwise, we cannot see similarity among cultural members in terms of values and behaviours nor succession of culture. It is likely, therefore, that people exhibit super-ordinary bias in North America as well, at least to some extent.

A previous study by Chambers, Windschitl, and Suls (2003) is relevant to this issue. They showed that the commonness of events influences American individuals' estimated relative likelihood of events. They interpreted the relationship between commonness and relative likelihood in terms of self-centeredness, suggesting that people have difficulty in imagining what an average person will experience and thus think only about their own future. We agree that self-centeredness can explain a part of the effect of the commonness of the events. However, self-centeredness cannot explain the positive and constant correlation found between the size of the bias and the tendency to view oneself as being ordinary. Therefore, there remains a possibility that bias is related to overestimation of one's ordinariness in North America as in Japan.

Ohashi (2006, Study 6) compared North American and Japanese college students in terms of the super-ordinary bias in self-predictions, employing the procedure of Study 1 in Ohashi and Yamaguchi (2004). The event list was modified so as to fit our sample in the USA and questions were added to measure the desirability of being ordinary. As predicted, the US sample showed the super-ordinary bias but to a significantly lesser extent compared with the Japanese sample ($M = 2.78$, $SD = 1.33$, $n = 76$ vs. $M = 4.54$, $SD = 2.46$, $n = 100$).

For an overall analysis, a multiple regression was used instead of an analysis of variance; because (1) the commonness of events and desirability of events were not manipulated independently and (2) the perceived commonness and desirability as well as perceived controllability were measured as continuous variables rather than discrete variables. Specifically, a Hierarchical Linear Model (HLM; Bryk & Raudenbush, 1992) was used because all the variables were measured within-subjects. HLM is a multilevel regression technique that permits simultaneous analysis of within-subjects and between-subjects sources of variance. In the present case, the results can be interpreted in essentially the same way as a one-way ANOVA with random effects. The relationship between the perceived controllability and the estimated relative likelihood of events may depend on the valence of the events in North America and Europe (see Harris, 1996, for a review). Therefore, we conducted a HLM analysis for the desirable events and the undesirable events separately. Events rated "want to experience" (4–6) on average were categorized as "positive events," whereas events rated "don't want to experience" (1–3) on average were categorized as "negative events." For the HLM analysis, all the variables were standardized within each dataset, with the grand mean being set to 0 and its standard deviation being set to 1.

As presented in Table 8.2, the results indicate that the interaction effect of the commonness of events X culture and the interaction effect of the controllability of events X culture were significant predictors of the estimated relative likelihood of experiencing both positive and negative events. We then conducted HLM for each culture because interaction effects were significant (Table 8.3).

As presented in Table 8.3, for positive events, the results indicated that the commonness of events, as well as the desirability and controllability of the events, is a positive predictor of the estimated relative likelihood of experiencing events in both samples. For negative events, the commonness of events, as well as the desirability of the events, was a positive predictor of the estimated relative likelihood of experiencing events in both samples. These results indicated that participants in both cultures tended to predict: (1) that they were more likely to experience the common events than the rare events; (2) that the more desirable the event, the higher their perceived relative probability of experiencing would be; and (3) that they were more optimistic about controllable events than uncontrollable events (except negative events for Japanese). The significant interaction effects shown in Table 8.2 were found to indicate: (1) that the effect of commonness of events is significantly stronger among Japanese than North Americans for

Table 8.2 Unconditional within-individual hierarchical linear modeling for estimating events characteristics on relative-likelihood estimates

	Desirable events	*Undesirable events*
Fixed effect		
average of individual (γ_{00})	−.02	−.06
average of culture (γ_{01})	−.04	.03
Attributes of events		
commonness (γ_{10})	.05	.13*
desirability (γ_{20})	.18**	.15+
controllability (γ_{30})	.33***	−.33***
Interaction effect of attributes of events and culture		
commonness * culture	.22***	.18**
desirability * culture	.03	.00
controllability * culture	−.13**	.18***
Random effect		
average of individual (γ_{00})	.10***	.09***
Attributes of events		
commonness (γ_{10})	0.02**	.03***
desirability (γ_{20})	.06 ***	.01+
controllability (γ_{30})	.00	.00
Residuals	.60***	.69***
AIC	6932	7196
Chi-Square (10)	306.7***	211.7***

Note $\Upsilon_{ij} = \beta_{0j} + \beta_{1j}$ (perceived commonness of an event) + β_{2j} (perceived desirability of an event) + β_{3j} (perceived controllability of an event) + error. $\beta_{0j} = \gamma_{00} + \gamma_{01}$ (culture) + u_{0j}. $\beta_{1j} = \gamma_{10} + \gamma_{11}$ (culture) + u_{1j}. $\beta_{2j} = \gamma_{20} + \gamma_{21}$ (culture) + u_{2j}. $\beta_{3j} = \gamma_{30} + \gamma_{31}$ (culture) + u_{3j}
$+p < .10$, $*p < .05$, $**p < .01$, $***p < .001$

both positive and negative events; and (2) the effect of controllability of events is significantly stronger among North Americans than Japanese for both positive and negative events (Table 8.3).

In addition, the controllability of the events was found to be a negative predictor of the estimated relative likelihood of experiencing events among North Americans. That is, they estimated relative likelihood of experiencing negative events to be lower when the events were controllable. Interaction effects involving culture shown in Table 8.2 indicate that: (1) the effect of commonness of events was significantly stronger among Japanese than North Americans for both positive and negative events; and (2) unlike Japanese, North Americans tended to predict the lower relative likelihood of experiencing the negative events when the event was more controllable.

Table 8.3 Unconditional within-individual hierarchical linear modeling for estimating events characteristics on relative-likelihood estimates: analysis by culture

	Positive events		*Negative events*	
	North Americans	*Japanese*	*North Americans*	*Japanese*
Fixed effect				
average of individual (γ_{00})	−.01	.01	.00	.01
Attributes of events				
commonness (γ_{10})	.27***	.49***	.32***	.47***
desirability (γ_{20})	.22***	.22***	.13*	.15***
controllability (γ_{30})	.19***	.06**	−.16***	.02
Random effect				
average of individual (γ_{00})	.09***	.13***	.14***	.11***
Attributes of events				
commonness (γ_{10})	.03**	.01+	.04**	.03**
desirability (γ_{20})	.03**	.07***	.02*	.03*
controllability (γ_{30})	.01	.00	.00	.00
Residuals	.41***	.66***	.45***	.75***
AIC	2306.3	4524	2243.1	4867
Chi-Square (10)	110.26***	274.87***	124.32***	141.88***

Note $\Upsilon_{ij} = \beta_{0j} + \beta_{1j}$ (perceived commonness of an event) + β_{2j} (perceived desirability of an event) + β_{3j} (perceived controllability of an event) + error. $\beta_{0j}=\gamma_{00} + u_{0j}$. $\beta_{1j} = \gamma_{10} + u_{1j}$. $\beta_{2j} = \gamma_{20} + u_{2j}$. $\beta_{3j} = \gamma_{30} + u_{3j}$
+$p < .10$, *$p < .05$, **$p < .01$, ***$p < .001$

The respondent's self-perception of ordinariness was assessed by 11 items (Table 8.4). The average of the 11 items constituted the perceived self-ordinariness score (Cronbach's alpha = 0.88 for Japanese, and $\alpha = 0.89$ for North Americans). Overall, Japanese ($M = 3.01$, $SD = 0.74$) viewed themselves as being significantly more ordinary than North Americans ($M = 2.72$, $SD = 0.70$; $t = 2.64$, $p < .01$). The perceived self-ordinariness was positively related to the size of super-ordinary bias among Japanese (r (99) = 0.27, $p < .01$), but was unrelated among North Americans (r (75) = 0.14, *n.s.*).

The desirability of ordinariness was assessed by three items. The average of the three items was used as the desirability of the ordinariness score. Although Cronbach's alpha was not high ($\alpha = 0.\ 53$ for Japanese, $\alpha = 0.59$ for North Americans), as is often the case with a small number of items, all the items were positively and significantly correlated. The average score did not differ significantly between Japanese ($M = 2.47$,

Table 8.4 Self-perception of ordinariness

	Japanese		*North Americans*		*df*	*t value*
	M	*SD*	*M*	*SD*		
I often think that I am ordinary	2.97	(1.20)	2.63	(1.09)	174	−2.5*
I am an average man/woman	3.11	(1.13)	2.88	(1.12)	174	−1.9+
I think that I am an ordinary person	3.37	(1.19)	2.57	(1.06)	173	−5.4***
I am a typical college student	2.83	(1.16)	2.87	(1.11)	174	−0.1
I am alike people around me as a whole	2.28	(0.99)	2.78	(0.92)	174	2.87**
I am an average student of this college	2.74	(1.13)	2.68	(1.11)	174	−0.7
I often worry if I am inferior to others	3.33	(1.39)	2.71	(1.24)	174	−2.7**
I am a kind of strange person	3.54	(1.15)	4.04	(0.76)	171	4.13***
I am common overall	2.93	(1.14)	2.71	(0.94)	174	−2.1*
I am in the middle	3.25	(1.13)	3.00	(0.98)	174	−2.5*
I am not superior nor inferior to others around me	3.04	(1.11)	3.32	(1.02)	174	0.91
Items excluded from the score						
I am superior than others	2.34	(0.93)	2.50	(0.95)	174	1.15
I have much more abilities than others around me	2.55	(1.20)	3.32	(0.77)	171	5.1***
I am rare kind of person	2.97	(1.08)	3.45	(1.02)	174	3.33**

Note A 5-point scale was used. At first 14 items were used to measure self-perception of ordinariness. Internal correlations, however, found three items were not correlated highly with other items in at least one culture, so excluded from the further analysis

+$p < .10$, *$p < .05$, **$p < .01$, ***$p < .001$

$SD=0.79$) and North Americans ($M=2.67$, $SD=0.75$; $t=1.74$, $p<.10$). It was found that the more people value ordinariness the more they show super-ordinary bias, both among Japanese (r (99)$=0.23$, $p<.05$) and North Americans (r (75)$=0.30$, $p<.01$).

In summary, the study showed that the commonness of events influenced the estimated relative likelihood of the events among North Americans, but to a lesser extent as compared with Japanese. Moreover, personal desirability of being ordinary was positively related to the size of the bias in each culture. That is, the more a person valued ordinariness the more he/she was influenced by the commonness of the events. Taken together, the bias could be interpreted as a reflection of the exaggerated ordinariness in addition to self-centeredness considered to be

common in the USA. The study showed that the super-ordinary bias originally found in Japanese culture was not limited to Japanese culture. This bias, which is concerned with the commonness of events, is independent of unrealistic optimism or pessimism, which is concerned with the desirability of events. The super-ordinary bias had not detected in previous studies, probably because they tended to focus on rare events. By focusing on an indigenous concept—ordinariness—another bias in self-predictions of future life events was unearthed. This fact points to the importance and productivity of approaches from IP.

The super-ordinary bias has another implication for research on Japanese self-enhancement and optimism. Previous studies on self-enhancement (e.g., Heine et al., 1999; Markus & Kitayama, 1991) and optimism (e.g., Heine & Lehman, 1995) used only rare events. But our research, which focused on the commonness of events, revealed that the desirability of events affected both Americans and Japanese in a positive way. If we employ both common and rare events chosen from an indigenous perspective, we may well be able to reveal self-enhancement and optimism among Japanese.

Agenda for Future Research in Super-Ordinary Bias

In this chapter, we demonstrated the existence of the super-ordinary bias, which would not have been revealed without an indigenous perspective. In this sense, the present chapter attests to the heuristic value of IP. It can lead us to unearth an unknown phenomenon in local culture, which is not imaginable in mainstream psychology; mainstream psychology has focused its research on individuals competitively seeking high self-esteem or uniqueness. Furthermore, IP can lead us to demonstrate the universality of the phenomenon beyond local culture, in which the phenomenon was unearthed originally. In this way, indigenous psychologists can make contributions beyond their local culture.

As to the specific bias presented in this chapter, there remains much room for further research. First, we need to know the generalizability of the super-ordinary bias. The Japanese tendency to value and seek being ordinary would not be limited to future prospect. For example, some studies have provided initial evidence showing that Japanese students preferred ordinary to non-ordinary people (i.e., have more positive impressions about ordinary people). It was also shown that ordinary people were preferred much more than less ordinary people (e.g., Ohashi, 2007).

This difference was found to be significantly larger among junior-high school students than among college students, and even elementary pupils prefer being ordinary (Ohashi, 2009, 2010). Super-ordinary bias may emerge in other behaviours, such as risk taking and consumer behaviour.

We also need to test our assumption that Japanese hold a notion that they are extremely ordinary. Almost 80% of randomly selected adults Japanese answered that they were ordinary (Ohashi, 2006). However, the average score of self-perception of ordinariness was not so high. It may be because Japanese have ambivalent feelings about being ordinary. Being ordinary is adaptive in the sense that it creates positive impressions. On the other hand, being positively unique may well be important in the other situations like in North America. More detailed analyses are necessary.

Lastly, the generalizability of the super-ordinary bias across cultures needs to be explored. We have shown that North Americans have the super-ordinary bias to some extent. The bias would be observed in the other cultures in the West as well as in the East. Although mainstream psychology has assumed that people in general have a motivation to be positively unique, the research presented in this chapter point to the existence of the apparently opposite motivation to be ordinary, which is arguably universal across cultures. North American psychologists cannot see a bias toward ordinarity, which we (Japanese psychologists) can see clearly and have demonstrated in this chapter. Both Western psychology and Asian IP can benefit from the perspective that the other party offers. We should keep in mind that "all psychological theories are to some extent indigenous psychologies" (Chiu, Shi, & Kwan, Chapter 5). Cultural psychologists are advised to be aware of their possible blind spots, which can be filled by psychologists from other cultures. Future research, therefore, should identify conditions under which each motivation prevails against the other rather than denying the existence of the less dominant motivation in each culture.

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CHAPTER 9

Indigenous Implications and Global Applications of the Dual Filial Piety Model: A Psychological Re-conceptualization of 'Xiao'

Wei-Chun Tsao and Kuang-Hui Yeh

Introduction

Filial piety (*xiao*) has long been seen as the core virtue of the Confucian philosophical system, and has thus come to represent Chinese cultural values. It is culture-specific and indigenous rather than universal. Due to the global trend of population aging, much attention has been focused on the issue of

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elder care and its relevance to filial piety. In addition to East Asian nations, governments in the Western world have also started to investigate the influence of filial norms on adult children's support of their elderly parents in order to share the public financial burden of elder care with the family system (Liu & Kendig, 2000). There have even been some large-scale cross-national surveys (e.g., Lowenstein & Daatland, 2006). Does this expansion of interest in filial piety mean that it may become a more universal concept in the contemporary world? Or, should there be a culture-specific definition for use in Western studies of filial piety? Is it possible to specify an appropriate conceptual framework of filial piety for cross-cultural or cross-national comparison?

This chapter introduces the Chinese indigenous theory underlying the Dual Filial Piety Model (DFPM, Yeh, 2003; Yeh & Bedford, 2003), which conceptualizes filial piety through its underlying psychological mechanisms and integrates its implications at multiple levels. In the first section, we address methodological concerns with respect to mainstream psychology regarding the DFPM's definition of an indigenous concept. Specifically, we explain how filial piety can be re-conceptualized through the DFPM to apply culturally sensitive psychological schemas of parent–child interaction instead of relying on Chinese culture-specific norms. Next, we elaborate the dual aspects of filial piety (authoritarian and relational), including their corresponding basic psychological needs and principles of functioning, and review their theoretical implications at different levels of analysis. In addition, we review the counterparts of the concept of filial piety in Western psychology and discuss how they could be integrated into the DFPM. Finally, we address new avenues for application of the DFPM in future research. We focus on its potential for investigating the issues relevant to population aging (such as elder care and intergenerational relationships between adult children and their elderly parents) and multicultural counseling, and for establishing an appropriate theoretical baseline for the cross-cultural and cross-national comparison of filial beliefs and behaviors.

Re-conceptualizing Filial Piety as a Contextualized Personality Construct

From the perspective of psychology, filial piety has often been defined as personal beliefs regarding Chinese culture-specific family norms. Much of the previous psychological research investigation of filial piety has focused on transforming it into measurable beliefs or attitudes. The problem with this approach is that it turns filial piety (presupposed to be an inherently culture-specific phenomenon) into a psychological concept (corresponding

to a universal human mechanism). It also overemphasizes categorization of concrete behavioral rules instead of focusing on understanding underlying psychological mechanisms. Consequently, study of the indigenous concept of filial piety has been limited to the periphery of psychological science and lacks a theoretical connection with mainstream psychology.

The DFPM is grounded in a different approach, which specifies that the psychological conceptualization of filial piety (or any cultural-specific indigenous norms or values) should *link the surface content of a cultural norm at the collective level to its underlying psychological needs at the individual level.* As a result, this approach is able to simultaneously incorporate meaningful cultural and individual differences into the underlying concept. Richard Shweder famously labeled this approach: 'one mind, many mentalities' (Shweder et al., 1998). Our goal in psychologically conceptualizing filial piety (or any indigenous construct) is to dig out the universal structure of the filial mind that lies beneath the mentality shaped by Chinese (or any given) culture.

In order to reduce cultural barriers to understanding the psychological implications of filial piety, its theoretical position within psychology might be redefined as *a contextualized personality construct* (Yeh, 2017a). This conceptualization highlights psychological mechanisms derived from both interpersonal and sociocultural contexts, especially personality characteristics within social roles (Dunlop, 2015). From this perspective, filial piety can be seen as a double-contextualized personality construct that develops both within the parent–child relationship context (the most enduring and important interpersonal context in one's life) and within the Chinese cultural context (well-known for its special emphasis on parent–child dyads as the basic social unit). In other words, filial piety can be seen as a specialized psychological mechanism for coping with one of the most frequently encountered interpersonal situations in daily life (the parent–child relationship) that is simultaneously embedded in/shaped by the Chinese socio-cultural context. Since parent–child interaction is the core psychological context of filial piety, the psychological conceptualization of filial piety should be based on the essence of the parent–child relationship rather than solely on the culturally shaped behavioral norms for interacting with one's parents. Another key advantage of this conceptualization is that it can explain the functions of filial piety from the child's perspective at the individual level, instead of simply viewing filial piety as an unfair cultural norm that is unilaterally beneficial to parents.

In summary, the psychological functions of filial piety at the individual level connect to children's personal motives for their filial practices.

This aspect relates to the universal structure of filial piety. The cultural functions of filial piety at the social or collective level manifest as reinforcement for the priority of parental rights or welfare. This aspect relates to the culturally specific structures of filial piety. Only the universal structure inherent in the parent–child relationship can provide appropriate cues for integrating the various contents of filial norms into the underlying psychological mechanisms.

The DFPM casts filial piety as a basic psychological schema of children's interaction with their parents. The two fundamental dimensions of filial piety (relational and authoritarian, elaborated on in the next section) are based upon the horizontal and vertical structures inherent in the parent–child relationship. The horizontal aspect of the parent–child dyad corresponds to an equal relationship between two particular individuals who can understand each other only through interaction and communication. The vertical aspect refers to the hierarchical relationship between two family roles (parents and child) for which there exist some common norms. Although these two aspects of parent–child interaction are often entwined in daily life, it is necessary to distinguish them at a theoretical level in order to parse the possible patterns of parent–child interaction more comprehensively. As inherent universal structures, the horizontal and vertical relational aspects provide a solid base for comparing similarities and differences in the ideal parent–child interaction patterns across cultures.

Re-conceptualizing filial piety as a contextualized personality construct has a number of merits. It incorporates the vertical–horizontal duality of the parent–child relationship and reflects meaningful individual differences in interaction patterns with parents. It functions as some kind of personality characteristic naturally developed in response to the first interpersonal context that everyone encounters after birth. This reconceptualization of filial piety not only makes it more psychological, but also resolves two of the methodological problems of indigenous psychology.

First, it removes the culture-specific limitation imposed on filial piety by contextualizing the concept within the universal relationship structure of the parent–child dyad. Filial piety can be seen as an important factor for interpreting contemporary family phenomena outside of Chinese societies. In fact, measurement tools have already been developed in different countries and cultures, including South Korea (e.g., Sung, 1995), Malaysia (Tan, Tan, Nainee, Ong, & Yeh, 2018), Hispanic/Latino cultures (Kao & Travis, 2005), and Arabic cultures (Khalaila, 2010). These filial piety measures borrowed some of their

contents (e.g., the possible dimensions or corresponding behaviors of filial piety) from the Chinese concept of filial piety. Compared with Western culture, Chinese family culture puts much more emphasis on the father–son axis rather than the husband–wife axis (Fei, 1983). Because it emphasizes parent–child interaction, the filial piety embedded in Chinese culture may provide insight into possible behavioral patterns or parent–child interaction schemas, as well as clues for exploring counterparts in Western psychology.

Second, this conceptualization could resolve the problem that the definition of filial piety may continuously evolve over time due to social change. Recently, an increasing number of studies have focused on developing a new conceptualization of filial piety that might be more acceptable in modern society. For example, one of these studies resulted in a new conception and measurement for filial piety in the twenty first century (see Lum et al., 2015). However, basing the psychological definition of filial piety on social change causes the problem that no one knows when to update the definition, especially in a rapidly changing era. Not only is there a theoretical dilemma with a behavioral norm-based definition, it can also cause research findings to be inconsistent or even conflicting (Yeh, 2017a). The DFPM is immune to this problem. Social change only influences the relative weightings of each of the dual psychological aspects of filial piety in the DFPM. No matter how the corresponding behavioral norms change (more strict or loose), these two filial aspects will still exist and function psychologically. Next, we introduce the two filial aspects.

The Dual Dimensions of Filial Piety and Their Theoretical Implications

The DFPM encompasses two distinct but inter-related aspects of filial piety based on the horizontal–vertical duality of the parent–child relationship structure: reciprocal and authoritarian filial piety. These dual aspects respectively correspond to different psychological schemas that represent two basic human needs embedded within the parent–child relationship.

Reciprocal filial piety (RFP) is guided by spontaneous affection originating from long-term interaction with one's parents in daily life. It fulfills the psychological need for relatedness between two individuals (but not the family role dyad) within the context of the parent–child relationship.

The basis for RFP is the intimacy and quality of the parent–child relationship, not coercive discipline. Since children and their parents treat each other as unique individuals and establish an intimate and trusting relationship via communication and mutual support (especially social-emotional support) in daily interaction, the positive relationship that children develop with their parents constitutes a source of their authentic gratitude and willingness to repay parents' care. RFP fits with Giddens' (1992) concept of the '*pure relationship*.' It often manifests in terms of children's voluntary intergenerational support behaviors and expressions of love and care for their parents.

Authoritarian filial piety (AFP) is guided by obedience to role obligations based on the family hierarchy and fulfills the need for collective identity. The parent–child relationship is inevitably asymmetrical in the beginning (Adams & Laursen, 2001), and parents are the role models or absolute authority during children's socialization process. AFP is developed by children's normative reaction to satisfy parental discipline and social expectations. The role of the parents within the functioning of AFP is only a personalized representation of the social/collective authority based on the family hierarchy of generation, age and gender. In other words, even though the absolute authority of parents often gradually weakens as children grow into adolescence and adulthood, AFP may still reflect internalized role obligations to be obedient to family norms. AFP often involves self-oppression and absolute obedience to parental authority and the specific traditional norms (e.g., to continue the family line one must have at least one son), and thus is more likely to cause personal stress than RFP.

The detailed psychological features of the dual filial aspects are summarized in Table 9.1. As a contextualized personality concept, filial piety develops from childhood and has enduring influence on the parent–child relationship. Conceptualizing filial piety psychologically does not impair its profound implications in Chinese culture. For example, the dual aspects of RFP and AFP correspond respectively to two ethical principles in Confucianism: *qin qin* (treating parents well out of gratitude for their love and sacrifices) and *zun zun* (to respect and obey parents because of their superior status in the family hierarchy) (see Yeh, 2003). Both RFP and AFP have the social functions of sustaining family solidarity and responsibility for elder care, but the underlying mechanism of each aspect is distinctive at the individual level (Yeh, Yi, Tsao, & Wan, 2013). From the perspective of psychological functioning, RFP facilitates

Table 9.1 The Dual Filial Piety Model: psychological schemas for interaction with parents

	RFP	*AFP*
Psychological needs and manifestations in different development stages	Need for interpersonal relatedness (toward another individual) *From infancy to adolescence*: create emotional safety and affective bonding with parents (main caregiver) through expression of love or affection *Adulthood*: continuously strengthen affection and bonding with parents; understand and support parents' life needs	Need for collective identity (toward society or generalized others) *From infancy to adolescence*: avoid punishment and gain social reward (e.g., parental praise) through learning to obey parental demands *Adulthood*: practice the social role of child according to common behavioral standards
Features of psychological functioning	Simultaneously satisfy the mutual needs (for relatedness and emotional safety) of parent and child	Consider others' needs (parents, spouse, or the whole family) before personal needs
Structural features inherent in the parent-child relationship	Equal status between two individuals; Need fulfillment is based on individual traits or differences	Unequal status between the different roles within the family hierarchy; Need fulfillment is based on specific role norms
Ethical principles of Confucianism	*qin qin*: principle of favoring the intimate	*zun zun*: principle of respecting the superior

Adapted and translated from Yeh (2017a)

intergenerational support for parents through accumulated affection; AFP does it by regulating behavior so that one meets the minimum social expectations for the role of the child.

In addition to their psychological meaning at the individual level, filial beliefs also reflect the influence of historical, societal and cultural contextual factors (Yeh et al., 2013). In constructing the DFPM theory, Yeh integrated findings related to filial piety from Chinese history and philosophy (see Yeh, 2003) and gradually broadened the theoretical implications of the dual framework by incorporating various empirical findings. Table 9.2 shows the theoretical implications of the dual filial aspects at

Table 9.2 Theoretical implications of the DFPM at different levels of analysis

Level of analysis	*Corresponding implications*
Basic psychological needs (of children)	RFP reflects the needs for interpersonal relatedness AFP reflects the needs for social belonging and collective identity
Structural properties of parent–child relationship	RFP reflects a horizontal relationship between two unique individuals AFP reflects a vertical relationship based on the family role hierarchy
Historical or social change	RFP as the core aspect of filial piety [relatively free from the impact of social change] AFP as the changing aspect of filial piety
Cross-cultural comparison	RFP as the psychological prototype of filial piety AFP as the cultural prototype of filial piety

Adapted and translated from Yeh (2017a)

four different levels of analysis. In the following section, we focus on the last two levels of analysis in Table 9.2 since the first two levels involve the psychological conceptualization of filial piety, which were discussed previously.

The differentiation between RFP and AFP not only clarifies the two distinctive psychological mechanisms underlying intergenerational interaction with parents, but also provides an appropriate theoretical framework for linking the continuous evolution of filial piety with social change. Most contemporary research has focused on the decline of old norms or the development of new norms supporting filial piety, which is generally regarded as representative of Chinese cultural traditions (e.g., Lum et al., 2015).

However, a systematic review of filial piety in different stages of China's development revealed that both RFP and AFP have existed throughout Chinese history. The filial concept during the pre-Chin Era (before 221 BCE) focused on the reciprocal ethics of the parent–child dyad similar to RFP. The filial concept during the period from the Han to the Qing dynasties (202 BCE–1911 AD) was closely connected to political sovereignty and emphasized absolute ethics based on the family role hierarchy similar to AFP (Yeh, 2003). Furthermore, since RFP and AFP represent the two fundamental psychological mechanisms

underlying all possible filial norms, neither of the filial aspects will disappear with social change. Instead, they may vary in relative importance in various eras (Yeh, Chang, & Tsao, 2012).

At the cross-cultural level, RFP and AFP represent two fundamental psychological schemas that can be identified universally. AFP represents the cultural prototype of filial piety. It is best understood as a universal schema that may reflect meaningful cultural differences in spite of its being vulnerable to cultural influences concerning specific expectations for the role of child. RFP is the psychological prototype of filial piety. It entails diverse personalized practices (rather than following norms) and thus there is likely to be greater cultural similarity due to its foundation in affection. Cross-cultural similarities in the level of RFP belief and its function in relation to adolescent autonomy development have been confirmed in Taiwanese and US samples (Yeh, Bedford, & Yang, 2009).

RFP and AFP are not mutually exclusive; they are interconnected within the individual. Numerous studies have consistently shown a medium positive correlation between RFP and AFP rather than a negative correlation (see review in Yeh, 2009a). This fact addresses findings in previous studies that did not apply the DFPM but instead measured only a single aspect of filial piety. Those studies resulted in conflicting findings showing that filial piety sometimes benefits and sometimes harms individual adaptation. The DFPM integrates those conflicting results by capturing the dual aspects of filial piety in one measure (see Yeh, 2003, 2017a).

The DFPM also provides a more comprehensive framework for understanding the personal practice of filial piety (including its motivation and expression) based on the interaction between RFP and AFP. Rather than designating people as filial or un-filial, the DFPM allows for identification of four possible modes of personal interaction with parents (see Fig. 9.1).

People operating in a *balanced mode* with both high RFP and high AFP can take personalized practices and role obligations into consideration together. People in the balanced mode have a deep and intimate bond with their parents and easily find the ways to combine their parents' needs with their own personal ones. People in the *reciprocal mode* with high RFP and low AFP can maintain good communication and a good relationship with their parents. These people emphasize personal practices over role obligations and experience filial piety as authentic love rather than self-sacrifice. They value searching for personal autonomy and egalitarian belief.



Fig. 9.1 Four modes of interaction with parents based on the DFPM (Adapted and translated from Yeh, 2017b). *Note* The *balanced mode* corresponds to the *absolute mode* in a previous study (Yeh & Bedford, 2004), which emphasized that the child's intergenerational behaviors are totally guided by the dual filial aspects

People in the *authoritarian mode* with low RFP and high AFP have a less intimate and more obedient relationship with their parents. Authoritarians focus on role obligations and perceive filial piety as self-oppression rather than self-sacrifice. They always find it difficult to interact with or satisfy their parents' needs. People functioning in the *non-filial mode* have low RFP and low AFP and isolate themselves from their parents. Non-filials have low identification with their family and child roles. Non-filials' intergenerational behavior towards their parents is guided by psychological mechanisms other than the dual aspects of filial piety, such as the principle of rational choice. This possibility indicates that the DFPM focuses on the psychological process of developing an intergenerational relationship, rather than moral judgment. Thus, the DFPM transforms the concept of filial piety from a cultural-specific norm into a contextualized personality construct and can contribute to exploring the possible counterparts of filial piety in Western psychology.

Integrating the Western Counterparts of Filial Piety into the DFPM

The DFPM defines filial piety as a contextualized personality concept rather than as a collection of specific cultural norms. Re-contextualizing filial piety in this way enables the exploration of the possible counterparts of filial piety in Western or other non-Chinese cultures. Specifically, any concept regarding children's psychological process of intergenerational relating, such as their beliefs, attitudes and perceptions toward parents, might correspond to one of the dimensions of filial piety. In this section, we review Western concepts that may relate to filial piety.

Few researchers have considered comparing filial piety and attachment. However, since attachment style can also be seen as certain type of contextualized personality concept that reflects the schema of children's interaction with their parents in Western family culture, the psychological re-conceptualization of filial piety with the DFPM clarifies the theoretical comparability between these two concepts. In order to illustrate how the psychological schema of intergenerational interaction is shaped into diverse forms by different cultural contexts, we discuss the differences between these two cultural psychological isomers (attachment style and filial piety) from the following three aspects: (1) the nature of parent–child relationship; (2) the ideal way for children to achieve developmental task of autonomy in their relationship with their parents; and (3) the classification of the mode of interaction with parents.

First, according to attachment theory, the nature of the parent–child relationship is determined by the relationship between the caregiver and the care receiver. The only task of the child is to form and maintain a strong bond with the parents until adulthood. By contrast, the DFPM clarifies the dual nature of the parent–child relationship across the lifespan and encompasses both horizontal and vertical aspects. Although there may be some correspondence between the implications of RFP and attachment, the major difference is in the critical period of developmental. Attachment theory focuses on the specific interaction style originating in infancy, while RFP focuses on the continuous accumulation of mutual understanding between parent and child across the lifespan. For example, previous studies have found that the experience of becoming parents often enhances adult children's RFP toward their own parents (see Yeh, 2017a).

Second, there is a famous experimental paradigm for attachment regarding the developmental task of children that focuses on a strange and stressful situation arising from separation anxiety (Ainsworth & Bowlby, 1991). It implies that the ideal parent–child relationship should help children to develop sufficient emotional security and social capacity to cope with separation from the family of origin, as well as the multiple roles of adulthood. In other words, the major task of children is to strive for individual autonomy from the relationship with their parents. By contrast, from the perspective of the DFPM, the major developmental task of children is to form autonomy or self-volition through the integration of numerous social roles, instead of just self-autonomy. The parent–child relationship is a robust basis for establishing other types of social relations or developing a more complex identity comprised of multiple social roles. For example, numerous Chinese proverbs reflect the father–son relationship as a prototype for other important social relations, such as the role of teacher: 'He who teaches me for one day is my father for life' (一日為師終生為父). Compared with attachment theory, the DFPM also recognizes that the parent–child relationship helps children transition into adulthood and emphasizes the importance of a continued relationship with one's parents after becoming an adult. The optimal level of both RFP (reflecting a high quality stable relationship with parents) and AFP (as a healthy collective identity) may provide different psychological niches that enable one to cope with various relationship changes at any stage of development.

Third, the two theoretical frameworks classify the interaction mode similarly. A secure attachment style corresponds to the balanced mode of the dual filial dimensions (high RFP and high AFP, see Fig. 9.1). The avoidant attachment style corresponds to the non-filial mode. The ambivalent attachment style could correspond to both the reciprocal and authoritarian modes in that both types of children lack the capacity to balance personalized filial practices based on affection for the parent (RFP) with the social expectations for the role of children (AFP). Thus, children with the reciprocal mode of intergenerational interaction are more likely to be anxious about others' doubt and criticism of their personalized filial behaviors, and those with the authoritarian mode are more likely to feel stress due to parents' extra demands and needs. Even though separation anxiety with parents is not the theoretical focus of the DFPM, the combination of RFP and AFP can still cover a wider

range of anxiety situations related to interaction with parents. The preliminary comparison based on the three attachment subtypes shows that the DFPM may have the potential to incorporate well-known Western counterparts.

Although the influence of attachment style on one's subsequent interpersonal relationships has been broadly discussed in the literature, the concept of attachment has rarely been applied to investigate intergenerational interaction between adult children and their parents. Because Western family culture is based on the husband–wife dyad or romantically close relationships as the primary attachment relationship during adulthood (Bartholomew & Horowitz, 1991), concepts other than attachment have been developed to describe intergenerational relationships in later life.

Most of these Western concepts regarding relationships with parents could be integrated into the DFPM. The concept of *intergenerational ambivalence*, which refers to the experience of both positive and negative feelings toward parents (Luescher & Pillemer, 1998) and can be expressed as an imbalance between RFP and AFP, is one example. Moreover, because attachment style has a narrower scope than the DFPM, Western scholars may need new conceptual tools to analyze developmental and family issues relevant to parent–child relations beyond that narrow scope. Another example is the concept of (perceived) *parental authority*, which is used to predict adolescent life adaptation, social development and delinquency (Darling, Cumsille, & Martínez, 2008; Smetana, 2000). It focuses on the vertical structure of the parent–child relationship as a counterpart to AFP.

A third example involves an emerging concept, *moral capital* (Silverstein, Conroy, & Gans, 2012), which is designed to deal with the issue of elder care in light of global population aging. Given the weakening ability of governments to sustain social security, even Western welfare states are rediscovering the family and exploring its role in protecting older adults. Western studies have paid more attention to the topic of filial norms and family support, including a large-scale cross-national survey in Europe (e.g. Lowenstein & Daatland, 2006). *Moral capital* is defined as the stock of internalized social norms regarding children's obligation to care for their older parents, and as a set of intergenerationally transmitted values that make up for the insufficiency of relying solely on children's gratitude or emotional bonds with their parents

(Silverstein et al., 2012). It corresponds to AFP in representing role obligations based on the family hierarchy. It can guarantee parental support by their children even with a weak parent–child relationship. As can be seen from these examples, these Western counterparts that deal with parent–child relations after childhood are similar to AFP in their mechanisms, functions and theoretical implications. This observation indirectly highlights the value of the dual nature of parent–child relationships depicted in the DFPM.

Although both RFP and AFP have a psychological basis (see Table 9.2), from the perspective of cross-cultural comparison, RFP (rather than AFP) better corresponds to the psychological prototype of filial piety as a generally accepted belief regarding intergenerational interaction with parents. In the field of contemporary Western applied ethics, there are also some concepts and theories regarding parent–child relationships that are similar to RFP. For example, English (1979) used the *friendship model* to explain the essence of filial piety and claimed it is an ongoing friendship characterized by spontaneous affection. Based upon this friendship model, Dixon (1995) proposed that the voluntary and loving nature of a relationship is the most robust base of children's filial behavior. It is more powerful than the constraint of morality or obligation across any situation. The definition and the operational mechanisms of filial piety based on the friendship model echo RFP. The reciprocal aspect of filial piety can represent the affection-based aspect of children's belief in how to interact with parents, and has a robust basis even for people not socialized in the Confucian tradition.

In summary, the dual dimensions of RFP and AFP have the potential to integrate various concepts regarding intergenerational interaction with parents during specific developmental stages or within specific contexts proposed by Western scholars. Taking these two fundamental psychological schemas into consideration simultaneously, one can identify the mode of interaction with parents across situations or developmental stages meaning that the DFPM can provide an appropriate baseline for comparative studies across cultures. However, the focus of cross-cultural comparison should not be limited to identifying which culture shows a greater degree of filial piety, but instead should focus on cultural similarities and differences in the psychological functions of RFP and AFP. In the next section, we review empirical studies that applied the DFPM with diverse samples (including different cultures, ages, etc.).

The Implications and Recent Applications of the DFPM

The Dual Filial Piety Scale (DFPS) supporting the DFPM provides a starting point for research. It has long been applied to relate filial piety to intergenerational relationships, family events, and personal adaptation (Yeh, 2009b; Yeh & Bedford, 2003, 2004). Following global trends, application of the DFPM has been extended to other issues, such as the challenge of elder care due to population aging, and counseling in a multicultural context. For instance, a recent study in Hong Kong looked at adolescent academic achievement as a filial duty, and found that RFP and AFP represent two different motivational beliefs, each with its own influence on academic success (Chen & Wong, 2014). In this section, three emerging applications of the DFPM are addressed: elder well-being, cross-cultural/societal comparison, and multicultural counseling.

Elder Well-Being

In the past two decades, population aging has become a global issue that affects both developed and developing countries. The United Nations Principles for Older Persons emphasized the role of cultural values in the provision of elder care (UN, 1991). However, the socio-cultural contextual factors and their role in shaping elder issues has been little discussed in the literature on elder well-being. Financial and healthcare support for older adults in Euro–American countries is the responsibility of social security and the pension system. Thus, elder support has been addressed as a social welfare issue focusing on resource allocation and distributive justice among diverse disadvantaged populations. By contrast, Taiwan's social welfare system is less comprehensive and its role in elder support is merely supplementary because, due to Confucian filial ethics, the Chinese family is seen as the primary provider of financial, housework and healthcare support for elderly parents (Lin, 2012). Hence, elder support and care is more of a family issue in Taiwan than in Western countries.

Previous studies have provided evidence of the beneficial effects of both RFP and AFP on intergenerational support for elderly parents, but RFP has repeatedly shown a stronger and broader effect. An analysis of a nationally representative sample of 1463 adults in Taiwan

(collected by the Taiwan Social Change Survey 2006) demonstrated that after controlling for demographic and family structure variables, adult children's RFP still has a significant positive effect on the frequency of financial support, household labor assistance, and emotional support for elderly parents (Yeh, 2009b). By contrast, their AFP had a positive correspondence only with the frequency of providing household labor, and not with providing financial or emotional support for elderly parents. Similar results have also been found in China and Hong Kong using cross-national data from the East Asia Survey (Yeh et al., 2013).

In addition, in a sample of Taiwanese college students, RFP was found to have a facilitating effect on the younger generation's attitudes towards co-residence with and caring for their elderly parents in the future (Cheng, 2005). Co-residence with adult children is still the ideal living arrangement for elderly retirees in contemporary Taiwan. These findings indicate the potential of RFP rather than AFP for serving as an efficient mechanism to promote support of elderly parents' basic life needs in Taiwan and even in other contemporary Chinese societies.

Adult children's support of their parents' basic needs from RFP not only entails provision of material sustenance, but also gratitude and more freedom of choice in life necessities for parents than can be provided by welfare services (Yeh & Tsao, 2014). This finding accounts for Taiwanese elders' greater preference for family rather than governmental support. RFP highlights love-based care rather than mere labor support, with additional positive effects for the well-being of both caregivers and care recipients.

Research indicates that Hong Kong Chinese, especially those who have been primary or long-term caregivers, often interpret their care for their elderly parents as affection-based repayment (the core of RFP) rather than as obedience to external norms (Wong & Chau, 2006). A study on caregiver experiences in Taiwan found that emotional intimacy and a closer relationship were often achieved in a family dyad (especially when children became caregivers for their parents) and could enhance the positive caring experience (Hsiao & Chiou, 2011). It seems that RFP can strengthen both children's intention to remain as caregivers of their parents and the quality of their care, thus ensuring the well-being of the parents. Further, a recent study on end-of-life caregiving showed that RFP, which facilitates mutual intergenerational support, not only reduced the caregivers' (adult children's) burden and stress, but also

enhanced the elderly parents' self-worth due to providing emotional support for family members (Chan et al., 2012).

Chan and Pang (2007) asserted that the reason family care is the best approach to long-term support is that it balances the values of dignity, autonomy and family integrity. These outcomes are mainly achieved through RFP. RFP plays an integrating role in fulfilling other significant psychological needs in later adulthood as well. For instance, RFP had a positive effect on the actual emotional support provided by adult children (Yeh, 2009b; Yeh et al., 2013) and adolescent grandchildren (Chang, 2006) for their elderly parents or grandparents. An intergenerational emotional connection meets both the relationship needs and the spiritual needs of the elderly. If adult children's RFP behaviors are viewed as repayment out of gratitude rather than as a burden, it can make it easier for aging parents to adapt to the caregiver role reversal, and it can raise their self-esteem in addition to meeting their care needs (Mottram & Hortacsu, 2005). Studies based on terror management theory found that adult children's filial behaviors (measured by items more relevant to RFP) and a high-quality parent–child relationship (encompassing core RFP values) could buffer the death anxiety activated by mortality salience for middle- and old-age parents in Taiwan. The buffer develops because the perceived RFP behaviors from the adult children correspond to parents' search for enduring meaning through their offspring (Chiou, 2007; Shen, 2010).

In each of these studies, RFP often simultaneously meets multiple psychological needs of the elderly and shows a spillover effect to elders' social acceptance and participation outside the family. Even though the practice of filial piety is essentially based on morality, adult children's regular financial support of their elderly parents is also required by law in some Chinese societies, such as the Maintenance of Parents Act in Singapore and the Family Support Agreement (FSA) in China. Is a filial responsibility law (which corresponds to AFP) an effective solution to elderly welfare in aging Chinese societies? According to a study on the FSA in China, filial responsibility backed by the legal force of the state may paradoxically erode spontaneity, flexibility and affection in the practice of filial piety (which correspond to RFP), thus harming the intergenerational relationship and resulting in more family lawsuits (Chou, 2011). This finding supports the theoretical differentiation of RFP and AFP, and the key role of RFP in the well-being of the elderly.

Cultural Comparison

Using the DFPM as the theoretical basis for interpretation of comparative results allows for more detailed exploration of the contemporary evolution of filial piety in different Chinese societies. For example, using the DFPM as the baseline for comparative analysis of China, Taiwan and Hong Kong with the data from 2006 family module of the East Asian Social Survey, Yeh et al. (2013) showed that RFP remains potent in all three societies despite the diverse socio-political developments in each society. By contrast, AFP is more emphasized in China than in Taiwan and Hong Kong. The core essence of filial piety in Taiwan and Hong Kong has shifted from absolute submission and parental authority to mutual affection and equality in the parent–child relationship. These results confirm that filial piety has not been erased by modernization and democratization. Moreover, even after the socialist transformation movement and the radical Cultural Revolution, filial belief remains important in China. Filial piety not only corresponds to salient psychological implications at the individual level in addition to its cultural impact, but also reflects the influence of societal and political contextual factors.

Multicultural Counseling

The last potential application is in multicultural counseling. Multiculturalism has been called the most important new idea to shape the field of counseling. Filial piety has been recognized as a Chinese indigenous core value that plays the primary role in family and interpersonal interaction for Chinese people. However, few researchers have examined filial piety issues for Chinese people in a counseling context. In a clinical or counseling practice, it is not unusual to see educated Chinese adults struggling between autonomy and being a good child to their parents, especially in areas such as mate selection and career decisions.

Some empirical studies have indicated that filial piety is associated with resistance to cognitive change, neuroticism and maintenance of certain dysfunctional parent–child relationships (Ho, 1996; Tang, 1998; Zhang & Bond, 1998). However, these studies only addressed the authoritarian aspect of filial piety, which can lead to harmful consequences for individual adaptation and the quality of relationships. The benefits of RFP manifest in many studies (Chen, 2014; Chen & Ho, 2012; Chen & Wong,

2014; Yeh, 2006, 2009b, 2014; Yeh & Bedford, 2004). If a counselor can identify the beneficial aspects of the filial piety, most Chinese personal issues and parent–child conflicts might be more smoothly and positively transformed (Kwan, 2000).

According to the DFPM, the emotions of affection and reverence are inherent in filial piety. That is, parents always convey and reinforce the message that they perform authority and discipline out of love and for the child's welfare (Liu, Yeh, Wu, Liu, & Yang, 2015). The intergenerational relationship is hierarchical, yet intimate. Such simultaneous pairing of the exercise of authority and benevolent intention leads children to respect their parents and to develop a sense of reciprocal responsibilities to submit to filial expectations (Kwan, 2000). Although not all Chinese clients present with issues related to intergenerational conflict, counselors still need to be sensitive to the implications of the influence of filial piety on Chinese people's self-construal and intergenerational relationships.

We do not promote a narrower perspective on multicultural counseling, which fosters an either-or type of reasoning. That type of perspective emphasizes dissimilarity, especially in terms of race and ethnicity, between the counselor and the client. However, there are infinite possible differences between counselors and clients. The ability to work with another individual is a basic counseling skill, not reserved only for those who specialize in multicultural counseling (Speight, Myers, Cox, & Highlen, 1991). All counselors work with people who are different from themselves.

According to Cox's tripartite model of worldview, cultural specificity, individual uniqueness, and human universality represent the interactive components influencing individuals (Cox, 1982). To gain a full understanding of individuals, it is necessary to explore the unique and simultaneous influences of these three aspects. Therefore, each counseling encounter possesses a mixture of differentness and sameness of the three parts, and all counseling is multicultural in nature (Speight et al., 1991). In the same vein, the DFPM conceptualizes filial piety by elucidating the underlying universal mechanisms in parent–child interaction and the culturally specific principles within the Confucian ethical system, while also integrating individual uniqueness. The DFPM describes simultaneous individual, relationship, family, and societal-level functions of filial piety and reinterprets the subtle and deep implications behind social phenomena.

Conclusion

The development of indigenous psychology has often focused on either criticizing or complementing Western-centric knowledge, and on discussing cultural variation or cross-cultural validity of some Western psychological construct among non-Western countries. However, the goal of indigenous psychology should be to explore the interrelation between culture and psychological concepts in order to evaluate the applicability of all kinds of psychological constructs in different cultures.

We contrasted the dual filial dimensions with several Western concepts relating to parent–child interaction. This contrast can be seen as a critical reflection on the basis of a culture–psychology link, rather than as the cross-cultural expansion of an existing Western concept. Filial piety is generally considered to be an indigenous concept developed within Chinese culture, and so is often seen as culture-specific. At a theoretical level, the DFPM indicates the two fundamental psychological needs that underlie the continuous cultural evolution of filial piety. It can be applied to empirically investigate the parent–child relationship in various social and cultural contexts, such as the mother–daughter relationship in Turkey (see Mottram & Hortacsu, 2005); a comparative study of intergenerational issues among different Chinese societies (e.g., Yeh et al., 2013) or between Western and non-Western cultures (e.g., Woodford, 2016); the cultural identity of overseas Chinese (e.g., Lin, 2008); or intergenerational issues in three major Chinese societies, including Hong Kong (e.g., Chen & Wong, 2014; Leung, Wong, Wong, & McBride-Chang, 2010), Taiwan (e.g., Tsao & Yeh, 2014), and China (e.g., Jin, Yuen, & Watkins, 2007; Jin, Zou, & Yu, 2011; Li, Chen, & Xu, 2016).

The cultural gap between individuals has gradually shrunk. Many individuals possess a bicultural or multicultural mind that enables them to switch between different cultural frames in order to meet the requirements of different situations (Hong, Morris, Chiu, & Benet-Martinez, 2000). However, this point of view still generally emphasizes the differences between and coexistence of Western and non-western cultural frames. By contrast, the psychological re-conceptualization of filial piety introduced in this chapter emphasizes the connection and integration of culture and psychological mechanisms within a contextualized personality concept. Culture can be seen as a set of contexts that can form, reinforce or manifest the degree of an individual's collective identity rather than as a set of specific cultural norms with which the individual complies.

The DFPM reflects the common human nature and cultural uniqueness in individuals' schema of parent–child interaction. An individual's degree of belief or behavioral tendency toward RFP and AFP is mainly shaped by actual interaction experiences with parents, which varies by individual. We suggest that theory construction and the development of indigenous psychology should go back to discussing the culture–psychology link at the individual level and to balancing universal human tenets, cultural diversity and individual differences. Only in this way can indigenous psychology contribute to understanding the psychological functioning of individuals from different cultures, thus enhancing the integration of knowledge in global psychology.

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PART III

Showcase the Next Generation of Scholars Who Develop Novel Applications of Culture-Inclusive Concepts, Topics, and Empirical Research to Asian Societies

CHAPTER 10

How Does Trust Relate to *Guanxi* in the Chinese Workplace? An Integrated Dynamic Model

Olwen Bedford

有關係、就沒關係; 沒關係、就有關係

If you have guanxi, you will have no problems; if you don't have guanxi, you will have problems.

Guanxi is a key characteristic of Chinese culture. It refers to particularized interpersonal connections that have been highlighted as crucial for business in China since ancient times. Historically, it has played an important role in government, trade and commerce, and even scholarship. A broad network of *guanxi* relationships represented the ability to travel and meet people outside the family and hometown, making it important for career success. *Guanxi* is no less important for organizations and for individuals' career outcomes in modern Chinese societies (Luo, Huang, & Wang, 2012), as attested by the prolific academic research on the topic, particularly in the business literature. Indeed,

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most research on *guanxi* has been aimed at examining work-related outcomes, both positive (e.g., improved efficiency and reduced transaction costs; Lovett, Simmons, & Kali, 1999) and negative (e.g., expense and time consumption; Yi & Ellis, 2000). However, despite being the most studied indigenous concept in the past ten years (Mao, Peng, & Wong, 2012), there are clear gaps in the research attention directed at *guanxi*. The literature on *guanxi* has been criticized for excessive focus on pragmatic utility rather than construct building (Yang, 2001), and recent studies have likewise noted the lack of attention to the social processes and psychological mechanisms underlying *guanxi* (e.g., Bedford, 2011).

The goal of the present chapter is to address this gap by developing a model of the social processes underlying *guanxi* pertaining to trust. Although many studies of *guanxi* have mentioned trust (Xin & Pearce, 1996), few have explicitly explored the role of trust in relation to *guanxi* in the Chinese workplace. Often *guanxi* and trust are examined in the context of other variables while assuming an underlying relationship between them, but there is no consensus as to what that relation is. For example, some researchers have asserted that trust is an <u>outcome</u> of *guanxi* ties (Han, Peng, & Zhu, 2012; Song, Cadsby, & Bi, 2012) or have claimed that *guanxi* provides the contextual confidence for building trust (e.g., Child & Möllering, 2003; Han et al., 2012), or that *guanxi* is the dominant mechanism for establishing trust (e.g., Whitley, 1991). Others have portrayed trust as an <u>antecedent</u> to *guanxi* (Wasti, Tan, & Erdil, 2011) or defined *guanxi* as a distinctive pattern of trusting relationships (King, 1991) or suggested that trust differentiates relationships since people with the same *guanxi* have different degrees of trust. A few researchers have proposed models in which trust is a component of *guanxi* (e.g., Bedford, 2011) or have suggested that trust is an indicator of *guanxi* quality and psychological closeness (Chen & Chen, 2004; although their model was not specific to the workplace). Others have argued that trust plays little role in *guanxi* (Standifird & Marshall, 2000) or that the components of *guanxi* do not include trust (Lee & Dawes, 2005).

What role does trust play in relation to *guanxi* in a workplace context? To answer this question, I start with theory development supported by an indigenous psychology perspective. As Yeh and Sadararajan (2018) noted, psychology cannot be culture-free. Yet, theories and conceptualizations of human functioning developed with dependence on Western values and norms—Western indigenous theories—are often applied to

other cultural contexts without examination. Researchers' application of Western models of trust to the Chinese workplace may have contributed to the inconsistency in findings regarding the relation between *guanxi* and trust. It is important to examine Western models carefully to identify whether they are appropriate or useful and whether they need to be amended in order to reflect the realities of the local context. Developing both Western and Chinese indigenous models of a particular concept can provide a valuable opportunity to develop a richer psychology on both local and global levels.

In this chapter, I re-examine the predominant Western model of workplace trust in light of important Chinese values and norms in order to propose a model integrating Chinese *guanxi* and trust development for application in a Chinese workplace. First, I identify a possible reason that the relationship between trust and *guanxi* has not been a specific focus of research: namely, emphasis on the use of a Western individualistic trait perspective in conceptualizing both of these concepts obscures the connection between them. Second, I briefly review sociological and historical perspectives on the cultural importance of *guanxi* to highlight broad similarities between *guanxi* and trust in a Chinese context. Third, I deconstruct each into its component parts. Based on that analysis, in the final section, I propose a dynamic model of *guanxi* development and maintenance that integrates trust, and then discuss implications for workplace relations and future research in the conclusion.

Uncovering the Relationship Between *Guanxi* and Trust

The bulk of research on *guanxi* in the business literature has focused on documenting how *guanxi* is helpful or harmful to work outcomes. This approach has tended to regard *guanxi* as a static or passive trait of individuals (Yang, 2001). For example, researchers have tended to define *guanxi* in terms of a common *guanxi* base, such as kinship, friendship, or school mates (Song et al., 2012). Accordingly, the more common bases that exist, the greater the likelihood of close *guanxi*, and lack of a common base means no *guanxi* (Jacobs, 1979). This approach is grounded in a Western individualistic perspective. It does not capture any of the dynamic processes of relationship development.

Similarly, several scholars have noted (e.g., Child & Möllering, 2003; Williams, 2007) that the literature on organizational trust has regarded the truster as a passive calculator of situational variables such as the

characteristics of the trustee. Trust development has been portrayed as a passive process of gathering data from third parties or observing behavior over time (e.g., Lewicki & Bunker, 1996). This viewpoint does not encompass the possibility that the truster can take action to influence the situation in favor of trust. Use of a static trait perspective grounded in Western philosophical traditions may have obscured how the concepts of *guanxi* and trust relate to one another.

In contrast to the trait perspective, a process perspective may lead to insights into how they may be connected. A process perspective is highlighted by starting with the question of why *guanxi* is important and how it is established and used. Few researchers have addressed these questions. Two researchers who have addressed these questions applied sociological (King, 1991) and historical (Whitley, 1991) perspectives.

King (1991) argued that Chinese people are preoccupied with developing *guanxi* because there is a built-in cultural imperative to do so; Confucianism orients people toward *guanxi*. The Confucian conceptualization of a person is not based on the individual and limited by the individual's body. Instead, personhood resides in the relationships between individuals. Similarly, the structure of Chinese ethics is based on relationships between dyads, as exemplified by the *wu lun*, the five cardinal relationships of Confucianism: father–son, superior–subordinate, husband–wife, elder brother–younger brother, and peer–peer. The interaction norms differ for each dyad, meaning that the principle that should be used to guide interpersonal interaction depends upon the target of interaction. Different standards are to be applied for interacting with different people (Fei, 1948)—this is an ethical requirement. The implication of this epistemological orientation is that interpersonal interaction is particularistic in the sense that interaction targets are not interchangeable. There is no historical foundation in Chinese culture for a relationship in which interaction norms are constant regardless of the target, or in which the personal aspects of the relationship are not supposed to impact the nature of the interaction. *Guanxi* relations are supported by Confucian ethical norms (Bedford & Hwang, 2011, 2013).

Historical patterns of social development in China reflect this philosophical particularism. Whitley (1991) examined these historical patterns to shed light on current differences in business systems in terms of trust, loyalty and authority in China and Japan. Whitley concluded that in pre-industrial China, the fact that the family was the basic unit of social

identity impacted the ease of establishing trust across family boundaries; traditional Chinese villages had little inter-family cooperation. Furthermore, in contrast to pre-industrial Japan where formal mechanisms for settling disputes arose in the eighteenth century, in China there was no effective legal system or institutions to regulate exchanges between people who were not family members. Without such institutions, personal relationships had increased importance.

The lack of strong institutions is still a reason put forth by scholars for the importance of *guanxi* in modern China (e.g., Xin & Pearce, 1996). *Guanxi* relationships allow a person to move forward in an environment in which outcomes would otherwise be too uncertain, such as when business laws are not coherent or when facing weak institutions or shortages of basic necessities (Child & Tse, 2001). Researchers have proposed that in an environment in which system trust is lacking, *guanxi* provides a complement to or a substitute for contract law (Lovett et al., 1999). *Guanxi* can play this role because *guanxi* norms can be considered moral criteria. They are socially enforceable to the extent that there are consequences, such as loss of face and social credibility, for opportunistic behavior. A person who acts in accordance with *guanxi* etiquette demonstrates an understanding and acceptance of the moral code that it represents. Thus, when *guanxi* behaviors are enacted they can be considered to support a form of trust in the system: if both partners in the dyad are able to demonstrate knowledge of the operation of the principles of *guanxi* and act according to its rules (participate in the system), each has empirical evidence on which to base the prediction of the other's behavior. The sociohistorical perspective on *guanxi* casts it as a dynamic strategy for establishing a basis for trust in an otherwise uncertain environment.

Deconstructing *Guanxi* and Trust

This dynamic perspective highlights a connection between *guanxi* and trust on a macro level. In order to clarify their relationship on an interpersonal level, in this section, I examine predominant models of *guanxi* and workplace trust. In the following section, I integrate them into a dynamic process model of workplace *guanxi* development and maintenance.

Guanxi

A number of researchers have proposed systems for categorizing different types of *guanxi*. Most have referenced Hwang's (1987) three types of Chinese interpersonal ties: the expressive tie, the instrumental tie, and the mixed tie. Expressive ties are mainly affective and longer term, instrumental ties are goal-oriented and transient, and mixed ties contain both expressive and instrumental aspects. According to Hwang, when a resource allocator is asked to mete out a social resource to benefit a petitioner, the resource allocator categorizes the petitioner into one of these three types of relational ties in order to determine the exchange rule to be used in responding to the request.

Subsequent researchers picked up Hwang's (1987) three types of ties and equated them with types of *guanxi* (e.g., Su & Littlefield, 2001: stranger *guanxi* consists of instrumental ties, family *guanxi* consists of expressive ties, and familiar *guanxi* is a mixture of instrumental and expressive ties; Fan, 2002: helper *guanxi* relies on instrumental ties, family *guanxi* relies on expressive ties, and business *guanxi* relies on mixed ties). If taken literally, these equations can limit the way *guanxi* is conceptualized. In particular, there is an aspect of the so-called helper or stranger *guanxi* that is important to highlight in a discussion of the processes surrounding the development of relationships: A relationship consisting purely of instrumental ties should not be considered a type of *guanxi*. A relationship that consists purely of instrumental ties is transient. It is the same regardless of the target, and, as Hwang (1987) originally defined it, "characterized by universality and impersonality … Neither side may expect to meet the other again after its purposes are achieved" (p. 953). Instrumental ties are better characterized by relational demography (Bedford, 2011), according to which, an individual may favor those who are demographically similar even though these people are otherwise strangers (Tsui & Farh, 1997). Depersonalized favoritism of those with whom one shares the same category of membership is not the same as a particularistic relationship between two individuals. Thus, instrumental ties clearly provide a basis for future interaction and thus a basis for establishing *guanxi*, but they are not a type of *guanxi*. I return to this point in the discussion of cognitive trust.

We are left with two types of *guanxi*: family *guanxi* and business *guanxi*. Family *guanxi* rests on well-defined obligations and

roles, but with business *guanxi* the individual can play an active role in determining the course of relational exchanges (see Chow & Ng, 2004). As the focal topic of this paper is the workplace, and the majority of workplace relationships do not involve family members, the remainder of the paper focuses only on business *guanxi*, consisting of both expressive and instrumental ties, and the active role the individual can play in developing *guanxi* and trust.

Trust

The consensus in the literature is that there are two basic forms of trust: cognition-based and affect-based (Lewis & Weigert, 1985). Both cognitive processes and affective elements play a role in the development of interpersonal trust. Cognition-based trust is the perception of competence and reliability (McAllister, 1995). Antecedents to cognitive trust include the extent of social similarity, the organizational context (including professional credentials), and the success of past interactions (including reputation) (Zucker, 1986). These components are comprised of external factors that allow relationship partners to predict each other's behavior.

In contrast to cognitive trust, affect-based trust is founded on perceptions of the internal motives of relationship partners. It focuses on who the target is as a person and whether that person has any intent to cause harm (McAllister, 1995). McAllister drew on findings from attribution research, which suggests three requirements are critical for the development of affect-based trust: behavior that (1) is perceived as personally chosen rather than role-prescribed, (2) meets legitimate needs, and (3) cannot be construed as enlightened self-interest. To contextualize affective trust for the workplace, McAllister focused on organizational commitment behavior (OCB), which he defined as *behavior intended to provide help and assistance that is outside an individual's work role, not directly rewarded, and conducive to effective organizational functioning*. In McAllister's model, the two antecedents of workplace affective trust are: OCB and frequency of interaction.

McAllister's (1995) study demonstrated that cognitive and affective trust in the workplace are separate dimensions with different antecedents and outcomes. His research was important because previously only

the cognitive dimension of trust had been emphasized in research on the workplace because of the assumption that work relationships are directed at accomplishing tasks, while social relationships are not. Therefore, task instrumentality and task-specific competence (aspects of cognitive trust) were seen as important in work relationships, while emotion and self-disclosure (aspects of affective trust) were seen as less important.

Previous research on affect and cognition in close relationships supported the notion that that some level of cognition-based trust may be necessary for affect-based trust to develop (Lewis & Weigert, 1985): people's baseline expectations must be met before they will invest further in the other person. McAllister (1995) emphasized that when people in the workplace are unfamiliar with one another they may attribute OCB (an antecedent of affective trust) to ingratiation, impression management or enlightened self-interest rather than to genuine care and concern. However, once affect-based trust is established, it can contribute to cognitive trust in that there is an awareness that breaking it will cause damage to both parties because trust is embedded in a larger system that contains norms for expected behavior in a relationship. In other words, affect-based trust can influence cognitive trust, and, if strong enough, can even persist even if the cognitive basis is repudiated. For this reason, breaking trust arouses anger and betrayal as well as feelings that extend beyond the specific content of the betrayal. Figure 10.1 displays this general Western model of workplace interpersonal trust development.



Fig. 10.1 The Western model of trust-building in the workplace

An Integrated Model of *Guanxi* and Trust

Several scholars have noted that this Western model of workplace trust may not be appropriate for application in Chinese societies. Although trust everywhere may have cognitive and affective components, comparative studies have found that in Chinese societies, affective bases are likely to be more salient than cognitive ones (Chua, Morris, & Ingram, 2009; Wasti et al., 2011). However, no scholar has proposed an alternate model of the social and psychological processes of interpersonal trust development in relation to *guanxi* in a Chinese workplace, which is the goal of this chapter.

From the discussion in the previous section, it is clear that *guanxi* and trust both require the presence of two components, one of which is emotional. For either *guanxi* or trust, the relationship can be characterized primarily by an affective/expressive aspect or primarily by a cognitive or instrumental component, and the nature of the relationship changes as the relative mix varies. In the following, I begin with a comparison of cognitive trust and *guanxi*, and then explore the relationship between affective trust and *guanxi* in order to integrate the models.

Cognitive Trust and Guanxi

Zucker (1986) described three antecedents to cognitive trust: (1) characteristic trust, (2) institutional trust, and (3) process trust. The first two types may exist even with little or no interpersonal interaction; they are not particular or personal.

Characteristic trust forms through social similarity; it requires a basis of shared attributes or characteristics and may have its roots in relational demography. It is similar to King's (1991) discussion of the foundations for developing *guanxi*: People may share a common frame (locality or institution, etc. that gives a common basis to individuals) or they may share attributes (acquired by birth or achievement). These attributes and frames are what Jacobs (1979) labeled *guanxi* bases (e.g., kinship, friendship, school mates). Having more bases in common with a person increases the likelihood of a close relationship. In other words, characteristic trust may be considered an antecedent of both *guanxi* and cognitive trust.

Institutional trust is the second antecedent to cognitive trust. Zucker (1986) highlighted the organizational context and professional

credentials as sources of institutional trust. Although, the formal institutions of China may not always be suitable as a basis for trust, professional credentials in the form of status due to individual achievement or even organizational status (*mianzi*) can be considered a source of trust. For example, in a survey of Australian expatriates working in China, Hutchings and Murray (2002) found that those working in large international firms felt that there was no special necessity for *guanxi* beyond that appropriate for maintaining relationships in the Australian context, while those working for smaller companies or those running their own businesses reported a strong need to develop *guanxi* and to engage in after-hours socializing with their Chinese counterparts. Hutchings and Murray surmised the variation was due to differences in the respective organizations. Those working for large companies (especially international ones) had no need to build *guanxi*, by virtue of the status of their company. Those at small organizations needed to create *guanxi* on their own; they were not accorded any status by virtue of their employer. Although Hutchings and Murray (2002) did not specifically connect these observations to *mianzi*, there is a case to be made for doing so. *Mianzi* represents status or material standing. The high *mianzi* by virtue of the company at which they worked accorded the participants in Hutchings and Murray's study a pass on doing the work usually needed to establish *guanxi* relations.

Strong *mianzi* can serve as a *guanxi* magnet; it induces others' desire to develop *guanxi* (Wong, Leung, Hung, & Ngai, 2007). People are drawn in without one having to work as hard to build trust and create and maintain relationships. In this sense, *mianzi* is similar to Bordieu's (1986) concept of symbolic capital—prestige as a sort of credit that can attract other forms of capital. This understanding of *mianzi* is supported by Leung, Lai, Chan, and Wong's discussion of types of Chinese personal trust, which they translated as *xinyong* and described as implying a hierarchical relationship: "a person who has a higher status will have more *xinyong*" (2005, p. 235). *Xinyong* can be compared to a credit rating. It is like trust in a system in that it is embedded in social relationships and subjected to social sanctions, but it goes beyond system trust in that there is an inherent moral component. A person who breaks it is not just untrustworthy, that person is also unethical. I return to this point in the following discussion of process trust.

Preliminary evidence to support a connection between *mianzi* or *xinyong* and cognitive trust already exists. Although they did not

specifically discuss *mianzi* or *xinyong*, Chua et al. (2009) found that, for Chinese employees, the extent to which a given relationship was embedded in ties to third parties increased cognitive trust. *Mianzi* and *xinyong* may represent the degree of social embeddedness.

The common aspect of these first two forms of cognitive trust (characteristic and institutional) is that they provide a basis for trust without the need for interpersonal interaction. Thus, a high level of trust may be obtained in a short period of time. I propose they may be categorized as forms of *calculative trust*, a type of trust discussed in the economics literature. It is defined as trust based on calculation of rationally derived costs and benefits (Lewicki & Bunker, 1996). In summary, the first two antecedents of cognitive trust may be categorized as calculative trust; they also provide a basis for establishing *guanxi*.

Process trust is the third antecedent of cognitive trust in Zucker's (1986) framework. It is based on the history of past transactions and the expectation of future transactions with a particular individual. For Westerners, it is a way of assessing reliability and dependability and it leads to cognitive trust. For Chinese people, I assert that both affective trust and cognitive trust may be outcomes. Two characteristics of Chinese relational exchanges that are different from typical Western exchanges provide a basis for the added connection with affective trust.

First, exchanges in Western cultures, particularly those in the workplace, tend to be characterized by the equity rule. Serial exchanges may occur, but each time the goal is to be even at the end of a round of exchanges. In comparison, for the Chinese, each exchange must be countered with a larger favor, as per the Chinese saying, "if you receive a drop of beneficence you must return a fountain." If the score is ever even there is no reason to continue the relationship. Individuals are bound into the relationship by the need to return the favor. The increasing size of the favors also enhances the commitment and gives both parties a long-term perspective on the relationship. In order to continue the *guanxi*-building process, people may even ask for favors when they not needed (Seligman, 1999).

Second, favors (*renqing*) may have deeper requirements than the psychological contract implied by reciprocity alone. There are ethical overtones, as noted by Tan and Snell (2002). *Renqing* places a moral obligation on the partner to return the favor. Both parties will lose face (*mianzi*) and the receiver will also lose *xinyong* (have a lower social credit rating) if the favor is not returned (reducing cognitive trust).

In addition to this cognitive aspect, *renqing* has affective components that go beyond the general reciprocity norm. In *renqing* exchanges, the nature of the favor is supposed to be personally tailored, which conveys care and demonstrates knowledge of the partner's personal situation, both of which are antecedents of affective trust (McAllister, 1995). The result of *renqing* exchanges is *xinren*, a deep form of trust that combines affective (*xin*) and cognitive (*ren*) aspects of trust. The implication is that although process trust has been identified as an antecedent of cognitive trust for Westerners, for Chinese people it is also clearly an antecedent of affective trust. Other researchers have made a similar observation. Although, they did not mention process trust, Chen and Chen (2004) indicated that the reciprocal exchange of favors can impact both the cognitive and emotional aspects of relationships. This point is developed in the following discussion on affective trust.

Affective Trust and Guanxi

Findings from attribution research indicate three criteria for developing affective trust in the workplace: demonstration of care and concern rather than self-interest, meeting legitimate needs, and personally chosen rather than role-prescribed behavior (Clark, Mills, & Powell, 1986). These prerequisites are clear in Western culture, but may not all be applicable in Chinese culture. Although affective trust and expressive ties both relate to affection in the relationship and therefore may seem similar, the meaning of these emotional bonds is quite different in Western and Chinese contexts in terms of expectations for (1) the boundaries of the relationship, (2) the content of the relationship (the meaning of friendship), (3) the length of the relationship, and (4) the moral norms guiding the relationship. Each is elaborated on in the following.

1. *Relationship boundaries*

In a Western context, the affective component is supposed to remain distinct from the instrumental aspects of a relationship—both in a work context and in a personal friendship context. From a work perspective, mixing emotional concerns with business is seen as unprofessional because workplace decisions should be motivated by the impersonal criteria of efficiency and effectiveness, a legacy of the Protestant ethic. It is normal for Westerners to maintain friends and colleagues in separate categories. However, in collective cultures, the professional/personal

dichotomy is less clear (Sanchez-Burks & Lee, 2007). People are comfortable mixing personal and professional concerns. There is no taboo against mixing emotional and instrumental concerns in either domain, as friends or as colleagues. A personal friend may ask a professional favor and vice versa (Seligman, 1999).

2. *Relationship content*
Affective relationships in the West emphasize intimacy and identification of values. Chinese affective relationships are more complicated, because in addition to intimacy and identification, obligation and rites are involved. The result is that the affection component of the relationship is not the same as friendship in the North American sense inasmuch as relationships in Chinese culture are based on hierarchy; it is possible to be affectively close without being friends. The affect felt might have the quality of admiration and reverence rather than the sympathy and similarity felt in friendship (Morris, Podolny, & Sullivan, 2008). It is possible to have a relationship with a high degree of affection but a low degree of friendship, such as that between a superior and subordinate, or any relationship involving economic dependence (Chua et al., 2009). As a consequence, some scholars have argued that in contrast to the Western assumption that a basis of cognitive trust is necessary to form affective trust, in Chinese culture, this may not always be the case (Wasti et al., 2011). One reason for the emphasis on affective trust in the workplace might be that a trustee's capability (an antecedent to cognitive trust) might not be salient in cultures in which cooperation and teamwork rather than individual ability are promoted (Wasti et al., 2011).

3. *Relationship length*
Affective trust supports the long-term orientation of Chinese culture because it is durable. As affect-based trust matures, the potential for reverse causation (affect-based trust influencing cognition-based trust) increases (McAllister, 1995). In addition, research has indicated that the stronger the emotional content relative to the cognitive content of trust, the less likely it is that contrary behavior will weaken the relationship. Zajonc (1980) observed that "once formed, an evaluation is not easily revoked… Affect often persists after a complete invalidation of its original cognitive basis" (p. 157). Although it takes longer to create affective trust, it is harder to destroy, supporting a long-term orientation to relationships. In comparison, in the Western workplace where affection

and personal concerns are to remain distinct from professional ones (and there is less expectation for long-term relationships) cognitive trust is a more efficient basis for trust because it focuses on reliability and dependability, which can be disproven quickly.

4. *Relationship morality norms*

The philosophical principle of *bao* (return, recompense, revenge) in the traditional Confucian worldview dictates that the natural order entails balance. This balance is meant to extend to human interaction, with the implication that the nature of human interaction is reciprocal. Individuals in Confucian societies have a moral obligation to reciprocate what other people do (Holt, 2011); favors must be returned. Individuals are fully aware that they are due back some consideration after a favor is provided, naturally highlighting the instrumental aspect of relationships. Previous researchers have even defined *guanxi* in terms of the personal connections through which an individual can secure personal and professional advantages. There is a Chinese saying, "*duo yi ge guanxi, duo yi tiao lu*" (each relationship provides another path) highlighting the instrumentality of *guanxi* relationships. From this perspective, interpersonal workplace relationships can be compared to business transactions. One invests in favors for later withdrawal at a time of need. Bedford and Hwang's (2013) qualitative study of *guanxi*-building in Taiwan found that participants used exactly this sort of investment terminology when talking about doing favors for people important to their work outcomes. However, favors are not to be granted purely out of selfish interest. They should be granted out of *renqingzai* (emotional debt) and concern and caring (Holt, 2011), which are antecedents of affective trust. The penalty for failing to repay one's *renqingzai* is loss of face and *xinyong* (social credit). These ethical penalties serve as a barrier to opportunism in *guanxi* relationships. The progression of repeated reciprocal exchanges gives rise to process trust, which tests not just calculative aspects such as reliability and dependability, but also whether a person is able to display the appropriate level of care and concern as the relationship progresses.

This situation differs from the Western context in two important ways. First, Western trusting relationships do not need to be grounded in a particular ethical or moral code. According to Horsburgh (1960), a person can be considered trustworthy because that person's actions always conform to certain rules; it is not necessary that those rules be connected to moral conviction—it is only necessary that the behavior be

reliable and predictable. In this sense, Western trust is not always necessarily tied to ethics. Trust can instead be a measure of reliability. In a Chinese work context, behavior should conform to the *guanxi* system, which is supported by Confucian ethical philosophy. In a Chinese context, *guanxi* ties trust to ethics.

Western relationships characterized mainly by affect-based trust tend to maintain awareness of their partner's needs (Clark, Mills, & Powell, 1986). By definition, what drives this mutual monitoring is not the desire to generate future obligations, but rather the inherent nature of the relationship. "The idea that a benefit is given in response to a benefit that was received is compromising, because it calls into question the assumption that each member responds to the needs of the other" (Clark & Mills, 1979, p. 13). Thus, partners do not keep track of personal inputs on joint tasks; they find it acceptable if assistance only flows one way, they simply maintain awareness of each other's needs and respond appropriately.

The presence of an instrumental component and the moral obligation to repay favors strongly differentiates Chinese affective trust from Western affective trust. Instrumentality is a necessary component of *guanxi*, but it is excluded from Western affective trust; in fact, the presence of self-interest in showing concern for others is antithetical to Western friendship norms (Silver, 1990). This difference makes it difficult to assess Chinese trust solely in terms of the Western dichotomy between cognitive and affective trust. For example, in a Western context, organizational commitment behavior (OCB) is behavior intended to provide assistance that is outside of an individual's work role, not directly rewarded, and is positively related to organizational functioning. OCB can be viewed as personally chosen since it is not part of the job requirements, and since it is not directly rewarded, it is seen as not attributable to enlightened self-interest. OCB is therefore easily categorized as building affective trust. However, in a Chinese context through the workings of *guanxi*, even behaviors external to one's job role may be included in the *guanxi* role, and personal benefit necessarily accrues from any favor because obligation is generated, and both sides are aware of the moral requirement to return the favor. Moreover, as stated previously, personal and professional favors are interchangeable; a favor in the workplace can be repaid with a personal favor. As a result, the cognitive–affective trust dichotomy cannot easily be applied to understand trust in the Chinese workplace.

Calculative and Experiential Trust

Because the cognitive–affective trust dichotomy does not fit Chinese relational norms, I propose that it is more useful to consider Chinese workplace trust in terms of its calculative and experiential aspects. Figure 10.2 displays an integrated model of *guanxi* and trust development in a Chinese context.

Calculative trust includes elements that provide a foundation for trust that do not require interpersonal interaction. It can be established quickly, such as through introduction by an intermediary. It stems from information about potential partners based on the indigenous notions of *mianzi* (face) and *xinyong* (social credit). It stimulates a desire to establish *guanxi* and provides a basis, or an instrumental motivation, on which to initiate *guanxi*-building activities.

Experiential trust is developed through activities that build and maintain *guanxi*. Experiential trust takes time to develop. It is personal and particular. It emphasizes repeated reciprocal exchanges and favors (*renqing*) that promote process trust. Process trust is particularly important



Fig. 10.2 The Chinese model of *guanxi*- and trust-building in the workplace

for building and maintaining *guanxi* (Bedford, 2011, 2016). Although process trust is categorized solely as a precursor to cognitive trust in Western theory, I propose that it contributes to both affective and cognitive trust in a Chinese context. It cannot be cleanly allocated to one category or the other.

Applying the *calculative* and *experiential* labels to understand Chinese trust in the workplace supports the two crucial aspects of Chinese *guanxi* relationships: instrumental and expressive ties. The calculative aspect allows for flexibility and rapid decision-making. It can be grounded in the social networks that provide information as to the trustworthiness of the target. It highlights the importance of the rich sources of information relevant to the decision to trust and that guide decisions to build *guanxi*. The experiential component supports the relational focus of Chinese identity by highlighting the trust developed through the personal experience of interacting with others. It underscores the importance of personal time investment in particular individuals to develop both affective and process trust. Use of the proposed framework allows process trust to be categorized squarely under one domain—experiential trust.

Cognitive and affective trust have been mapped to head and heart functions in the West, reflecting the underlying comfort with Cartesian dualism in Western culture. However, there is no inherent mind–body separation in Confucian thought. As Chua et al. (2009) found, affective and cognitive trust may be intertwined for Chinese managers. Thus, although the predominant paradigm for Western trust in the workplace entails a distinction between affective and cognitive trust, in a Chinese context this dichotomy is difficult to defend given the importance of process trust, which I assert supports both cognitive and affective aspects of trust simultaneously, and cannot be categorized cleanly into either. Chinese affective trust, like Western affective trust, is strengthened by actions that meet real needs and that demonstrate genuine care and concern. However, differences in the boundaries, content, length and moral norms of workplace relationships make some aspects of the Western version of affective trust inapplicable in the Chinese context. From the perspective of Chinese interpersonal relations, a distinction between calculative and experiential trust makes more sense than a distinction between affective and cognitive trust.

Discussion

What is the relationship between *guanxi* and trust? This question has no simple answer. Moving away from the traditional approach to research on *guanxi* and on trust (which has tended to define these constructs as static traits) to a more dynamic interactional approach highlights the overlap in their processes of development. From a sociological perspective, there are many similarities. Both simultaneously result from and facilitate interaction and thus, in the absence of other people, have no real meaning. Clarifying the conceptualization of *guanxi* highlights a key similarity between workplace *guanxi* and interpersonal trust: both always contain cognitive and affective aspects, meaning that both *guanxi* and interpersonal trust are personal and particular and both take time to develop fully. However, given that Chinese relationships differ in crucial ways from Western relationships, the meaning and content of both cognitive and affective trust differs between Chinese and Western cultures.

As Kriz and Keating (2010) noted in their discussion of trust in China, the few studies that have examined trust in relation to *guanxi* used a Western framework to test Chinese trust. While the predominant Western paradigm of cognitive–affective trust captures some universal attributes of trust development, it still predominantly reflects values and tendencies emphasized in Western cultures.

My proposed framework anchors *guanxi* in local trust processes and emphasizes the importance of considering *guanxi* and trust together in order to improve understanding of both concepts. For example, the framework highlights the roles of different types of Chinese trust (*xinyong* and *xinren*), which have not been adequately addressed and distinguished in the literature (with the notable exception of Kriz & Keating, 2010). The proposed framework also highlights the problem inherent in focusing solely on the instrumental aspects of *guanxi* as some studies that focused on *guanxi's* negative outcomes have done (e.g., Fan, 2002). Doing so clearly severs *guanxi* from the ethical foundations that root it in Chinese morality.

I have pointed out some gaps in the prevailing Western paradigm of workplace trust development when applied in the Chinese context and proposed a new model specifically applicable to the Chinese context integrating trust and *guanxi* development. This model highlights a number of points not previously explored in the literature on trust or *guanxi*.

Its first contribution is to provide an indigenous model for use as a starting point to examine trust in the context of Chinese workplace relationship development. Recently, scholars have emphasized the need to go beyond testing the cross-cultural generalizability of Western theories by conducting indigenous research relevant to a specific context. Adopting a non-Western perspective has the benefit of highlighting emic aspects that are hidden by the assumptions of Western culture. It allows for the identification of a model of trust that fits the experiences of Chinese people. Much of the extant research on workplace trust in China can be criticized for the use of a deductive positivist approach that applies a Western framework to understand Chinese relationships. Cross-cultural comparison is useful for mature concepts but unsuited for exploration of topics in which the very nature and boundaries of the concept are in question, which are better suited to inductive empirical investigation (Kriz & Keating, 2010).

Second, examining trust from the perspective of *guanxi* highlighted the dual roles of process trust in supporting both affective and cognitive aspects of trust in Chinese culture, instead of only cognitive trust as emphasized in the Western literature. The Confucian values of *renqing* and reciprocity support process trust and simultaneously contribute to both affective and cognitive aspects of trust. Moreover, I identified four specific differences in Chinese and Western relationships that have implications for development of affective trust: differences in the boundaries, content, length and moral norms of workplace relationships. By highlighting relationships and affective trust, indigenous models such as the one presented in this paper may have implications beyond Chinese culture. Because *guanxi* is so central to Chinese culture, it is a highly developed construct. The insights gained from studying *guanxi* may be used to shed light on aspects that are less evident in other cultures, just as sociologist Erving Goffman (1959) relied on the Chinese conceptualization of face in constructing his famous universal dramaturgical theory of face. The lack of Western research on interpersonal relationships in business relationships (Lee & Dawes, 2005) and the neglect of the emotional aspects of trust development in the workplace (Williams, 2007) have already been highlighted as areas in need of research investigation. Future research could investigate the findings of indigenous models to explore whether process trust also builds affective trust in Western workplace relationships.

Third, the model emphasizes a distinction between trust that can be established quickly with little interaction (calculative trust) and trust that takes time to build (experiential trust) as the two major forms of trust in the Chinese workplace. This distinction reflects the components of *guanxi* (instrumental and expressive ties), and also highlights how *guanxi* ties trust to ethics for Chinese people, a connection that has not been previously highlighted in the literature on *guanxi*. Also relating to ethics, the model suggests differing roles for *xinyong* and *xinren*. With the exception of Kriz and Keating (2010), no previous study has proposed a model that includes both of these indigenous aspects of Chinese trust. *Xinyong*, which is a type of calculative/cognitive trust based on credentials and reputation, is tied to ethics in that if a person is perceived as having *xinyong*, that person is seen as being ethical (Leung, Chan, Lai, & Ngai, 2011). Given the reported importance of *xinyong* in Chinese business transactions (Leung et al., 2005), it may be that cognitive trust in a business context is more central than some researchers have suggested. This point is worthy of future investigation.

Finally, although a few studies have proposed models of *guanxi* development specific to the workplace (i.e., Bedford, 2011; Fan, 2002; Su & Littlefield, 2001; Wong et al., 2007), none have included different aspects of trust. The proposed model not only highlights the interaction of trust and *guanxi*, it also provides a framework for the initiation, building and maintenance of *guanxi*.

Future Research and Conclusions

In this volume, Bhatia and Priya (2018) highlighted the fact that indigenous psychologies can offer distinctive yet complementary alternatives to Western paradigms, and Gergen et al. (2018) emphasized that cultures continue to evolve and transform. Understanding another culture can enrich understanding of how our own is changing. Additional research is necessary to obtain a complete understanding of the relationship between *guanxi* and trust, the relationship between the different types of Chinese trust, and cross-cultural differences in trust development in the context of workplace relationships. Future research should test the proposed model with empirical data to discover whether the experiences of individuals interacting with others in the workplace match the predictions of the model. Qualitative approaches are particularly suited to this sort of investigation, which will require uncovering the deep structure of

psychological patterns that participants are generally unable to directly articulate.

The proposed framework has implications for cross-cultural as well as indigenous studies of *guanxi* and trust. *Guanxi* determines the course of relational exchange in Chinese societies (Hwang, 1987), influencing the ways in which people make decisions about resource allocation. In Western cultures, the basis of relational exchange is trust (Gundlach & Murphy, 1993). The difference in emphasis results in distinctive styles of trust-building and variation in expectations for trust-building activities that have implications for communication and the development of work-related relationships in a cross-cultural context. In other words, the difference in Chinese and Western approaches is not just in how to build trust, but in what it means when trust is built, and the moral obligations that accompany such trust. For example, expectations concerning appropriate types of favors for workplace relationships and the degree of obligation after a favor differ, making trust-building more challenging.

Another possible cross-cultural difference worthy of investigation would be the speed with which a person is ready to begin building an affective relationship with someone important to their workplace outcomes. People in Chinese societies have a variety of powerful social resources for quickly determining a basis for calculative trust, including face and *xinyong*. While similar resources are available to Westerners in their home context, these resources are not so explicit, and there is a tendency for emphasis on individual assessment of ability rather than reliance on the subjective reports of others. For Westerners, process trust may fill this role. Process trust takes time to develop, so it may be the case that it takes longer for Westerners to achieve cognitive trust as a foundation for the affective component of the relationship. Unlike Westerners, Chinese people tend to rely on the calculative aspects of trust, which can be established quickly, and move onto the more time-consuming process of making the relationship more personal earlier on. They can then continue to build the strength of the relationship as needed. An additional point to consider is that it may be that in Western cultures process trust also supports development of affective trust, but this facet has been overlooked due to the emphasis on ability in the Western workplace.

Guanxi has played an important role in human relations throughout Chinese history. Its connection to trust and morality make it a foundation for deep and long-lasting interpersonal connections, and its

complexity and fluidity have allowed it to transition into modern times and to remain an important tool for workplace relationships. While the principles of human functioning may be constant, the cultural manifestation of these principles is varied. Development of an understanding of trust and *guanxi* that reflect an emic Chinese perspective contributes to the etic picture of human relationships—it promotes the generation of theories of global relevance that reflect universal aspects of human functioning.

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CHAPTER 11

An Inclusive Indigenous Psychology for All Chinese: Heeding the Mind and Spirit of Ethnic Minorities in China

Rachel Sing-Kiat Ting, Kejia Zhang and Qingbo Huang

Since the dawn of civilization, many ethnic groups have expressed their mind and spirit through collective symbols and communal spaces. However, since Western psychology stems from a highly abstract and private space, its understanding of the human mind might be limited to certain contexts and cultural groups (Sundararajan, 2015). Moreover, there is a tendency for cross-cultural psychologists to confuse Han Chinese as being the only Chinese in their studies, which runs the risk of homogenization and over-generalization. While hybridization (Gergen, Sharma, Sameshima, Wu, & Yang, 2018) of old and new, east and west, may be celebrated by the middle class in urban China, it comes with a great deal

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of suffering in rural China, where rapid urbanization is "a kind of *historical acceleration* which caused two forms of economic organization, normally separated by a gap of several centuries and making contradictory demands on their participants, to co-exist…" (Bourdieu, 2000, p. 18, emphasis in original). Ethnic minorities in China, especially those residing in the remote border provinces, are faced with challenges in retaining their ethnic roots while absorbing the values of individualism and atheism embedded in the process of modernization. Indigenous psychology (IP), henceforth, could give them a voice by listening to their cultural narratives at this juncture of globalization without pathologizing their uniqueness. Inspired by Bhatia and Priya's (2018) proposal for a paradigm of IP that allows for religious pluralism and addresses the power differentiation within social hierarchy, our chapter hopes to advocate for a similar paradigm of IP in China that is inclusive, conversational, and peaceable to the tribal and aboriginal groups worldwide.

At present time, most of the psychological studies on the Chinese population are bound to Han tradition, which is mainly informed by Confucian, Daoism and Buddhism traditions. However, an ethnocentric psychology could pose a threat to the less dominant ethnic group by their hegemonic assumptions in self-construal, mental spaces, morality, intelligence, definitions of health, and healing agency. In addition, there has been a history of inter-racial conflicts in China created by the force of unilateral assimilation (汉化) from Han people. Studying the ethnic minority groups would be a remedy to counterbalance the singular Chinese psychology, by creating an inclusive and reflexive Chinese IP.

To prove the argument we set forth above, in this chapter, we first systemically reviewed the key literature that documented both the empirical and theoretical studies among the ethnic minorities in China over the past 30 years. We then address the problem of uncritical importation of Western psychology in this literature, which caused cultural bias and stereotypes. Hence, we argue that IP's perspective on empowerment could help to bridge the gaps in epistemology and methodology. Next, in order to propose a different research paradigm, we cited our recent psychology of religion research project with Yi ethnic minorities in Southwestern China as an illustrative example, where we found that religious traditions and rituals shaped the cognitive style (mind) and emotional profiles (spirit) among Yi communities, through an anthropological psychology study design (Ting & Sundararajan, 2017). Lastly, we summarized the ecological rationality theory (Sundararajan, 2015;

Todd & Gigerenzer, 2012) in the interpretation of four major psychological concepts embedded in Yi's suffering narratives such as emotions, help-seeking patterns (religious coping), explanatory model (cognitive attribution), and resilience. We believe this IP model could be extended to study other ethnic minority groups or indigenous people whose ecological niches are similar to the Yi people in China.

Historical Development of Ethnic Studies in China

According to the 2010 census,[1] there are about 113 million people in the ethnic minority population in China (8.5% of the total population), which is more than one third of the US populations. However, it is certainly an under-studied subject in the history of Western psychology. In the English psychology database, few studies have explored the aspect of psychology among ethnic groups in China. After searching through a major psychology database,[2] using the keywords of the name of all 55 ethnic minority groups, and 'psychology,' 'China,' 'ethnic,' and/or 'ethnicity' as a combination, we only found 25 relevant articles published in English-language (Western) psychology journals. In terms of research methodology, among these papers, there were 18 quantitative studies, 4 qualitative studies, 2 mixed-method studies, and 1 literature review paper. From 2010 until now, there have been significant yearly increases in publications in this research area.[3] The research samples mainly constitute college students, and Han Chinese are always the reference group in contrast to the ethnic minority group. The frequently studied populations were the Uyghur group, Tibetan (including refugees), and ethnic Korean Chinese. The topics of recent publication range from mental health, social injustice, spirituality and resilience, cultural identity and so forth (Abdukeram, Mamat, Luo, & Wu, 2015; Dong, Lin, Li, Dou, & Zhou, 2015; Hussain & Bhushan, 2011; Mamat et al., 2014; Ting, 2016). It is also worth noting that some scholars began to develop indigenous scales to measure specific ethnic identities, such as the Qiang

[1] Cited from "Communiqué of the National Bureau of Statistics of People's Republic of China on Major Figures of the 2010 Population Census (No. 1)". National Bureau of Statistics of China. April 28, 2011.

[2] Including PsycINFO, Psychology and Behavioral Sciences Collection, PsyEXTRA, PsyCRITIQUES, PsyBOOKS, and PsyARTICLES.

[3] 2016 (7), 2015 (4), 2013 (2), 2012 (3), 2011 (1), 2010 (1).

Identity Scale (Han, Berry, & Zheng, 2016). However, there has not been a single English-language publication among mainstream psychology found that addresses the Yi ethnic group.

However, if we just relied on English-language databases to look for ethnic minority studies in China, we would probably mistakenly take away the impression that this is not an area of concern. Due to the language barrier, many studies carried out on the minority groups are solely available in Chinese, which presents a hindrance for global dialogue and conversation with other Asian psychologists. In order to develop an inclusive IP, we attempted to explore the local Chinese journals and publications in order to have a more accurate perception and criticism of IP in China.[4] After a thorough review of the literature, we found that in China, there are two academic disciplines that have carried our extensive research on the psychology of ethnic minorities. One is the mainstream psychology that is interested in cross-cultural comparison study, and the other one is the ethnology discipline.

In the field of ethnology, ethno-psychology study began in 1980 in China. Under the influence of Soviet Union, the concept of 'common ethnic psychological traits' was emphasized and studied by scholars from the field of ethnology. Many agreed that there are 'common psychological traits,' such as cognition, emotion, motivation, among a certain ethnic group, which could be shaped by cultural and material conditions (Li, 2004, 2006; Lin, 1997; Xiong, 1983; Zhang, 1996, 2006). Their studies also adopted an emic perspective to explain the psychological phenomena within certain ethnic groups, and their data were drawn from both literature and field studies.

By contrast, we learned that Chinese psychologists still face many hurdles in giving voice to their ethnic minority participants. When we used the keyword 'ethnic group' (zu) to do a thorough search on the topic of publications from 1990 until the present day, from the Chinese research database on psychology (CNKI), only 85 psychology papers from indexed journals included ethnic minority samples. We found that during 1990–2010, most of the scholars were interested in ethnic comparison in the concepts of mental health, personality, intelligence and so on. The questionnaires were always administered in Mandarin Chinese, without translation to the local dialect. The participant samples were

[4] This chapter only look exclusively at mainland China psychology, and does not include Hongkong and Taiwan which has different IP development history.

predominantly college students from Northern China and there was an over-use of SCL-90 (Symptom Checklist-90) and 16PF (The Sixteen Personality Factor Questionnaire) in the ethnic studies (Luo, Huang, & Su, 2010; Zhang et al., 1998). A few otherstudies (e.g. Cai & Jiang, 1995; Wan, Li, & Xing, 1997) also tried to compare the intelligence across ethnic groups using culturally unfair intelligence tests.

Between 2000 and 2010, the samples of participants, the methods of study, the instruments and the scope of topics continued to narrow and become increasingly homogenous (Qin, Lv, & Zhou, 2007). There was still an 'us vs them' mentality in this period of time, where researchers lumped all ethnic minority groups into one single group in a so-called cross-cultural study with Han Chinese (e.g., Chen, 2007; Lu, 2008; Wang, Pan, & Hu, 2007). Mental health was still the major concern for the psychologists, partly because of the assumption that minority groups faced more challenges and hence were more vulnerable compared with the majority group (Han people). The focus on intelligence testing decreased, but the topic of 'coping behavior' started to gain researchers' attention (Ban, Tao, & Yu, 2009; Wan, 2009; Yang, Zhang, & Ge, 2009; Zeng, 2006). The concept of resilience was also introduced after the Sichuan earthquake in 2008 (Ge, 2010; Han, Yuan, & Xu, 2015).

From 2010 to date, the topics and the ethnic groups being studied have become more diverse, including cultural identity (Wang, Zhao, & La, 2006) and cognitive styles (Wang, Zhang, He, & Min, 2013; Zhang, Yang, Fang, & Zhang, 2016), although the samples studied were still mainly ethnic students who literate in Chinese Mandarin. The research methods also branched away from quantitative analysis to a qualitative nature, although the former is still more prevalent. As mainstream Chinese psychologists were exposed to the cross-cultural psychology and IP worldwide (Allwood & Berry, 2006), their methods of studying ethnic minorities became more creative (such as indigenized questionnaires or self-devised tools), and they started borrowing theories from cultural psychology (such as culture assimilation theory) to explain the results. However, many of them are still testing and confirming the Western theory of psychology, rather than challenging or modifying Western theories. This has created the phenomenon of 'scholarly mutism' for ethnic minorities, whose rich traditions are often overlooked while mainstream Chinese psychologists busily assimilate themselves into Western theories.

Comparing the sources of literature, we found that Chinese publications consisted of a more diverse range of ethnic groups compared

with the English-language papers; however, these Chinese studies were less rigorous in their method of study (e.g., choice of instruments and samples) and interpretation of the data. English-language publications addressed more social issues, but were scarce in number due to the language barrier for many Chinese psychologists. While there are some gaps between Chinese and English-language publications with regard to the issues faced by the ethnic minorities of China, there was another gap between Chinese ethnology and psychology disciplines in terms of their theories and methods towards ethnic studies. The ethnopsychology discipline studied common psychological quality, which could be further broken down by psychology discipline into different vernacular, such as 'personality,' 'identity,' or 'cultural values.' The segregation of these two disciplines created two systems of languages and methods, though both are interested in the same phenomena.

As the new generation of IP scholars, we hope to break these language, cultural and disciplinary barriers in ethnic studies. Ethnicity includes the originality, geography, physicality, social custom, religiosity, temperament, psychology and language of a specific ethnic group. All these elements are very complicated and constantly evolving (Mou, 1998). While studying ethnic minorities, we need to begin with the diversity within-groups and the ecological systems of such diversity, such as religious and social ties. As such, we carried out a pioneering study among the Yi ethnic minority from Southwest China in order to explore a new paradigm for IP researchers (Ting & Sundararajan, 2017).

A Pioneering Paradigm of Studying Ethnic Minorities in China

Historical Background of Yi's Suffering Experiences

Yi people are the seventh largest ethnic group in China and reside mainly in the most isolated and economically deprived regions in Southwest China (see Fig. 11.1). Historically, the Yi ethnic minority from Liangshan Autonomous State are marginalized with labels such as 'AIDS/HIV,' 'drug addicts,' 'violent,' 'lazy' and so on. However, from the ethnological perspective, Su (1999) proposed that traditional Yi shared a social responsibility through *jia zhi* (family clan), and they follow 'li' (courtesy) and 'shan' (goodness) as basic moral principles.

Fig. 11.1 Two locations of our study among Yi people in China

In the past, there have been a few psychological papers published in China looking at the coping styles, attribution styles, drinking behaviors, self-acceptance, relationship between loneliness and negative thoughts, and the psychological meaning of religious rituals among Yi people (Duan et al., 2006; Gao, 2001; Huang, 2013; Liu, Chen, & Wu, 2005; Yin, Zhao, & Yin, 2011). Nevertheless, we found that all these empirical studies used teenage Yi participants (high schoolers and college students) and Han Chinese or Tibetan as a comparison group. The research method was mainly questionnaire based, and the validity of the instrument used among the Yi people was still questionable. Hence, we proposed an anthropological psychology research paradigm, with a view to look at the within-group difference—in particular the role of religion in their suffering experiences.

Most of the ethnic minority groups in China have a very complicated religious context and historical lineage (Wickeri & Tam, 2011). Traditionally, Yi people believed in animism, shamanism and ancestor worship. They worshiped gods in nature (e.g., fire god, mountain god,

water god, sun god, water god, etc.) and believed that the suffering and misfortunes came from the evil forces/ghosts. After death, they believe their souls need to rest in peace and be sent to the origin of their ancestral place, otherwise they will turn into restless ghosts harassing the survivors. Thus, the Bimo priest serves as the medium between the human and the spiritual realm to mediate blessings, and prevent the cursing of the family (Bamoayi, 1994; Zhang, 2006, 2008). During the Cultural Revolution time, Bimo practice was labeled as 'mi xin' (superstition), and banned by the government until the 1980s (Bamoayi, 1994). Nowadays, Bimo tradition was recovered as one of the "Intangible Cultural Heritage" in China. Liu (2007) found that these religious rituals were not merely a healing process, but also a socializing event because they had the function of mediating the relationships among family members, and improving the unity of the family clan. There was one psychology paper that actually looked at the relationship between Bimo belief and the subjective well-being of Yi people. Zhang (2009) conducted a questionnaire study among Liangshan Yi people across three age cohorts, utilizing community samples and his self-developed 'Yi Bimo Belief Survey.' Though there was no detailed documentation on the validity of this scale, his study actually showed that the higher scores obtained on the Bimo belief questionnaire, the higher the satisfaction towards life; the older generation group also scored higher on the satisfaction of life scale. This finding is consistent with the thesis of our study, that belief in the Bimo tradition could actually promote wellbeing among the Yi indigenous community who practice the tradition.

Nevertheless, some Yi people in the Jinsha River of Yunnan (northern Yunnan) have long been converted to Christianity (four generations ago), and have embraced the church worship traditions in their village (see Fig. 11.1). These Yi Christians also went through religious oppression and physical suffering during the Cultural Revolution and socialist construction period. This gives us a rare chance to compare these two religious systems among Yi groups, and to study the diversity among them, especially their suffering experiences. We chose a rather universal topic as the starting point of our study, because all psychologists have to face the vulnerability of humanity, and construct various theories out of human experiences of suffering. We believe that suffering narratives contains the richness and breadth of human psychological experiences, ranging from cognitive appraisal and emotional reactions to help-seeking behaviour (Ting & Sundararajan, 2017); uncovering the suffering

narratives from the ethnic minority groups could connect both local and global psychologist communities.

Embodiment of Indigenous Psychology Values and Principles

There were a few IP principles we adhered to in order to be culturally sensitive and empowering while conducting psychological research with the ethnic minority groups in China (Ting & Sundararajan, 2017):

First, we used a multidisciplinary research team that consisted of those with sociology, psychology, social work, and religious study majors. The team members also came from three different countries—though all were Chinese—and were rooted in different cultural backgrounds. The team members were also diverse in age group and level of education, ranging from sophomore student to senior scholars.

Secondly, we adopt a mixed-method that could account for both the etic and emic approach to a cultural phenomena. Learning from the anthropological approach, we decided to invest at least a one-year span in following up cases and taking notes of their changes. Rather than collecting data in the lab or distributing questionnaire in the school, we did a cultural immersion in the field where the ethnic minority live. We spent half a year before we conducted a semi-structural interview, because we wanted to ensure that there was sufficient trust towards us as the 'outsider' from the local community. As a result, we found that even a strong-ties society like the Yi group could accept us as their 'insiders' and address us with familial terms, such as 'sister.'

Thirdly, we used linguistic analysis to analyse interview transcripts, so that we could do a cross-sectional comparison between two religious groups. This conversion from qualitative data to quantitative data will not be foreign to many empirical psychologists in developing standardized scales for measurement. However, after we did the qualitative coding, we created a categorical scale that could encompass the topics specific to the domains we were assessing. Manual coding was preferred when the interview was not structured and context of speech was important.

Fourth, we as a researcher team, acknowledged our own power differentiation and cultural myopia when carrying out IP research in China. Therefore, using our reflexivity in theory construction was critical. For example, when our research assistants encountered a village heavily impacted by HIV, their field notes that day were emotionally laden, and

there were a lot of parallel cognitive processes between the research assistants and the participants. These kind of reflective memos actually serve important data for us to construct cultural theory, because we found that through empathy the researchers may unconsciously mimic the cognitive, emotional and relational profile in the ecological system they in which they were immersed.

Lastly, as a gesture of giving back to the community we investigated, we reached out to some deprived households after finishing data collection. We introduced an organization that helps to sponsor children for education and also provides medical care for those affected with HIV/AIDS. As a parting gift, we also compiled the pictures and videos of them taken the during the interview sessions (with their permission) and edited it into a 30-minute video clip. Then we watched the video clip together with them to gain feedback and ecological validity.

Development of Indigenous Psychology Theories—Ecological Rationality Model

The theoretical framework that guides our quantitative research is ecological rationality (Todd & Gigerenzer, 2012), which posits that cognitive styles shape as well as are being shaped by different types of adaptations in response to the varying environmental demands. This theory is extended by Sundararajan (2015) to explain the difference in cognitive styles across cultures, using strong vs. weak ties as ecological niches to replace the collectivistic vs. individualistic societies/cultures. We adopted and adapted it further to explain the differences between Yi people from Bimo and Christian traditions in the research (Ting & Sundararjan, 2017). The traditional Yi culture stresses the importance of bloodline membership (family clan 家支), which make it characteristic of a strong-ties society. However, Christianity stresses the inclusion of outsiders (the others) into the community as its membership was built on shared belief and faith, rather than familism. The Yi–Christian community thus might possess characteristics of both strong-ties and weak-ties society, according to the ecological rationality model. This hypothesis was validated in our previous study (Ting & Sundararajan, 2017).

Cast in the context of evolution and stated in simplest terms, ecological rationality posits that the cognitive skills of an organism evolved to serve the purpose of its ecological niche as well as shaping said niche. For example, in the ecological niche of the beaver, it is advantageous to

Table 11.1 An expanded schematic comparison between Yi-Bimo and Yi-Christians in terms of ecological rationality, defined as cognition coevolved with the ecological niche

Ecological niche	*Strong ties (Yi-Bimo)*	*Weak ties (Yi Christians)*
Cognitive styles		
Information processing	Perceptual (concrete)	Conceptual (abstract)
Categorizations	Experience-bound	Higher level of abstraction
	In-group versus out-group; natural versus supernatural causes	Church as all-inclusive group: God having sovereignty over all things, natural and supernatural
Cognitive orientation	Physical space (external)	Mental space (internal)
Cognitive effort	Low cognitive effort	High cognitive effort
Psychological variables explored by the psycholinguistic analyses		
Representation of emotion	Implicit	Explicit
	Somatic expressions	Verbal, linguistic, conceptual
Cognitive attribution of suffering	Supernatural causation: external (explanatory power is outsourced to religious experts)	Internal causation: reflective, and invested in one's own explanatory power
Help-seeking (coping) resources	In-group	Both in-group and out-group
	Concrete action: manipulation of external resources, such as religious experts and rituals	Mental action: manipulation of internal resources, such as prayers and singing hymns
Resilience	Both internal trait and state-dependent criteria	Internal traits and ability

build dams, such that beavers have evolved the skills to do so. In our framework of cultural analysis, we posit two basic ecological niches in the remote past of human civilization—strong ties and weak ties (Granovetter, 1973)—each privileging the development of certain cognitive styles (see Table 11.1). For illustration, consider the two different cognitive orientations—internal versus external. Cognitive orientation refers to attentional focus—external focus on the physical space versus internal focus on the mental space. Internal focus is privileged by weak-ties societies, in which one frequently rubs elbows with strangers through trade, whereas external focus on the physical space is privileged

by (some) strong-ties societies, characterized by a sharp in-group and out-group distinction due to the centrality of bloodline-based connections in the sedentary agricultural community.

The cognitive dimensions in Table 11.1 could be seen as a continuum anchored at two extreme ends. Most cultures could fall along this bidirectional continuum to more or lesser degrees. In order to understand the implication of this model, we need to first acknowledge that in the framework of ecological rationality, all cognitive styles are equally useful in the ecological niches which they evolved to function adaptively and creatively. Thus, internal focus is not necessarily better than external focus. Nor does external focus need to have the connotations of superficiality, lack of depth, and so on. Second, while cognitive styles are assumed to be equally useful and adaptive in their respective ecological niches that initially gave rise to and co-evolved with them, cognitive styles do have good and bad consequences—due to historical contingencies. For instance, if the river dries up, the beaver's dam building skills would be useless and might even drain cognitive resources that it could have used for other skills. One important contingency in modern times is globalization, which privileges the weak-ties rationality, which some strong-ties societies may not be prepared for.

To understand how we utilize this model through our analysis on Yi suffering narratives, we introduce our findings in the four psychological concepts in Table 11.1, and present dialogue with the relevant Western theories.

Ecological Rationality Model and Emotion

Emotion is obviously an under-studied topic among the ethnic minority groups in China, as the current scope of emotion research is limited to the developmental aspects of the ethnic minority students (Chen, 2014; Li & Su, 2005; Liu, 2009), and no published study mentioned the emotions of Yi people. While many cross-cultural psychologists have demonstrated that emotions are closely connected to self-construal in different cultures (Kitayama & Markus, 1994), the culture theory they adopted to explain the difference of emotion language was largely based on the independent–interdependent continuum.

In our linguistic analysis on suffering narratives (Ting, Sundararajan, & Huang, 2017), we found that the Yi-Christian group in comparison with the Yi-Bimo group had showed significantly more reports of

emotion lexicons whereas Yi-Bimo group demonstrated significantly more emotion-laden events (narratives of emotional episodes) than the Yi-Christian group. In addition, there were unexpected group differences in difficulty in articulation (awareness of language barrier triggered by the desire to be expressive) and external attribution (words used to describe the environment), in both of which the Yi-Christian used more such words than the Yi-Bimo. To the extent that Yi-Christians have relatively more desire to express themselves, they are more likely to be aware of difficulties in articulation caused by the language barriers (e.g., "I don't know how to say it"). Likewise, the fact that Yi-Christians used relatively more words in describing the external environment than the Yi-Bimo, suggests that the former group is relatively more verbally expressive (preferring the explicit code) than the latter who preferred the implicit code.

While the traditional 'balance of components' model (Ortony, Clore, & Collins, 1990) is correct in that the expression of emotions has to do with the distribution of cognitive resources, our study shed light on Yi people's preference for the concrete and external channels of emotion expression in contrast to Western psychology that privileges verbal, abstract and internal expression of emotion (feeling). Even among the same ethnic group as the Yi people, we found two different modalities of emotion expression that were shaped by their ecological niche and social ties. Hence, we argued that emotion expression is not universal, but rather a dynamic continuum specific to its contexts and sanctioned by cultural norms (Ting et al., 2017). We should listen more carefully to those external and concrete emotion-laden events (e.g., "we have no enough money to see doctor or perform the Bimo ritual") for ethnic minority group such as Yi-Bimo, while acknowledging that they might also learn the internalized set of feeling words while being converted to another religion, like Yi-Christians.

To understand how ecological rationality impacts emotion, we could use the quadrant diagram (see Fig. 11.2) to represent cultural differences in emotion expression. We proposed that cognitive styles of information processing differ along two axes—*A*: experience-near versus experience-distant; and *B*: external/physical versus internal/mental. In the psychology of emotion, the *A* axis is prominent in the cognitive appraisal theory of Scherer (2001), who posits a sequence of emotion processing from sensory-motor (experience-near) to conceptual (experience-distant) levels of appraisal. The *B* axis is emphasized by the structural theory of



Fig. 11.2 Mapping cultures along the axes of cognition

Ortony, Clore, and Foss (1987), who claim that emotion lexicon has an internal/mental rather than external/physical locus of reference. Together, these two axes can be used to differentiate the cognitive styles of cultures.

According to Sundararajan (2015), strong-ties societies privilege an experience-near, perceptual mode of processing; whereas weak-ties societies show an experience-distant, conceptual mode of processing. Within the strong-ties societies, we can further differentiate cultures along the divide between internal versus external orientation—Confucianism privileges the former (Sundararajan, 2015), whereas the Yi-Bimo tradition may privilege the latter. As for the Yi-Christians, they may share with weak-ties society—via Christianity—a tendency to engage in the experience-distant, conceptual mode of processing, with an internal/mental focus. Emotion expression hence is a multi-axial variation that conditioned by its environment and cultural norm. Studies on ethnic minority groups thus could contribute to global psychology from its within-group difference and could enrich culture-inclusive theories on emotion in global psychology.

Ecological Rationality Model and Religious Coping

Traditionally, coping mechanism is seen as the effort for an individual managing and transforming the resources around them (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984). There have been many different coping method

taxonomies in Western literatures—active vs. passive, problem-focused vs. emotion-focused, positive vs. negative, and cognitive behavioral vs. interpersonal and spiritual (O. Harrison, Koenig, Hays, Eme-Akwari, & Pargament, 2001). The term 'religious coping' has become prevalent within the discipline of psychology of religion in the past decade. Numerous scholars have demonstrated that one of the moderators in facilitating positive growth from suffering is a personal religiosity, including religious practice, religious belief and involvement in a religious community (Nooney & Woodrum, 2002; Pargament, Koenig, & Perez, 2000). Yet, all of the religious coping theories mentioned are based on US samples, which are predominantly Christian, and these theories are using 'God,' the deity figure, as reference point. What if a religion, such as the Bimo tradition, does not emphasize the 'relationship with God' or 'unity with the spiritual presence or the universe' as their religious resources or spiritual meaning?

There were only two studies found that included the variable of coping styles among Yi samples, using different measurements and age groups. Wang and Xia (2013b) found that, with increasing age, Yi high school students would adopt more problem-solving methods and more behavioural and physical approaches in order to handle challenging scenarios; in addition, there were gender differences in their coping styles. Zhao, Fu, and Zhu (2008) found that Yi college students' self-confidence level had a significant positive correlation with positive coping styles and concluded that the former factor could predict the adopted coping styles. In both studies, they used student samples, probably because these were the people able to answer Mandarin surveys. The coping styles were defined by Western developed scales, with coping taxonomy from Western psychologists, such as positive vs. negative, emotional-focused vs. problem-focused, behavioural vs. cognitive dimensions. Yet there was no mention of religious coping or communal space in their coping resources, although the Yi are an ethnic group that come from a rich spirituality tradition and family clan network.

In our study (Ting & Sundararajan, 2017), we avoid imposing the word 'coping' and adopt the more neutral term of 'help-seeking,' in order to capture both religious and nonreligious responses, and to further differentiate the internal vs. external manipulation of resources, and the strong vs. weak ties of support network within the Yi people. Since Yi people are, by nature, a strong-ties society, we did not find a significant difference between Yi-Bimo and Yi-Christian groups in terms of

seeking support from the family clan and relatives. We found that the Yi-Christian group utilized the weak-ties networking via church membership more often than the Yi-Bimo group. One unique feature of Yi Christian group was their inclusiveness of the outsiders or strangers as their support network, which was an additional asset in times of turbulence and breakdown of the family network due to modernization and economic re-structuring in rural China. Both groups also sought secular help from sources such as medical professionals, workplaces, neighbors and friends, and governmental welfare.

We also found that these two groups differed significantly on internal vs. external manipulation in help seeking. We found that the Yi-Bimo group preferred manipulation of external resources, relatively more often compared with the Yi-Christian group, who resorted more frequently to manipulation of internal resources. As our model in Table 11.1 shows, in response to suffering events, those who are externally oriented would employ more concrete action (such as hiring a religious specialist to do a ritual) and invested less cognitive effort into problem solving. By contrast, those who are internally oriented would employ mental action (such as prayer) and invested high cognitive effort into problem solving.

By looking at help-seeking behaviors through the lens of social ties, our study challenges the Western notion of coping that has spawned various coping theories pertaining to religious coping at the individual level (O. Harrison et al., 2001). Our study on the Yi minority group confirmed that 'coping' is a culture-laden concept, and there could be at least two dimensions (social ties and cognitive orientation) to consider before constructing a psychological theory that could encompass universal suffering experiences (see Fig. 11.3). In addition, the boundary of social ties is not that strict and inflexible; we found that religion could actually change the boundary of help-seeking.

Ecological Rationality Model and Suffering Attribution

There was only one article found in the Chinese database that studied the attribution style among Yi samples. Wang and Xia (2013a) utilized a Chinese questionnaire posed to Yi high sc hool students that contained four factors of attribution styles: internal vs. external, controllable vs. uncontrollable, localized vs. globalized, temporary vs. permanent. There was an underlying assumption that the internalized, controllable,



Fig. 11.3 Culture and cognitive dimensions on coping styles

globalized and permanent styles were 'healthier' and 'more mature' compared with the other end of the dimension. Hence they recorded higher scores for these factors in Yi male students who were an only child, and who were staying with their parents. As their Yi student sample came from a more urbanized population in Honghe, we doubt that their result finding could be generalized to the wider Yi population in Southwest China who have a lower level of assimilation to mainstream society. Moreover, the higher cognitive effort invested in causal attribution (e.g., internalized, controllable, globalized and permanent) process could be a sign of a weak-ties society, according to our ecological rationality framework (see Table 11.1).

We argued that the cognitive attribution of suffering events differed along the divide between perceptual and conceptual modes of processing depending on the ecological niche. Both modes of processing could be



Fig. 11.4 Dimensions of cognitive styles and suffering attribution styles

'healthy' and 'adaptive' depending on their ecological system. The perceptual mode of processing is concrete, external and experience-bound, which is privileged by strong-ties societies, whereas the conceptual mode of processing is relatively more abstract and internal, and privileged by weak-ties societies. This external vs. internal difference in cognitive orientation can be expected to lead to differences in attributions of causation (see Fig. 11.4).

For instance, in our study (Ting et al., 2017), when asked about suffering, we found that the Yi-Bimo group attributed supernatural causes, such as ghosts, significantly more often than the Yi-Christian group who employed significantly more internal attributions, such as personal sin and fate.

There were unexpected group differences in the agnosticism category, which concerned the extent to which respondents were able or unable to produce philosophical answers to the question of 'why' concerning suffering (i.e., puzzled, not knowing why). As can be expected, the Yi-Bimo scored significantly higher on agnosticism and lower on life review (abstract reflections on life), in comparison with the Yi-Christian group. Although Yi Christians and Bimo communities shared certain secular causal attributions in common (e.g., natural, socio-political, and psychological reasons), they differed in religious worldviews—the Yi-Christian attributed the cause of suffering internally (e.g., lack of faith) and engaged in abstract reflections on and interpretations of life (e.g., fate, God's guidance, and punishment or testing by God), whereas the Yi-Bimo attributed the cause of suffering to external forces (e.g., ghosts, evil spirits) and, when no ready answers were available, were content with 'not knowing' instead of resorting to abstract speculations.

Our study in the Yi ethnic minority group validated the function of situational and externally focused cognitive styles in folk psychology from the ecological rationality perspective. The so-called supernatural or animistic beliefs in Yi-Bimo tradition used to be labeled as 'superstition' (mi xin) by the local Chinese government and their religious practices were banned during the time of the Cultural Revolution. However, if we view their ritualistic practice as a form of perceptual concrete cognitive processing style, we cannot dimiss its importance to the mental health of the Yi people. Rather than pathologizing their externally focused beliefs with regard to the cause of suffering (e.g., ghosts/spirits), the ecological rationality perspective embraces this supernatural form of belief as a normal and healthy form of cognitive functioning resulting from a strong-ties ecology. This is particularly crucial for IP practitioners who have the chance to listen to the stories of suffering of a certain cultural group, and not diagnose them with 'superstition' or as 'backward' when the sufferers use the symbols of spirits and myths. On the other hand, most of the Yi from both religious communities embrace the medical explanation of their illness, without excluding the religious explanation. The acceptance of both supernatural and natural beliefs within Yi-Bimo group also points to their 'hybridization' (Gergen et al., 2018) of both ancient and modern cultures.

Ecological Rationality Model and Concept of Resilience

Through our study, we have heard powerful and touching stories regarding how our Yi interviewees struggled with hindrances and injustice yet still remain resilient in the face of suffering. A follow-up qualitative study carried our by one of our team research members, Luo (2017) in her Masters thesis[5] focused on the HIV/AIDS-affected families also reveal some cultural unique interpretations the concept of resilience. In the past, many scholars have defined resilience as an inner trait that helps an individual to bounce back after a traumatic experience (Werner & Smith, 1992). There is also the concept of family resilience and community resilience, which expand the idea of resilience among aboriginal people to dynamic ecological dimension (Kirmayer, Dandeneau, Marshall, Phillips, & Williamson, 2011; Walsh, 2016). Through Luo's focused group interview with the Yi village leaders, they identified the indigenous concept of '*jian qiang*' (being strong) as a similar concept to resilience. The themes of *jian qiang* consisted of both individual characteristics such as a positive outlook on life, displaying endurance and generosity, being knowledgeable and forgiving and so on, as well as communal characteristics such as a connection with family lineage and history (Luo, 2017).

Where as there are many traditional resources embedded in the Yi-Bimo culture, such as mystery, the healing tradition, the totem of the eagle, heroism, the philosophy of life and death, and solidarity, many agreed that the "Yi people have a tradition of *jian qiang*." While Luo interviewed the Yi pateints with AIDS ($n = 7$) about factors that keep them *jian qiang*, they all mentioned the help received from their family clan (*jia zhi*). This sense of security and acceptance within one's *jia zhi* is a protective factor for these Yi patients with AIDS. Referring back to the ecological rationality framework for strong-ties (Ting & Sundararajan, 2017), the members within this kind of society do not invest in personal development, but rather communal development. Their personhood is embedded in their *jia zhi*, hence the character of *jian qiang* is also dependent on the quality of *jia zhi*. It is different from the individualistic trait on *jian qiang*, though both are contributory protective factors for the vulnerable Yi individuals. Another factor that Luo (2017) found

[5] Supervised by the first author of this paper.

to be a protective factor for the Yi patients with AIDS patient was their sense of obligation to pass down the family lineage through their sons.

Unlike the family resilience model proposed by Walsh (2016), the Yi families affected by HIV did not rely much on the verbal communication and support within the family members during crisis. Not only did the spouse of the AIDS patient became more flexible in their roles and duties, they strove to ensure that their children were healthy and could continue life for their generation. This strong sense of 'passing the family root,' especially through their sons, is the source of their hope despite living under the shadow of death. This dimension on family resilience should be added to Walsh's model which was originally built on a weak-ties society.

Though Luo (2017) found factors for resilience among Yi people that were very similar to Kirmayer's et al. (2011) finding among indigenous people in Canada, there was one unique factor that had never been identified in the previous study, which is the realistic factor—the possession of financial security and physical health. From this reality orientation, we may infer that the Yi's concept of resilience (*jian qiang*) is not internally focused as a static trait so much as an externally oriented effort to continually negotiate with the environment for the optimal outcome; an ability not just to 'bounce back in times of adversity,' but to progress and grow in harsh conditions. This definition is certainly shaped by their ecological niche, and concrete perception, which should be taken into consideration by global researchers who attempt to construct a global theory on the notion of resilience.

Conclusion

Over the past 30 years, ethnic minority groups in China have been used like a testing board for psychological testing instruments or questionnaires developed in the West. In addition, there was still an assumption of 'us vs. them' in grouping all non-Han Chinese together as a cultural group. Though there is still some growing interest among psychologists in China for the study of ethnic minority groups, the selected ethnic groups have been quite narrow (e.g., Uyghur, Tibetan, Mongolian, and Muslims) and the research paradigm have often been directed by political ideology. Mental health issues remain the major topic of studying ethnic minorities in the literature, and the findings often indicated that ethnic minority groups were no different or less healthy than Han Chinese. Therefore, if we follow this trend of noninclusive research in Chinese

psychology, ethnic minorities in China would suffer from the consequence of unfair cultural comparison and over-generalization of ethnic stereotypes by cross-cultural psychology research. Introducing another more inclusive paradigm of doing IP research in China then become an imminent calling to us.

Through our previous study with Yi people on their suffering experiences (Ting & Sundararajan, 2017), we discovered a few psychological concepts that could be explained through the lens of the ecological rationality framework, complementing the existing Western psychology model that priviledges explicit emotional expression, internal manipulation of religiosity, abstract cognitive attribution style, trait-like resilience, and individual coping. Rather than labeling the Yi-Bimo worldview as 'superstitious,' their emotion as 'repressed,' their coping behavior as 'materialistic,' our study removed those stereotypes toward Yi people by honoring their language of suffering within their cultural system. These are the indigenous phenomena that deserve more focused study in future to develop a culture-inclusive global psychology. We believe our research paradigm could be extended to study other ethnic minority groups or indigenous people whose ecological niche is similar to the Yi people in China. Using a mixed-method study, we also employed a 'voice-giving' and 'peaceable' approach to the marginalized Yi participants, in respect to their cultural heritage and uniqueness. The findings shows us that no culture or ethnic group could be immune to the storm of globalization and modernization.

The evolvement of ecology among ethnic groups is of critical importance, especially in a society undergoing rapid economic transformation. Globalization is no longer a descriptive term, but a living force for many ethnic groups in China. For example, a Yi migrant worker could be working for a Korean company in Guangzhou. A HIV virus that originated in Africa could now end up in the Yi Liangshan mountain villages. When we listened to their stories of suffering, we also heard the threat of urbanization and globalization for these migrant workers from ethnic backgrounds. Juggling between their tradition of *jia zhi* and financial demands, their perception towards reality is no longer the simple 'traditional Yi worldview.' They used concrete symbols such as 'no money' to describe their painful emotions, and they counted the numbers of sacrificial animals needed for different religious rituals. If we came from a paradigm of psychology that favored abstract spirituality and higher cognitive functioning, we would overlook the 'monetary counting' as a discrete

emotional expression, but label their religion as 'materialistic' and 'secular.' Therefore, a theoretical framework such as the ecological rationality model that could explain both the macro and micro levels of diversity within an ethnic minority group is highly recommended for the future development of Asian IP.

We echo Bhatia and Priya (2018) that rather than using ethnic minority studies to confirm the scientific truth as the major mission for Asian IP, fostering voices among ethnic minority groups is as important for IP scholars. It is impossible to be objective in the 'truth examination,' if we as IP researchers are ignorant to the hierarchy and implicit power differentiation in our research agenda. Thus, we hope to use our research paradigm among Yi people as a feeble attempt to elicit the local cultural narratives and to amplify the volume of the voiceless. Specifically, we suggest that Asian IP could learn from ethnology and anthropological epistemology that specializes in certain ethnic minority group, before interpreting cultural differences with an existing Western psychology theory. Ethnic minority groups live in a "culture in making" (Gergen et al., 2018) while Asia is going through globalization; hence their voice of suffering is inseparable from the global social issues. We believe that a good IP researcher would cherish their voice and become attune to them for the process of theory-making.

It is the vision of our chapter to give a voice to the indigenous people in Asia as well as honoring their inherent diversities. The 'seed' (paradigm) of this IP study has been planted in the soil of the Yi ethnic group in China, and we need a community of IPs to cultivate it in order for it to sprout and grow into a harvest among Asian psychologies.

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CHAPTER 12

Self-Views of Aging and Well-Being Among Taiwanese Older Adults: The Context of Filial Piety and Living Arrangements

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Self-views of aging are shaped by cultural context and can in turn shape the process of older adults' own aging as well as their well-being in older adulthood (Diehl et al., 2014). In Chinese cultures, individuals embody multiple layers of self-constructs in addition to the individual-self,

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including relationship-, familistic-, and other-oriented selves (Yang, 2006). For Chinese societies such as Taiwan, family has long been the center of daily life. Filial piety provides an age-based set of cultural expectations in Taiwan about how the younger generation should treat the older generation (Kim, Cheng, Zarit, & Fingerman, 2015; Tsao & Yeh, chapter 9 in this series; Yeh & Bedford, 2003). Empirical studies examining the extent to which self-views of aging have implications for older adults in Taiwan are mostly based on theories developed in Western cultures without explicitly incorporating cultural concepts, such as filial piety (e.g., Levy, 2009; Lu, Kao, & Hsieh, 2010). Since the 1980s, Asian indigenous psychology has lead to a greater emphasis in Asian research on how theoretical constructs developed in Western cultures may be translated to local cultures (Yang, 2006). In this chapter, we apply the Asian psychological concept of filial piety in Taiwan to build upon Western theories that describe how contextual resources shape the self-views and well-being of older adults.

The increased reliance on technology along with the rapid speed of social, economic and political development have displaced Taiwanese older adults' traditional roles as sources of knowledge in the family and society (Yeh et al., 2013). Today's Taiwanese older adults have experienced drastic transitions from an agricultural to an industrial society (Lu & Chen, 2002). Previously, individuals worked and resided with extended family members, with younger family members taking care of older family members. Today, younger generations work outside of the family and have less frequent contact with older family members. Increased female labor participation and labor migration have led to family relationships being limited to the nuclear families and increased geographical distances between generations (Kim et al., 2015). Moreover, since the 1990s, Taiwan has undergone a gradual process of political democratization (Yeh et al., 2013). Such social, economic and political trends may have made caring for older parents more challenging for younger generations (Lu & Chen, 2002), and the influence of Western individualism and democracy may have gradually interrupted traditional collectivism and filial piety (Schoenberg & Lewis, 2005). In Western cross-cultural agism literature (e.g., North & Fiske, 2015; Park, Nisbett, & Hedden, 1999), East Asian cultures tend to be hypothesized as having more positive views towards older adults due to the emphasis of collectivism and the Confucian traditional values of filial piety (Ho, 1996; Hofstede, 1980). A recent meta-analysis identified 37 cross-cultural studies and concluded that Eastern countries had significantly more

negative views towards aging and older adults than Western countries (North & Fiske, 2015). Moreover, within regions, the strongest decline emerged in East Asia compared with South and Southeast Asia. To the extent that traditional values of filial piety might still be protective against agism in Taiwan, the erosion of these cultural values may contribute to agist views of aging and diminished health and well-being outcomes for older adults (Allen, 2015; Kim et al., 2015).

In this chapter, we first review the importance of contextual resources for both views of aging and well-being in late life, followed by the contemporary filial piety and living arrangements in Taiwan. Second, we present two studies to examine the dynamics between filial piety, self-views of aging, health and life satisfaction. We discuss the enhancement of a Western framework by incorporating the concepts of self and filial piety distinct to Taiwanese culture.

The Importance of Context for Views of Aging

Our interest in both self-views of aging and well-being stems from the growing body of work showing the linkage between these constructs. Positive and negative beliefs about aging could lead, respectively, to beneficial and detrimental effects on physical, cognitive, psychological, and social outcomes with age (Allen, Mejía, & Hooker, 2015; Hummert, 2011; Levy, Ashman, & Dror, 2000). The Awareness of Aging (AoA; Diehl et al., 2014) model suggests that the process by which individuals construct their beliefs about aging is conditioned by contexts, such as cultures, lifelong experiences and events, socioeconomic factors, and psychological resources. Aging-related constructs, including self-views of aging and views towards older adults, are heuristically conceptualized within the larger superordinate construct of AoA, an “integral psychological process or condition of the aging self” (Diehl et al., 2014, p. 2). Self-views of aging tend to be implicit and are a result of individuals internalizing their age stereotypes as they develop into older adulthood (Diehl et al., 2014; Kornadt & Rothermund, 2011; Levy, 2009). Consistent with lifespan developmental theories (Baltes, Lindenberger, & Staudinger, 2006), self-views of aging are related to long-term outcomes such as health and well-being (e.g., Levy et al., 2000). Whether one has positive or negative self-views of aging could vary by sociocultural context and either enhance or constrict one’s development throughout the life course.

Older adults in Taiwan have been shown to hold relatively positive self-views of aging, especially compared with age stereotypes, which tend to be more negative in most domains (Lu & Chang, 1998; Lu & Kao, 2009; Lu et al., 2010). Lu and Chen (2002) found that in interviews Taiwanese community older adults discussed their positive self-views as being mostly associated with family roles. Because of rich life experiences and values based in filial piety, the older adults believed that, as older members of the family, they could guide and help the next generation. Social and personal resources, such as positive self-views of aging along with coping strategies, social support, and community involvement, have been shown to promote happiness and life satisfaction and prevent depression among older adults in Taiwan and other cultures (Kornadt & Rothermund, 2011; Lu et al., 2010). The extent to which self-views of aging are related to health and well-being has been theoretically hypothesized (Diehl et al., 2014) but not empirically tested in a Taiwanese context. Most existing studies have focused on views of aging as individual differences (e.g., Lu, 2010; Lu et al., 2010), with little focus on incorporating key features of the cultural context. Specifically, contextual resources salient in Taiwan include changes in filial piety beliefs and how they are expressed, which might shape older adults' self-views of aging, associated health, and well-being.

Filial Piety Beliefs and Living Arrangements in Contemporary Taiwan

Within East Asian cultures, filial piety centers on values and norms for harmonious parent–child interactions. Younger generations should unquestioningly respect and support older parents both economically and emotionally (Ho, 1996). Considering the traditional and conservative basis of patriarchal values and the emotional connection between family members, the Dual Filial Piety Model (DFPM) was recently proposed to capture the two dimensions of filial piety: authoritarian and reciprocal filial piety (Yeh & Bedford, 2003; Yeh et al., 2013). Authoritarian filial piety emphasizes the hierarchy of roles based on age and status in Confucian cultures, therefore requiring children's obedience to the absolute authority of their parents. By contrast, reciprocal filial piety emphasizes the motivation of gratitude and close emotional

ties as the foundation for children to provide support to their parents (also see Tsao & Yeh, chapter 10 in this series). Therefore, reciprocal filial piety is more consistent with modern societal values such as democracy and equality. To date, people still consider filial piety to be the core family value in Taiwan but the emphasis has shifted from more authoritative to more reciprocal during the transition towards democracy since the 1990s (Yeh et al., 2013).

One primary expression of filial piety is intergenerational support provision and co-residence living arrangements (i.e., older parents residing with their adult children) (Kim et al., 2015). For example, when comparing Taiwanese adults endorsing more authoritarian versus those endorsing more reciprocal filial piety, those with higher reciprocal filial piety tended to provide more support to their aging parents (Yeh, 2009). Moreover, aging parents provided more household support to their co-residing adult children while those without co-residence provided more monetary support. Poor health and widowhood often triggered the transition to aging parents living with their adult children's families. Adult children may opt to co-reside with their parents if they need help related to child care and housing, especially when their parents are relatively healthy and can provide instrumental support (Chen, Liu, & Mair, 2011; Chu, Xie, & Yu, 2011). The patterns of intergenerational co-residence may depend on parents' and adult children's filial piety beliefs, economic needs and resources.

Filial piety beliefs do not always translate into expressions of intergenerational co-residence. This depends on personal factors, such as parent–child relationships, adult children's employment status, in-law relationships, as well as objective factors, such as income and size of the home (Lu & Cheng, 2012). According to a Taiwanese government survey, the rate of intergenerational co-residence with adult children (aged 35–54 years) and their families is 20.5% in Taipei City, compared with 33.8% in rural Kinmen County (Department of Household Registration, Ministry of the Interior, Taiwan, 2016). Adult children in urban areas may be more likely to live with adult parents for economic reasons related to higher cost of housing (Kim et al., 2015); however, the lower rate of intergenerational co-residence in urban Taiwan may also reflect that these adult children are also more likely to emphasize self-reliance, self-fulfillment, and independence from parents as influenced by Western cultures (Cheng & Chan, 2006).

Whether older adults' filial expectations are met by their children may be associated with older adults' life satisfaction and mental health (Cheng & Chan, 2006). It is known, for example, that in Hong Kong older adults were able to adjust their expectations for filial piety and emphasized the importance of feeling respected by adult children rather than expecting co-residence (Cheng & Chan, 2006). Co-residence status did not contribute to these older adults' perceptions of lack of filial piety or lower well-being. To our knowledge, no studies have examined filial piety beliefs and expressions (e.g., co-residence) along with views of aging in order to understand potential outcomes of well-being among Taiwanese older adults.

The Present Focus

In this chapter, we conducted two studies that examined how the cultural resources of filial piety beliefs and expression (e.g., co-residence) may promote optimal self-views of aging and well-being for Taiwanese older adults. The first study used interview data from a cross-cultural perception of aging study ($N=15$; 40% women; $M_{age}=73$ years; Allen, Ko, Yeh, & Hooker, 2015) to explore how older adults shaped self-views of aging in relation to the changing sociocultural context. The research questions for Study 1 were: How do older adults' contextual resources in Taiwan, in particular expectations of filial piety and living arrangement with adult children, shape their self-views of aging? How do older adults' opinions on modern filial piety beliefs influence their aging experiences? Informed by the first study, the second study utilized Taiwan Social Change Survey 2011 data from 425 older adults (50% women; $M_{age}=73.46$ years) to further investigate how authoritarian and reciprocal filial piety values (Yeh & Bedford, 2003) and co-residence belief may be associated with self-rated health and life satisfaction.

Study 1—Method

Data for the cross-cultural perceptions of aging study were collected in a west coast city in the USA and in Taipei, Taiwan, between 2012 and 2013 ($N=175$; Allen, 2015). Qualitative data used in this study were from the 15 older adult participants, who volunteered for the follow-up interviews.

Sample

Interview participants aged 65 or older were recruited from an Elder Community University, and two community centers, and a local park where older adults usually gather during the day in Taipei City, Taiwan. Table 12.1 shows demographic information of our sample. Participants ranged in age from 67 to 86 years and included 9 men and 6 women. In total, 63% were married at the time of interviews, 6% were divorced, 25% were widowed, and the others indicated other marital situations. Nine participants rated their health as “good” or “excellent,” five “fair,” and one “poor.” The majority had completed high school or junior high

Table 12.1 Demographic characteristics of sample (*N*=15)

	N	*M (SD) or (%)*	*Compared with the overall older adult sample (N=175) (%)*
Age (years)	15	73.40 (6.03)	73.18 (6.34)
Gender			
Male	9	60	41
Female	6	40	58
Self-report health			
Excellent	2	13	10
Good	7	46	38
Fair	5	33	43
Poor	1	8	9
Marital status[a]			
Married	10	63	67
Divorced	1	6	5
Widowed	4	25	25
Other (e.g., living with partner)	1	6	3
Educational attainment			
College	2	13	21
High school	5	33	20
Junior high school	4	27	16
Other	4	27	36
Employment status			
Retired	12	86	70
Homemaker	2	14	25
Employed full time	–	–	< 1
Employed part time	–	–	3
Unemployed	–	–	2

[a]These categories were not mutually exclusive

Note Due to rounding or small amounts of missing values percentages might not add up to 100

school education while two had college degrees. The demographic characteristics of the interview sample ($N = 15$) matched the overall survey sample ($N = 175$; Allen et al., 2015), with the exception of there being more male participants (60% in interviews vs. 41% in surveys) and more retirees (86% in interviews vs. 70% in surveys).

Interview Data Collection

Semi-structured interviews were conducted for approximately 1–2 hours at a location comfortable for the participants. Interview questions were designed to provide an understanding of how political, social and economic developments, through their impact on family dynamics, shaped the perceptions of aging in Taiwan. Questions were organized in three sections: background information, family, and experiences related to age stereotypes. Interviews were conducted either by the first author, the third author in English with a bilingual Mandarin translator, or a Taiwanese undergraduate research assistant. A copy of the interview protocol was shared with the participants at the end of the interviews.

Data Analysis

All of the interviews were audio-recorded and transcribed by the research team. The first author verified that the translation from Mandarin to English reflected the interviewees' intent. The first and fourth authors analyzed the data independently using a grounded theory approach (Charmaz, 2014). They read the interview transcripts and listened to the recordings several times to immerse themselves in the data. Data were initially open coded by the two coders independently to capture the participants' ideas regarding their views of aging and the contexts associated with their views. The coders discussed the codes they identified, compared their memos, and then created key codes that were then applied to focused coding with the aid of Dedoose, software for qualitative data analysis. The process of focused coding enabled in-depth comparison of the codes, which allowed conceptual links between categories of codes to be drawn, including self-views of aging, views of older adults in general, societal views of older adults, family living arrangements and filial piety. The two coders discussed the discrepancies in codes and categories until they finally reached a consensus. Pseudonyms were used for the participants presented in the results.

Results

Eager to share their aging experiences, older adults in our interviews aided our understanding of how their self-views of aging were related to their cultural context of filial piety and well-being. They expressed the importance of good health for their positive self-views of aging and their expectation of not becoming their children's burden. They focused on aging experiences within traditional family co-residence and societal changes. Furthermore, how they adjusted their filial piety beliefs to the generational changes they overserved in the current society was a salient theme across the interviews. The changes they discussed ranged from family and school education to overall society, all as a result of the broader social changes of modernization, democratization, and technology advances. As they navigated the generational changes, older adults reflected on how younger generations, including their adult children, could not uphold traditional filial piety responsibilities, such as taking care of older adults and obeying their commands. They adjusted to the changes in modern Taiwanese society by relaxing their expectations around authoritarian filial obligation and increasing their flexibility for reciprocal filial piety.

"I Still Think I Am Young at Heart": Contextualizing Self-Views of Aging

Most older adults shared positive self-views of aging, except for two older adults. Older adults attributed their 'young at heart' attitude to their good health, especially to being mobile and physically independent. For example, A-Jao cheerfully shared her views of aging:

> Even though I am in my 60s, I still think I am young at heart. I could communicate and play with people from a wide range of ages, like one year old to 80 something. I think this is great grace from God. (A-Jao, female, 68 years old)

They also independently arranged their daily activities so that their adult children did not have to worry about them. For those who were in their 70s or 80s or had overcome a major illness, their acceptance of being old was more explicit. In fact, they discussed how they were ready to embrace the end of life.

> When you become 70s [or] 80s you are aging really fast, and we are sort of like ready for this… embrace the end. So we just do exercises and stay healthy. When you grow old you just have to pay attention to your body condition, and actually we don't have any expectation. (Chia-Kuo, male, 71 years old)

With good health, some participants enjoyed volunteering for other older adults, which also contributed to positive self-views of aging. When participants discussed their self-views of aging, they compared themselves with older adults in general. Even though they might not view other older adults as positively as they viewed themselves, they shared some key reasons as to why they had such positive self-views. A-Mei thought population aging could be a problem because older adults were no longer productive. She believed many older adults to stay at home and do nothing. However, she saw herseld as different from older adults in general in that she was open-minded and outgoing, participating in many activities and classes designed for people at her age.

Two participants had negative self-views of aging. They both discussed how older adults were not valued in the current society because they were not needed by the younger generation anymore, both in family and societal contexts. The factors that had contributed to their negative views of aging were not explicitly discussed. However, they firmly believed it was normal for younger people and older people to not like one other. They seemed to have limited opportunities to interact with younger generations.

For most of our participants, being open-minded and content with themselves as well as being able to interact with family members related to positive self-views of aging. For the two participants who held negative views of aging, they believed that age segregation explained the worthlessness of being old.

"Our Health Is the Source of Our Children's Happiness": Being Healthy as Most Important

The importance of health for self-views of aging was evident throughout the interviews. The participants not only emphasized the importance of good health for their own perceptions of self in old age but also for avoiding burdening their children. With their cumulative life experiences,

keeping themselves healthy seemed to be the only thing over which they had control. Consistent with their self-views of aging, their health-related concerns were also embedded in their family context. For example, Chia-Chung shared his motivation of keeping healthy for his adult children:

> After I retired… I got sick, I also have to go to the hospital for an operation. I also get depressed… I been through lots of different stages, but it comes around, I can sort of deal with it, and so I've become better now. For now, I think I should use every single minute to laugh. I don't know how many times I laugh, but I try to enjoy that… If we are not getting sick, we are in a good condition, physical condition, the kids will be more relieved, they will not have to be as concerned about their parents. Our health is the source of our children's happiness… The children can do what they want to do and the parents can be proud of that, and the parents won't become a burden of them. (Chia-Chung, male, 75 years old)

When asked to identify the most important thing for older adults like themselves, health was a top priority. Remaining healthy and not becoming their family's burden seem to motivate them on a daily basis. The intersection between personal health and family orientation suggests Taiwanese older adults' self-views of aging are embedded in family context.

"An Older Adult at Home Is Like Having a Treasure at Home": Living with an Adult Child's Family

Ten participants were living with their adult children's families whereas three were living with their spouses but remained geographically close to their adult children's families. Only two were living alone due to personal choice. For many of them, living with adult children was harmonious; satisfaction with the intergenerational interactions was the focus of their commentary. Although they reflected on the differences between their adult children and themselves, these differences were necessary in response to the changes in societal norms that had occurred over time between the two generations. For example, family mealtime varied to fit the grandchildren's formal school and busy schedules that included participation in additional structured study programs in the evening (e.g., cram school).

> Because we live together, we usually would eat together, but the timing varies. It could be in the early evening or late evening… so they [the grandchildren] will need to go to cram school for many skills, and the two grandchildren are at different ages, so they have different English classes. Before we only need to memorize the formula or something to perform well in school, but now for the children, they need to learn how to apply it. The parents are thinking, um, the children could not lose at the beginning. If this is a race, they could not lose. (A-Pei, female, 66 years old)

By contrast, living in facilities was considered to be unacceptable although the participants were aware there would be an increasing need for care services with an population aging. For example, when Chia-Ba, an 86-year-old male, was sick years ago, he decided to move back to Taiwan by himself from Japan, where his wife and adult children's families still reside to this day. He lived alone in a senior living community with support from the universal health insurance. However, if he could choose, living with family would still be the best choice for him. He thinks that gradually Taiwan will become similar to Western countries where more older adults live in nursing homes or otherwise separate from their families. But currently in Taiwan, fewer people send their older parents to nursing homes because it is not considered acceptable by the general public. Even though he said it would eventually become more acceptable to place older adults in institutions, he did not think this was good because "an older adult at home is like having a treasure at home."

The findings suggest that most aging parents continued to endorse the traditional value of filial piety that they should live together with their adult children's families—with the condition of mutual agreement. Regardless of their living arrangement, whether living with adult children or not, participants generally maintained positive emotional and physical connections with their adult children's families.

"The Younger Generation Wants Freedom": Reflecting on Generational Changes

The participants all shared their observations in generational differences. There were three main changes from the participants' generation to younger generations, including: (1) nuclear family structure and less

emphasis on respecting elders in the family, (2) academic-oriented school education, and (3) societal trends in terms of the advances in technology and stress in the labor force. For example, Chia-Li thinks today's children do not listen to their grandparents because the generations are not living together as before. In his opinion, the younger generation is also becoming more independent financially and knowledgeable compared with the older generation who grew up in an agricultural society.

> Grandpa and grandma [used to have] power… he said something and no one would say no. Right now, most family would not obey the grandparents. Right now is small family… Old families, no matter 40 almost 30, were [living] together. And the other reason is the younger generation is independent. You get a job. You get money. You don't need [to listen to the grandparents]. [It's] just natural. (Chia-Li, male, 67 years old)

The other social change in families is lower fertility (Silverstein & Giarrusso, 2010). Chia-Ba explained that people are having fewer children now so they tend to over-protect and spoil them. This is likely to contribute to younger generations only thinking about themselves but not caring about older adults. On one hand he did acknowledge the inevitable competitiveness in modern society, which forced families to focus on children's academic performance more but not how to respect older adults. On the other hand, he thought that the value placed on freedom that has emerged from Western culture has influenced the younger generations, but they do not understand the true meaning of freedom. He described this as follows:

> Back in time the family might teach the kids to show respect to older adults, but nowadays, they don't. It's rare to see a situation like that… the environment is changed, and back in time we were more conservative… we didn't have that much information coming from Western culture, or the foreigner culture, and since the Western and foreign cultures have the most important effect on us… the idea of freedom, like now the people will say 'I have the right… I should have the freedom.' But the truth is, they don't understand the true meaning of freedom. They only use the word to do whatever they want to do. They become ego-centric, and when anything comes to them against their will, they just sort of tell their parents, and the parents will just help them, too. (Chia-Ba, male, 86 years old)

Similarly, A-Bao illustrated how the value of freedom in family and education has created a big problem in how the younger generation views the older generation. For her generation, at school they were taught to respect older adults, not to fight back, and not to have differing opinions. Today's children feel they have much freedom. As a result, they become ego-centric and rebellious and do not know how to show respect to older adults. The idea of the media creating bad examples for the younger generation was brought up in various interviews. Nevertheless, older adults reasoned about the necessity of such generational changes by sympathizing with the increasing family and work stress felt by the younger generation.

In general, we found that older adults accepted these generational changes because they considered them to be inevitable societal trends. Indeed, many have found ways to maintain connections with their adult children and grandchildren by sharing mealtimes, traveling, or having conversations.

"It Doesn't Seem They Need to Obey Me": Adjusting to the Changing Norms of Filial Piety

The participants discussed the traditional norms of filial piety in terms of obeying older adults, physically and financially taking care of older adults, and emotionally caring for older adults (Kim et al., 2015; Yeh et al., 2013). A distinct theme that emerged from participants' discussion of filial piety is how, as they have developed into older adults in modern Taiwan, they have adjusted to the social changes in filial piety. Consistent with their comments on generational changes, they do not think the current younger generation would be willing and able to fulfill these filial piety norms to the extent that their own generation obeyed and cared for their aging parents and parents-in-law. For example, A-Guan, a 67-year-old woman, shared her current experiences.

A-Guan: Before with my parents, we needed to listen to whatever the parents wanted… We needed to obey them—but now my children have much more freedom. They might not listen to my advice.

Interviewer: How do you feel about that change?

A-Guan: It's the trend. It's the societal trend.

Interviewer: So, there's an increasing portion of the population that is 65 years of age and older in Taiwan. What do you think is the attitude toward that development?

A-Guan: Because of economic hardship in the current society, the younger generation, they probably cannot afford taking care of the children at the same time as taking care of their older family members. The burden on the government, on the whole society, is larger than before. Because our generation tended to save for retirement since we were young, and we got pensions for ourselves, [with the economic hardship] I think that the children probably could not afford taking care of their parents.

The participants demonstrated how they had adjusted their own expectations as a result of their younger generation's family and work responsibilities in the context of the broader societal trend towards freedom and individualism. Even though the younger generation did not obey the older generation as much, the participants generally felt satisfied with their own families. As long as they felt respected by their children, filial piety was still being practiced sufficiently in the family. Therefore, older parents seemed to be maintained as the authority figure. Moreover, open communication was seen to be key for resolving conflicts in filial piety between younger and older generations and both generations should collaborate in order to make their relationships better. The participants discussed that they did not want to and could not constrain their children like their parents' generation did. For example:

> In my parent's generation they were more authoritarian. It's like you need to obey them. But in my generation [with] the relationship with the kids, I could not do that anymore. I need to be a little bit easy going and not have as much authority as my parents. (Chia-Wen, male, 67 years old)

As grandparents, some participants discussed being more proactive in terms of interacting with their children's families, especially with grandchildren.

The consensus among our participants was that the younger generations do not have the same strength of filial piety as their own generations and prior generations. Our participants have adapted to the change by framing it as a societal trend and by maintaining closeness and open communication with their children. They seem to find a balance in the self-views of aging between a healthy and supportive aging parent in the family and a more independent older adult in the society.

Discussion

The interviews explored Taiwanese older adults' self-views of aging in the cultural contexts of filial piety. Specifically, changes in beliefs and expressions of filial piety were discussed as they reflected on experiences and views of aging. First, the majority of our participants held positive self-views of aging, consistent with the overall sample in the same survey study (Allen et al., 2015) and other community older adult samples (Lu & Chang, 1998; Lu & Kao, 2009; Lu et al., 2010). Positive self-views of aging were discussed in relation to their roles in family (Lu & Chen, 2002). Importantly, our participants further explained how their self-views of aging were contingent on physical health in that they valued being independent and emphasized taking physical care of themselves in order to reduce burden for their adult children. Although causal relationships cannot be determined, our participants focuses more on how their health influences self-views of aging, adding insight to the theorized direction between views of aging and developmental outcomes (Diehl et al., 2014). Future studies can examine how self-views of aging and health influence each other over time.

Second, self-views of aging should be explored in the family context. Two participants demonstrated distinct cases, suggesting how negative self-views of aging were related to intergenerational interactions. These participants believed there is a natural divide between younger and older generations. They did not have close relationship with their adult children and grandchildren, nor did they reach out to younger adults outside of their families. Such a stark contrast from the majority of participants further highlight the importance of family for older adults' self-views of aging.

Lastly, our participants had renegotiated traditional filial piety beliefs to adjust to societal changes, like the majority of Asian families (Kim et al., 2015). They articulated the generational changes in filial piety that emphasized authoritarianism less, individual freedom more, and reciprocity more. Changes in filial piety included less obedience to older adults, less physical care for aging parents, and less frequent intergenerational contact. They attributed these changes to the smaller family size and nuclear structure, more emphasis on academic performance in school education, and modernization. Nevertheless, they accepted the changes as an inevitable societal trend. They demonstrated how they had adjusted themselves to these generational changes in filial piety.

This is consistent with the increasing evidence that children's fulfillment of filial responsibilities depends on their abilities and resources and that Chinese parents are willing to lower their expectations of filial piety and even give instrumental or financial support to their children, in addition to receiving support (Cheng & Chan, 2006; Chong & Liu, 2016). The significance of family as an integral unit to Taiwanese older adults seems to buffer any negative effects of the aforementioned societal changes (North & Fiske, 2015). To many of the older adults, filial piety might not be as strong as before, but their families still maintained filial piety to a satisfying degree.

The majority of our participants were living with their adult children's families whereas only a few lived separately and they remained close emotionally, if not geographically. They tended to discuss their living arrangements as being a mutual agreement between their adult children and themselves (Kim et al., 2015). Being able to fulfill their preference of intergenerational living arrangement and to maintain a healthy balance between their own social circles and their adult children's seemed to contribute to their positive self-views of aging. This finding supports the shift from authoritative towards reciprocal filial piety (Yeh et al., 2013) and further expands our understanding of how older adults adjust to such changes. By attributing the changes of filial piety beliefs and expressions to external factors (e.g., an inevitable societal trend) rather than internal factors (e.g., the older or younger generation's problem), they are able to maintain their positive aging views and experiences. Culturally, self-views of aging among Taiwanese older adults are highly contextualized in families. Our participants demonstrated adjusting their expectations of filial piety according to the generational changes in families, education, and society. Importantly, with age, their self-views of aging were contingent on their health. Therefore, in Study 2 we draw from a Taiwanese national dataset to examine the extent to which filial piety and adjustment of co-residence value predict older adults' health and life satisfaction.

Study 2

Using the 2011 Taiwan Social Change Survey (2011 TSCS phase six, wave two), Study 2 investigated whether filial piety beliefs and perceived belief adjustments of living arrangement are associated with older adult participants' well-being. In this study, the dual filial piety

model (DFPM) was used to capture individuals' general sense of obligation to interact with their parents. A variable of "perceived adjustment of intergenerational co-residence belief" was created as an attempt to tap older adults' ability to notice differences of the intergenerational co-residence belief between generations. A traditional belief regarding living arrangements in Taiwan maintains that grown children, preferably sons, should live with their older parents. Participants were asked about which family members should co-reside with their older parents based on a parents' view and a child's view, respectively. A more modern adjustment of this value is to report a more traditional view about co-residence under a parent's view (i.e. older parents should live with their sons) and a less traditional view under a child's view (i.e. older parents do not need to live with their children).

Based on findings from Study 1, we hypothesized that older adults with a stronger sense of authoritarian filial piety were more likely to report worse well-being while a stronger sense of reciprocal filial piety would be associated with better well-being. We also hypothesized that a more modern perceived adjustment of co-residence value would be associated with better well-being.

Study 2—Method

Sample

Data were from the 2011 Taiwan Social Change Survey, phase six, wave two (2011 TSCS; Institute of Sociology, Academia Sinica, Taiwan, 2011; released in 2015). The 2011 TSCS consisted of 2135 adults (48% women, 52% men) aged from 19 to 96 years (mean age = 47.75 years). Participants were interviewed using a structured survey during July 2011 and May 2012. The completion rate was around 63%. The demographic statistics of the selected sample were comparable to the 2011 national demographic statistics (Department of Statistics, 2017).

To be consistent with the age of participants in Study 1, we selected participants aged 65 years and older from the 2011 TSCS. The final sample included 425 adults (50% women; M_{age} = 73.46 years) (see Table 12.2). The median monthly income of this sample was less than 10,000 New Taiwan Dollar (NTD), which is equivalent to the median monthly income of the older population in Taiwan (Directorate General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics, Executive Yuan, R.O.C, 2011).

Table 12.2 Background characteristics of participants ($N=425$)

Variable			
	M	*SD*	*Range*
Age	73.46	6.49	65–96
Number of children	4.09	2.14	0–14
Household income[a]	3.03	2.10	1–23
Self-reported health[b]	3.19	1.08	1–5
Satisfaction with family life[c]	3.90	0.81	1–5
Reciprocal filial piety[d]	3.81	0.36	0–4
Authoritarian filial piety[d]	3.11	0.72	0–4
Adjustment of value[e]	−0.17	0.96	−2–2
	Proportions		
Women	0.50		
Co-reside with children	0.65		
Marital status			
Married	0.63		
Widowed	0.31		
Divorced	0.02		
Separate	0.01		
Cohabiting	0.01		
Single, never married	0.01		
Education			
Illiterate	0.24		
Literate, no formal education	0.05		
Elementary school	0.43		
Middle school	0.09		
High school	0.12		
College and above	0.07		

[a]Income rated from 1 = none to 23 = more than NT $300,000 monthly

[b]Self-reported health rated from 1 = *very bad* to 5 = *very good*

[c]Satisfaction with family life rated from 1 = *very unsatisfied* to 5 = *very satisfied*

[d]Filial piety: mean scores of four/five items rated 0 = *unimportant* to 4 = *absolutely important*

[e]Adjustment of value: difference between two items rated: 1 = *parents do not need to live with their married children/it depends on children's opinion*; 2 = *parents take turn to live with every married child/parents live with one married son or daughter*; 3 = *parent take turns to live with every married son/parents live with one married son*

Measures

Self-Reported Health

Participants reported their own health status on a 5-point scale of 1 (very bad) to 5 (very good).

Satisfaction with Family Life

Participants reported their satisfaction with their family life on a 5-point scale (reverse coded; 1 = *very unsatisfied* to 5 = *very satisfied*).

Filial Piety

The short-form nine-item dual filial piety scale (Yeh & Bedford, 2003) was used. This scale included five authoritarian filial piety items and four reciprocal filial piety items. Each item was rated from 0 (not important) to 4 (definitely important). The mean scores for authoritarian and reciprocal filial piety were computed separately. The Cronbach's α was .67 for authoritarian filial piety and .73 for reciprocal filial piety.

Perceived Adjustment of Traditional Co-residence Value

Regardless of whether participants considered themselves to be parents, they answered the following two questions: (1) based on a parent's point of view, how should parents and their married children arrange their place to live?; and (2) based on a child's point of view, how should parents and their married children arrange where to live? To tap into whether participants adjusted their views about coresiding responsibilities or not, we recoded responses into three categories so that larger numbers meant more traditional beliefs: 1 = *parents do not need to live with their married children/it depends on children's opinion*; 2 = *parents take turn to live with every married child/parents live with one married son or daughter*; 3 = *parents take turns to live with every married son/parents live with one married son*. The item about the children's view was then deducted from the item about parents' view. The difference between these two items thus represents the older adults' perception of difference between parental views and children's views. Participants who shifted from more traditional parental views to less traditional children's views received higher scores (e.g., answer 3 (from parental view)—answer 1 (from children's view) = 2). Participants who perceived no difference received a score of 0 (e.g., answer 3 (from parental view)—answer 3 (from children's view) = 0). Finally, those who perceived parents to have

less traditional views and children to have more traditional views received smaller values (e.g., answer 1 (from parental view)—answer 3 (from children's view) = −2). Consistent with Study 1, we refer to this difference score as the perceived 'adjustment' of this traditional co-residence belief between generations.

Control Variables
Participants' gender was coded: 0 = *women* or 1 = *men*. Participants reported their monthly personal income from 1 (none) to 26 (10,00,000 NTD or more). Finally, co-residence with children was coded: 0 (not co-residing with children) or 1 (co-residing with children).

Analytic Strategy

The analysis relied on ordinary least squares regression (OLS). Because authoritarian and reciprocal filial piety showed a median correlation (see Table 12.3), we centered these two variables and included the interaction term in the model. Therefore, participants' self-reported health and satisfaction with family life, the two outcome variables of interest, were each regressed on authoritarian filial piety, reciprocal filial piety, the interaction of authoritarian and reciprocal filial piety, and perceived adjustment of co-residence value. Control variables included gender, income, age, and whether living with adult children.

Results

OLS regression models indicated that perceiving a belief adjustment from more traditional views as parents to less traditional views as children was associated with higher satisfaction with family life (see Table 12.4). Consistent with our hypotheses, stronger authoritarian filial piety was marginally associated with worse health. Moreover, higher reciprocal filial piety was significantly associated with better satisfaction with family life. However, the interaction effect between authoritarian and reciprocal filial piety was significant: high reciprocal filial piety was associated with high family life satisfaction, regardless of authoritarian filial piety. By contrast, when reciprocal filial piety is low, participants who reported higher authoritarian filial piety reported lower family life satisfaction than those with lower authoritarian filial piety (see Fig. 12.1).

Table 12.3 Correlations for study variables ($N=425$)

Variables	*1*	*2*	*3*	*4*	*5*	*6*	*7*	*8*	*9*
1. Self-reported health[a]	–								
2. Satisfaction with family life[b]	0.25**	–							
3. Reciprocal filial piety[c]	−0.06	0.17**	–						
4. Authoritarian filial piety[c]	−0.15**	0.02	0.42**	–					
5. Adjustment of value[d]	−0.02	0.12*	−0.03	0.10*	–				
6. Gender[e]	0.03	0.00	0.03	0.00	−0.05	–			
7. Income[f]	0.21**	0.14**	−0.03	−0.23**	−0.04	0.17**	–		
8. Age	−0.14**	−0.09	−0.06	0.04	0.01	0.01	−0.06	–	
9. Co-residence with children[g]	0.11*	0.03	−0.07	0.04	0.17**	0.01	−0.10	−0.09	–

Note *p < .05, **p < .01

[a]Self-reported health rated from 1 = *very bad* to 5 = *very good*

[b]Satisfaction with family life rated from 1 = *very unsatisfied* to 5 = *very satisfied*

[c]Filial piety: mean scores of four/five items rated 0 = *unimportant* to 4 = *absolutely important*

[d]Adjustment of value: difference between two items rated: 1 = *parents do not need to live with their married children/it depends on children's opinion*; 2 = *parents take turn to live with every married child/parents live with one married son or daughter*; 3 = *parent take turns to live with every married son/parents live with one married son*

[e]Gender: 0 = *women*, 1 = *men*

[f]Income rated from 1 = none to 23 = more than NT $300,000 monthly

[g]Co-residence with children: 0 = *not co-reside*, 1 = *co-reside*

Table 12.4 Ordinary least squares regressions predicting self-reported health and satisfaction with family life ($N=425$)

	Self-reported health			*Satisfaction with family life*		
Predictors	*β*		*SE*	*β*		*SE*
Intercept	4.40	***	0.63	4.62	***	0.46
Adjustment of value[a]	−0.02		0.06	0.11	*	0.04
Authoritarian filial piety[b]	−0.16	+	0.09	−0.06		0.06
Reciprocal filial piety[b]	0.11		0.22	0.65	***	0.16
Interaction of two filial piety terms	0.16		0.16	0.25	*	0.12
Control variables						
Gender[c]	−0.03		0.11	−0.01		0.08
Income[d]	0.09	**	0.03	0.04	*	0.02
Age	−0.02	**	0.01	−0.01		0.01
Co-reside[e]	0.21		0.11	−0.04		0.08
F	4.10	***		4.30	***	
Adjusted R^2	0.05			0.06		

[a]Adjustment of value: difference between two items rated: 1 = *parents do not need to live with their married children/it depends on children's opinion*; 2 = *parents take turn to live with every married child/parents live with one married son or daughter*; 3 = *parent take turns to live with every married son/parents live with one married son*

[b]Filial piety: centered mean scores of items rated 0 = *unimportant* to 4 = *absolutely important*

[c]Gender: 0 = *women*, 1 = *men*

[d]Income rated from 1 = none to 23 = more than NT $300,000 monthly

[e]Co-reside: 0 = *not co-reside*, 1 = *co-reside*

$^{+}p = .07$. $^{*}p < .05$. $^{**}p < .01$. $^{***}p < .001$

Discussion

Study 2 investigated the association between traditional Taiwanese values and well-being using a national sample of Taiwanese older adults Findings suggested that the sense of reciprocal filial piety functions differently from that of authoritarian filial piety (Yeh, 2009; Yeh & Bedford, 2003; Yeh et al., 2013). The literature from Western studies regarding why adult offspring provide support to their older parents usually considers filial obligation to be a single concept. In this sense, authoritarian filial piety is similar to filial obligation due to their normative features. People who feel obligated to engage in a behavior may find doing that behavior unpleasant (Shultz, Morton, & Weckerle, 1998; Van Petegem, Aelterman, Rosseel, & Creemers, 2007). Similarly, in this study, we found the trend that older adults who reported a stronger sense of authoritarian filial piety



Fig. 12.1 The interaction of two types of filial piety (FP) with satisfaction with family life as the dependent variable

tended to report worse health as well. By contrast, based on the solidarity theory (Bengtson, Giarrusso, Mabry, & Silverstein, 2002; Kim et al., 2015; Silverstein, Parrott, & Bengtson, 1995), reciprocal filial piety can be mapped onto relationship quality with parents and reciprocity of support, which are the main reasons for intergenerational support behaviors (Grundy, 2005; Schwarz, Trommsdorff, Albert, & Mayer, 2005; Silverstein, Conroy, Wang, Giarrusso, & Bengtson, 2002). Studies on filial piety in the Eastern Asian cultures, however, suggest there may be an obligation derived from intergenerational relationship quality and reciprocity of support (Yeh, 2009; Yeh et al., 2013). Such reciprocal obligation may function as a protective factor to prevent the negative function of authoritarian filial piety, as suggested in this study. Future studies should explore whether the derived obligation is associated with individuals' actual support behaviors and well-being in late life.

This study also found that older adults who changed their co-residence beliefs were likely to report better well-being. The theory of control (Heckhausen & Schulz, 1995) suggests that in old age, individuals tend to utilize secondary control due to gradual loss of primary control. Losing a sense of control entirely may result in negative emotion and even depression. Therefore, when actively changing the environment is not possible, lowering one's own expectations may avoid the loss

of control. Indeed, in Study 1, participants frequently mentioned that their adult children may not perform the high-standard traditional filial behaviors. They thus adjusted their filial expectations of their children. Furthermore, Study 2 showed that older adults who lowered their expectations regarding intergenerational co-residence reported better family life satisfaction.

Finally, intergenerational co-residence is one of the traditional beliefs in Taiwanese society (Kim et al., 2015). Older adults who live with their adult offspring may feel satisfied with fulfilling cultural expectations (Silverstein, Cong, & Li, 2006). However, this study revealed that older adults who actually lived with their adult children did not report significantly better health or family life satisfaction. It is possible the intergenerational co-residence belief has weakened (Kim et al., 2015; Ogawa, Retherford, & Matsukura, 2006). Moreover, living together with adult children's family entails adjustments of lifestyles and conflicts with family members (Ko, 2012). Therefore, intergenerational co-residence may not guarantee a better quality of life.

General Discussion

It is critical to understand self-views of aging in context (Diehl et al., 2014). Guided by the Asian indigenous psychological perspective (Yang, 2006; Yeh & Sundararajan, chapter 1 in this series), in the first study we found Taiwanese older adults discussed their self-views of aging in relation to their family, in particular, their adult children. Our result contributes to the framework in Western psychology that generally considers self-views from an individualistic point of view. In Taiwan, one of the East Asian cultures, older adults view their aging selves as part of their families, suggesting a multidimensional perspective to the self-views of aging. Although researchers have classified cultures based on whether they are individual- or group-oriented to be individualistic or collectivist, respectively (see Markus & Kitayama, 1991; North & Fiske, 2015; Triandis, 1995), with the emergence of indigenous research it is suggested that both individualism and collectivism may co-exist in the same culture (Owusu-Bempah & Howitt, 2000). Indeed, there are individual-, relationship-, familistic-, and other-oriented selves among the Chinese (Yang, 2006). The individual-oriented self refers to one's interaction with oneself, similar to the Western culture's concept of self. Moreover, domains of interpersonal interactions with others, with family

(or members in a intimate group), and with generalized others, form the distinct characteristic of social orientation in the Chinese self. Our Taiwanese older adult sample contextualized their self-views of aging as relevant to themselves as individuals, interactions with others and, especially, family members, and the general societal views of older adults.

The idea of "culture in the making" instead of "cultures in a static state" (Gergen, chapter 4, in this volume) was demonstrated in that the emphasis on authoritarian filial piety has shifted to emphasis on reciprocal filial piety (Yeh, 2009). This shift is consistent with the cultural movement towards modernization in the contemporary Taiwanese society as well as individuals' own choices to adapt to these societal changes. Taiwanese older adults were aware of generational changes in filial piety. Importantly, they showed strength in adjusting their own beliefs of filial piety to accommodate such generational differences. Consistent with the existing research on filial piety in Taiwan (e.g., Yeh, 2009), it is not that there is less prevalence of filial piety beliefs but rather that reciprocal filial piety is being emphasized more in families. As such, living with adult children's families has become a mutual negotiation between older and younger generations, rather than merely adhering to the traditional norms of authoritarian filial piety. Their discussions on filial piety suggested the co-existence of expectations for authoritarian and reciprocal filial piety (Yeh, 2009), or broadly the Chinese psychological traditionality and modernity (Yang, 2006). Traditionality refers to submission to authority, filial piety and ancestral worship, conservatism and endurance, fatalism and defensiveness, and male dominance, whereas modernity refers to egalitarianism and open-mindedness, social isolation and self-reliance, optimism and assertiveness, affective hedonism, and sex equality (Yang, 2006, p. 301). That is, reciprocal filial piety is more consistent with the modern societal values such as democracy and equality (Yeh & Bedford, 2003; Yeh et al., 2013). Based on the interviews, our findings shed light on how older adults de-emphasize their expectations for authoritarian filial piety and traditionality but proactively emphasize reciprocal filial piety and modernity. For future studies examining filial piety in a Chinese cultural context, our result suggests the importance of assessing both authoritarian and reciprocal filial piety rather than blending both dimensions with collectivism or traditional Chinese culture.

The survey findings from Study 2 consistently indicated the different functions of authoritarian and reciprocal filial piety, which related to worse self-reported health and better life satisfaction, respectively.

When intergenerational relationships were based on age, for example, with the suggestion that adult children needed to respect and obey older adults simply because they were older, even older adults who should have received the benefit of authoritarian filial piety suffered from a worse health status. Similarly, when family members emphasized the emotional closeness rather than the status associated with age, it contributed positively to older adults' family satisfaction regardless of whether high authoritarian filial piety coexists. However, when low reciprocal filial is present, high authoritarian filial piety further deteriorates older adults' satisfaction with family (Yeh et al., 2013).

One of the prominent expressions of filial piety are the living arrangements (Kim et al., 2015). The findings from these two studies consistently suggest that Taiwanese older adults were able to adjust their views of intergenerational co-residence. To fit into the broader societal trend and take into consideration the work and family situation of their adult children's generation, the older adults in the interviews did not view intergenerational co-residence as strictly as their prior generations did. Our interpretation of this form of adjustment in filial piety beliefs as adaptive is supported in that those who were able to adjust their views of intergenerational co-residence tended to report higher life satisfaction. In fact, our interview participants discussed their living arrangement as a result of mutual understanding between their adult children and themselves. When examining the effect of cultural contextual factors (Diehl et al., 2014), such as intergenerational living arrangements and contact frequency, on self-views of aging for societies endorsing filial piety beliefs, studies should incorporate participants' views of intergenerational co-residence in addition to their actual living arrangements. This is consistent with the Chinese familism, including cognitive, affective and behavioral components (Yang, 2006). By incorporating the domains of Chinese self and the beliefs and practices of filial piety into self-views of aging, future research can adopt a more culturally appropriate conceptualization to better understand the interplay between cultural contexts and views of aging (Yeh & Sundararajan, chapter 1 in this series).

Limitations and Future Direction

There are three main limitations in our studies. First, cross-sectional datasets are limited in providing causal information. For Study 1, we are not certain whether participants' self-views of aging determined their

perception of their own health, or vice versa—even though the participants discussed how they would likely view themselves as "old" if they experienced a decline in health. For Study 2, it may be that older adults in worse health needed more support, and therefore reported a stronger sense of authoritarian filial piety.

Second, regarding the co-residence, Study 1 participants discussed how it is increasingly impossible to live with their adult children's families given the societal trend of modernization and globalization. In Study 2, the participants might respond to co-residence beliefs from the general population's perspective rather than specifically considering themselves as the parents or the children stated in the questions. Future studies should ask participants directly whether they adjust their filial expectations and expression, such as co-residence belief and actual living arrangement, and how such adjustment and beliefs of filial piety are related to their self-views of aging. Taken together, we can conclude that the older adults in the interviews implied adjusting their filial expectations to meet their adult children's generation's needs in different aspects in life. Moreover, the older adults who adjusted their co-residence belief that it is not necessary for the younger generation to live with the older generation tended to have better life satisfaction.

A third limitation is that it is challenging to examine the co-existence of authoritarian and reciprocal filial piety quantitatively in order to tease out the mechanisms of authoritarian and reciprocal filial piety on health and life satisfaction. Future studies should interview participants' views of authoritarian and reciprocal filial piety, how having both beliefs functions in their relationships with adult children, and the underlying process that both beliefs have on well-being in late life. Given the importance of authoritarian and reciprocal filial piety in Taiwan, incorporating these beliefs would enhance the understanding of how Taiwanese older adults develop self-views of aging.

In Taiwan, social changes due to modernization and globalization are changing the dynamics of family development in late life. Researchers have just begun to examine views of aging in Taiwan from different age groups, but few studies have explicitly examined the effects of the indigenous contextual factors, such as cultural values of filial piety and intergenerational living arrangements, on views of aging among older adults. This chapter incorporated the cultural context of filial piety with a Western theoretical model (Diehl et al., 2014) to examine how self-views were related to these cultural contextual factors, followed by how beliefs

and co-residence beliefs influenced Taiwanese older adults' well-being. In contrast to the Westernized theoretical perspective, which conceptualizes self-views of aging as individualistic, it is clear that the interviewed Taiwanese older adults' self-views of aging are contextualized in their families as being part of the collective self. Furthermore, the follow-up population survey study demonstrated the distinct effects of co-residence beliefs and dual filial piety dimensions (Yeh & Bedford, 2003; Yeh et al., 2013), on older adults' health and life satisfaction. To better elucidate the implications of self-views of aging in culturally sensitive ways in the Taiwanese cultural context, future studies need to consider familial contexts of beliefs and expressions of filial piety.

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PART IV

Conclusion

CHAPTER 13

Asian Indigenous Psychology: Emerging Possibilities

Louise Sundararajan

Since our access to Asian indigenous psychology (IP) is necessarily incomplete, due to the fact that many indigenous psychologists publish in their local languages, the goal of this volume is not comprehensive inventory-taking so much as demonstrating some exciting and significant possibilities in the field. In this concluding chapter, I highlight the following possibilities that are essential for the development of Asian IP: global awareness, self-reflexivity, and contribution to a more equitable global psychology. But, first of all, why do we need Asian IP?

Why Asian Indigenous Psychology?

Why do we need Asian IP, when there is already a flourishing Asian psychology? Asian psychology refers to a 'movement' in which Asian psychologists strive to have an expanding role in the field of psychology, which is dominated by a Western influence. And like the proverbial model Asian, Asian psychology is reaching this goal through hard work

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and perseverance. In an essay entitled *Asian Psychology Coming of Age*, Kitayama (2007) reports that Asian psychology has contributed greatly in the last two decades to the theories and database of psychology.

Asian IP is no less ambitious. However, it takes a more critical stance toward mainstream psychology and it strives for a more equitable global psychology. The prevalent model of global psychology is basically an expanded version of mainstream psychology, in which Western psychology serves as the blueprint for global development, with non-Western psychologies, such as Asian Psychology, working out some local details. From the perspective of IP, this model of global psychology is not feasible, because it continues the hegemony of the West, which determines both research interests as well as the norm of performance (Bhatia, 2002), thereby posing an intrinsic constraint on the potential contributions of non-Western cultures to psychology.

Toward a GPS-Based Global Psychology

GPS is used here as an acronym for two potentially inter-related ideas: (1) global positioning system, and (2) good psychological science—the former, I propose, may be considered as the basis for the latter. This GPS-based version of global psychology tracks the social/historical and epistemological underpinnings of all psychologies, thus rendering them all, including Western psychology, local or indigenous. This attests to the insight of Yang (1997) that global psychology cannot be an expanded version of any particular IP, but is rather an emergent phenomenon different from all the contributing IPs. Only when a psychology is aware of its roots in culture and history does it become a good candidate for true collaboration in the global community of psychologies.

In this emergent global psychology, to practice good psychological science (GPS) is for Asian IP to situate itself in the global positioning system so as to see both its own unique position and the global picture at once. This is by no means an easy task. Psychology is an identity fraught with contradictions. It claims to be concerned with universal laws like physics, on the one hand; and yet on the other, it is inextricably embedded in history and culture in terms of both its subject matter as well as its method of investigation. This split between the universal and the particular can be healed by GPS. The GPS for psychology is not based in outer space, so much as in consciousness—that of self-reflexivity.

Self-Reflexivity

Self-reflexivity in psychology refers to the reflexive consciousness that renders visible the cultural and historical roots of its science (see Sundararajan, 2015). A case in point are the multiple attempts in this volume to define and redefine culture and IP. Gergen et al. (Chapter 3) and Bhatia and Priya (Chapter 2) emphasize the continuously unfolding process of culture to deconstruct its reification. Similarly, the definition of IP is the object of much critical reflection. Bhatia and Priya (Chapter 2) present an incisive critique of the 'mainstream' IP, and along the way clarify what is and is not IP; Chiu et al. (Chapter 5) take issue with one popular version of IP, namely Kim and Berry's (1993) emphasis on "of the local, by the local, and for the local" (for another criticism, see Jahoda, 2016). Ting et al. (Chapter 11) further argue for the vital importance of self-criticism in the field. As for the essential attributes of IP, there are a number of proposals: Gergen et al. (Chapter 3) suggest a hybrid, an "in the making" cultural identity; Chiu et al. (Chapter 5) recommend open-mindedness and creativity; Ting et al. (Chapter 11) and Bhatia and Priya (Chapter 2) advocate for commitment to social justice.

Contributions to a More Equitable Psychology of Tomorrow

As envisioned by the contributors of this volume, Asian IP is not simply application of psychology for local use but is more primarily an intellectual movement around the globe, a movement sustained by critical thinking and self-reflections on what psychology is about for the local as well as for the global community. Thus, this volume contributes to the meme pool of psychology in a unique way—it paves the way for a more equitable global psychology of tomorrow.

New Narratives

What "the exilic, the marginal, subjective, migratory energies of modern life" (Said, 1993, p. 334) needs is a new narrative. Giving priority to new visions and narratives, this volume opens with three new ways of doing psychology. Bhatia and Priya (Chapter 2) call for a paradigm shift from the representation of culture to fostering voice; Gergen et al. (Chapter 3) advocate for a shift from "what is" to "what could be"—from prediction

and control to shaping the future; Paranjpe (Chapter 4) recommends a careful analysis of the fundamental principles of cultural paradigms, and demonstrates the heuristic value of a shift in cross-cultural comparisons from behavioral to ontological and epistemological analysis.

Critical Appraisals of Mainstream Psychology

The authors in this volume capitalize on indigenous cultural categories (Sundararajan, 2014) as basis for their critique of assumptions in mainstream psychology. Based on the Japanese notion of being ordinary (*futsu*), Ohashi and Yamaguchi (Chapter 8) make a stringent critique of the widely accepted self-esteem theory (Heine et al., 1999) in cross-cultural psychology that reinforces cultural stereotyping of the Japanese as the antithesis of the self-aggrandizing West. Based on their insight into the Chinese sensitivity to social norms, Chiu et al. (Chapter 5) call into question the personality bias in mainstream psychology. Based on the ancient traditions of Indian spirituality, Bhawuk (Chapter 7) makes a stringent critique of Western theories of creativity. Based on the Chinese notion of *quanxi* (particularistic ties), Bedford (Chapter 10) calls into question the universal applicability of the Western model of trust in the workplace. Based on an in-depth analysis of the ontological, epistemological and ethical framework of Yoga, Paranjpe (Chapter 4) exposes the cultural and historical roots of Skinner's behaviorism, thereby rendering the latter an IP like any other.

Knowledge Production Outside the Western Framework

Using religion as an example, Rosch (2002) identifies the asymmetrical claims of science as the main factor that prevents the two-way flow of knowledge between science and culture—as she puts it, "modern psychology, like modern politicians, seems able only to talk *at* religions rather than to listen to them" (p. 37, emphasis in the original). Lamenting the one-way flow of knowledge, Rosch (2002) wonders whether science can afford to continue to allow:

> … the understanding of the human mind to be left solely to the pre-existing conceptualizations and latest fashions of our incipient psychology, with no contribution from the thousands of years of worldwide religious practice and observation? (p. 38)

Redressing this imbalance in psychological knowledge, this volume is an attempt to showcase Asian psychologies that go beyond the framework of Western psychology in researching the ontological/epistemological, ethical and spiritual dimensions of the mental life.

Chiu et al. (Chapter 5) point out how IP, as an alternative viewpoint to mainstream psychology, contributes to theoretical innovations. A case in point is their theory of normology, of which the source of inspiration is derived from the Chinese tendency to align their behavior with the perceived social distributions of values and beliefs in a group. Perceived social norm is also an important factor behind the Japanese super-ordinary bias. Debunking the stereotype of Japanese modesty, Ohashi and Yamaguchi (Chapter 8) have made a nuanced analysis of the positive connotations of being ordinary among the Japanese. One such positive connotation is a shared similarity with others—a judgment probably based on perceived representations of how widely shared a certain idea or value is in a group, if normology is right (Chiu et al., Chapter 5).

Relationalism (Hwang, 2000) is the bedrock of Asian cultures. Unsurprisingly Confucian filial piety has been the subject of much research. Yeh's influential dual model of filial piety is introduced by Tsao and Yeh (Chapter 9), and further elaborated on by Ko et al.'s (Chapter 12) novel application to an investigation of the connection between well-being and self-views of the elderly in Taiwan. Outside the family, Confucian relationalism (Hwang, 2012) also impacts on the modern work life. Bedford (Chapter 10) makes a nuanced analysis of the Confucian notion of *guanxi* (particularistic ties) to propose a new model of trust in business. Bor-Shiuan Cheng has made a great contribution to the research on parternalistic leadership, which, like garlic, turns out to have both fans and critics in the field of management. Taking the bull by the horn, Lin et al. (Chapter 6) review the extensive literature on parternalistic leadership, clarify the potential misunderstandings, and make recommendations for future research and practice of this uniquely indigenous leadership style. There is also a spiritual dimension to the work life, a dimension that is foregrounded by Bhawuk's (Chapter 7) theory of creativity, which derives its inspiration from the Indian traditions of spirituality. How do we accommodate all these different theoretical frameworks and research agendas? Paranjpe (Chapter 4) reminds us that different epistemological universes are complementary. Capitalizing on an insight that may have its roots in polytheism, Paranjpe (Chapter 4) suggests that truth can be plural, a claim that cuts against the grain of monotheism.

At the level of coarse grain analysis prevalent in cross-cultural psychology, almost all the chapters in this volume can be lumped under the category of collectivism—which is nothing new. What is new here are the multifaceted nuances of relationalism—shades of gray that are visible only to the researchers who are steeped in the local culture. Fostering the insider's sensitivity to subtle variations, IP opens up a space where there is freedom to indulge in the local nuances, without the pressure to average them out in the service of the group aggregates of collectivism vs. individualism. What the contributors of this volume bring are fruits of this intellectual freedom that loom large in Asian IP.

Asian Indigenous Psychology in the Larger Context of Indigenous Psychology

How does Asian IP relate to the larger context of IP? To answer this question, I present the results of the Delphi Poll recently conducted by the Indigenous Psychology Task Force.

The Delphi Poll

To assess the current status and future developments within the field of IP, a Delphi Poll was conducted on the international members of a research network, the IP Task Force, which has been in existence since 2010 for scholars around the globe to exchange information on IP.

The Survey

The Delphi Poll technique is one form of expert forecasting that consists of multiple (in our case two) rounds of survey. In the first round, identified experts answered questions regarding their assessment of a particular subject—in this case, IP. This is followed by the second round where the responses from the first round are aggregated into a more objective form with the average responses shown in order to obtain a second assessment and work towards convergence. The poll consisted of two types of questions—quantitative and qualitative. One is on a Likert scale, which can be checked off quickly; the other raises open-ended questions for reflection. In combination, these questions can help to get a clearer sense of where the IP field is going, and where it needs to go.

The Participants
The IP Task Force is a heterogeneous group, consisting of cross-cultural, cultural, indigenous psychologists, and non-psychologists, such as anthropologists and sociologists. What holds this group of scholars together is their concern and interest in moving the field of IP forward.

Timeline
In 2012, the Delphi Poll Committee was formed to generate a questionnaire. The committee, chaired by Louise Sundararajan, consisted of five members: Fred Leong, James Liu, Dharm Bhawuk, Peter P. Li and K. K. Hwang.

The survey was conducted twice:

- 1st round, 2/1/2013 to 10/20/13: 72 out of a total of 115 members of the IP Task Force participated.
- 2nd round, 2/15/15 to 6/15/15: 49 out of a total of 163 members of the IP Task Force participated.

Results
Since the questionnaire and results of the Delphi Poll are posted online (http://www.indigenouspsych.org/Discussion/forum/Archives/PDF/Delphi%20Poll%20analyses%20by%20Louise%20Sundararajan.pdf), a summary shall suffice here. Quantitative analysis, conducted by Kuan Hui Yeh, revealed no significant difference between the two rounds. Qualitative analysis, conducted by Radhika Sundararajan, revealed two major themes: first, rejection of the hegemony of Western psychology; and second, issues of diversity. The first theme showed no change across the two rounds. The second theme showed a slightly different emphasis—the first round focused on diversity; the second round on the tension between the particular and the universal.

Continuities and New Developments

Viewed against the backdrop of the survey on IP conducted by Allwood and Berry (2006) a decade ago, the Delphi Poll results revealed both continuity and new developments in the field.

Continuity
The main themes found in the study of Allwood and Berry (2006) also loom large in our survey: rejection of the hegemony of Western mainstream psychology; importance given to the local context; development

of more appropriate, context-sensitive theories and methods; the tension between the universality and the specificity of psychology; and the enormous heterogeneity in the field of IP.

However, The Delphi Poll results also suggested some new reflections and responses to old issues.

Self-Reflexivity

The absence of self-reflexivity is one of the charges made by Bhatia and Priya (Chapter 2) against "mainstream" IP. Indeed, self-reflexivity was not found in the responses collected by Allwood and Berry (2006). By contrast, the Delphi Poll evinced much critical self-reflection on almost all issues brought up by the questionnaire. For instance:

> *We need to be careful not to get caught up in differentiating between Western and indigenous psychologies to the extent that indigenous psychology becomes more of a reactive psychology…* 1st round

> *The need to define ONE indigenous psychology rather than accepting many local definitions is a problem.* 2nd round

> *We may be our own worst enemy.* 2nd round

> *Perhaps diversity is both our strength and liability.* 2nd round

The search for new solutions was also evident:

> *This particular approach to diversity fosters the vision of a global psychology that embodies unity in diversity—a unity that transcends blood and soil; a diversity that celebrates epistemological differences among cultures and even within the same culture.* 1st round

> *I think we need to work toward an approach that is inclusive, but not so inclusive to become meaningless. To accomplish this, we need to allow for change within indigenous approaches and what could be considered new indigenous approaches. We also need to avoid having any litmus test items that must be adhered to in order to be considered a true indigenous psychology.* 2nd round

New Responses to Old Issues

One thread that runs through all narratives of IP from past to present is the hegemony of Western psychology. It is also on this issue that we see some relatively new developments. To elaborate on this point, we pull together the qualitative and quantitative data.

According to the qualitative analysis of our survey, response to the problem of marginalization, as a result of the hegemony of Western psychology, focuses on two issues—the relevance and visibility of IP. Consistent with this are the results of our quantitative analysis, which indicate that two areas with the highest projected increase in importance were **theory building** (necessary for relevance) and **definition of IP** (necessary for visibility). Note that this projected emphasis on conceptual developments—theory and definition—forms a sharp contrast to the claim in Allwood and Berry (2006) that Eastern IPs are "intensely practical" (p. 263).

Indeed, conceptual issues seem to have received unprecedented attention in this survey. This is evident in the following analysis of the problem of marginalization:

> *The Western scientific model does not question itself, [or] recognize that it possesses a unique worldview and values that accompany that worldview. Thus, this limits the perspective toward recognizing the importance of this area [IP].* 2nd round

It is also evident in the following reflection on the need for qualitative methods:

> *IP and cultural studies necessarily require deeper exploration at the conceptual level through qualitative methods before they can be tested at the broader level through quantitative methods.* 2nd round

As for the need for improvement in the definition of IP, there is much reflection on its conceptual issues:

> *It is not really a coherent movement because it does not share a core sets of goals or ideas about what it IS so much as it shares ideas about what it is NOT* (Western mainstream). 1st round
>
> *Cultural identity versus national identity versus ethnic identity are all being lumped into indigenous psychology. If we embrace a multiple identities of IP, then we are also embracing a not so 'concise' definition of IP.* 2nd round
>
> *The murky definition of indigenous psychology is a key one. I suspect that there are lots of rifts and fissures among those who fall under that rubric. I'm pretty sure that there are latent disagreements that will turn out to be pivotal.* 2nd round

It may come as no surprise, then, that in the following reflection, developments in theory and definition are recommended as solutions to the problem of marginalization:

> *[We need] articles, books, etc. that show how 'accepted' or 'mainstream' models, theories, explanations, definitions can be expanded, improved, changed with indigenous concepts … [thereby] getting mainstream readers, editors, etc. to realize that they are missing something.* 1st round

Projected Trajectories of IP

Will an investment in theory building contribute to the relevance and visibility of IP? An affirmative answer is supported by the following cluster of projected areas of improvement: importance given to **theory building** was strongly and positively correlated (at p 0.001) with **perceived need** for IP (r (72) = 0.54), **Citation** (r (72) = 0.53), academic **positions** (r (72) = 0.53), and with the need for IP to **differentiate itself** from other related disciplines (r (72) = 0.50). It is worthy of note that the projected importance given to **theory-building** is closely associated with the projected **self-identity of IP** (the need for IP to differentiate itself from related disciplines). This forms a sharp contrast to the fact that a decade ago the need for IP to differentiate itself from cross-cultural psychology was not in evidence in Allwood and Berry's (2006) investigation.

Will importance given to the **definition of IP** contribute to the increase of relevance and visibility of IP? A tentative answer is in the affirmative, as evidenced by the following cluster of projected areas of improvement: importance given to the **definition of IP** was strongly and positively correlated (at $p < 0.001$) with academic **positions** (r (72) = 0.54), with IPs contribution to the formulation of important **research questions** (r (72) = 0.51), and with **workshops** on IP (r (72) = 0.48). The fact that projected advancement in academic **positions** is strongly and positively ($p < 0.001$) correlated with projected importance given to both **theory-building** (r (72) = 0.53) and the **definition of IP** (r (72) = 0.54) is noteworthy. In conclusion, according to the forecast of the survey, it will literally pay—in terms of academic positions—in the next ten years to invest in the conceptual development of IP, such as theory building and the definition of the term 'IP'.

A Concluding Forecast

In conclusion, the results of the Delphi Poll suggest that the scholarship showcased in this volume on Asian IP seems to foreshadow the future directions of IP. More specifically, three dominant themes in this volume—self-reflexivity, the definition of IP, and theory construction—have been identified by the survey as important future directions for IP. One issue that is the topic of much self-reflection in the survey is the heterogeneity of IP. While it frustrates any critic's attempt to get a concise definition of IP, diversity is essential for the future development of this field. To the extent that evolution is not possible without variability, the heterogeneity of Asian IP, as evidenced in this volume, augurs well for new and exciting developments in the evolution of this field. Since these emerging possibilities in Asian IP can neither be predicted nor explained by Jahoda's (2016) static, consistency-based model of IP, we may conclude with a prediction as envisioned by the Vedic sages:

> There are so many dawns that have not yet broken. (Rig-Veda, V. 8 4–6)

This volume heralds one of the many dawns yet to break on the horizons of Asian IP.

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